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INTRODUCTION
This summary is divided into three major sections: the problem or
restraint side of productivity, positive programs used by companies for
improving productivity, and a discussion of several strategies that tackle the
challenging task of increasing productivity on a continuing and comprehensive
basis.
PRODUCTIVITY RESTRAINTS
Based on the analysis of plant level questionnaires (61 in number) plus
a review of extensive information from other sources about the industrial
relations components of the productivity problem, we identified three major
themes: resistance to change, reduced worker motivation, and inhibiting work
rules. (See Table 1.)
1. Resistance to Change - By far the most important and pervasive
factor is resistance to change. The phrase does not apply as much today to
outright opposition to new technology (only 5% of the firms mentioned this as
a significant problem), rather to the resistance to adopting new work
arrangements and to aligning the social organization to the requirements of
the technology. For example, new technology is being used extensively in the
office, but management is finding it difficult to do away with unnecessary
labor.
Since resistance to change prevents the organization from using its
technical capabilities to the fullest, it represents the biggest drag on
i
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TABLE 1
Productivity Restraints Identified by
Respondents to Plant Survey
Number of Times Identified
As a Restraint
Resistance to Chane .
*worker/supervisor resistance to change 43
first-line supervisory resistance 2
adapting to change 1
uncertainty of change 1
Motivation
*absenteeism 37
attitudes 4
work ethic 1
union-management relationship 1
Work Rules
*subcontracting 21
*crew size 19
*seniority 30
contractual restraints/work rules 11
Paid Time Off
*paid time off 34
Government Regulations
*OSHA regulations 25
other government regulations 5
Business Conditions
limited resource dollars 8
volume 2
lack of sufficient information systems 1
product complexity 1
behind in technical improvements or equipment design 3
Training
insufficient training programs 5
lack of technical personnel 2
Other
outdated incentive pay systems 1
inability to perform time studies 2
Job security 1
work stoppages 1
overtime 1
turnover 1
*Restraints listed on questionnaire
productivity. While we do not have any precise estimates, nevertheless, based
on the examples that were presented in the survey, we would estimate that the
impact on labor productivity over a period of several years could be as large
as 40 or 50 percent.
2. Reduced Motivation - This factor represents the least important of
the three broad themes. The gap that exists because a work force is not well
motivated might range at any point in time between 15 and 25 percent -- the
range that wage payment systems or other direct reward arrangements seek to
eliminate.
One of the problems most frequently mentioned under the general heading
of motivation is that of absenteeism where plants estimated that this
restraint increased work force levels between two and fifteen percent.
3. Work Rule Restraints - This subject was frequently mentioned,
especially for plants where unions were present. The type of work rule
problem evident today falls more in the area of deployment of workers on a
flexible basis. (The examples often mentioned in the literature, such as crew
size problems -- what was termed in the 1960s as the "featherbedding" issue --
and the craft demarcation problem are apparently not as troublesome today as
they were in the past.) We estimate that the work rule problem may impact
negatively labor productivity in the range of 15 to 25 percent.
The conclusion about the negative effect of work rules (and indirectly
the role of unions) needs to be placed against academic research which has
found that productivity is generally higher in the presence of unions. This
finding diverges from the experience of management and from the evidence in
our survey. Our attempt to reconcile research with practice runs as follows:
-- Productivity can be as high or higher in a unionized operation as
long as the operations are stable and the volume is on a large
scale. Indeed, the work rules, and the generally higher division
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of labor that is found in a unionized plant, may produce higher
productivity if the volume and stability are present.
However, with the need to alter the scale and character of
operations, work rules become an inhibitor to the redeployment of
labor that is necessary.
Work rules also emerge in a nonunion plant. Indeed, the principle
of seniority is often used with as much weight as in unionized
operations. However, management finds it easier to make the
exception and to bring to play other considerations such as worker
qualifications; and consequently the deployment of labor is usually
done on a more flexible basis in a nonunion plant.
While work rules can be a limiting factor to the achievement of
full productivity, "times are changing" and through productivity
bargaining and labor management committees, many of the inhibitors
are being revised.
POSITIVE PROGRAMS
Before summarizing the major programs being used by corporations for
improving productivity, we should acknowledge some organizational and
measurement efforts underway to move productivity much more to the center of
the corporation.
One of the most visable new areas of emphasis is productivity
measurement and control. In the past year or so, many large corporations have
established a position of "productivity czar," a person responsible for
monitoring overall productivity growth for the corporation and instilling
productivity awareness throughout the organization. Usually this new position
reports to either the president or vice president, typically in the functional
areas of planning, budgets, or operations (also, but less prevalent, in
industrial relations or human resources).
Also included in this renewed interest in productivity is a widespread
implementation or revision of corporate productivity measurements. Several
corporations are using, or are in the process of developing, multi-factor
measurements. However, the majority continue to use traditional forms of
iv
II
labor productivity measurement, such as man hours/unit, units/employee, or
revenue/employee. Whatever the measurement, an increased corporate emphasis
and extensive communication campaigns have led to an enhanced sensitivity
toward the productivity subject in most corporations.
SPECIFIC PROGRAMS
At this point we would like to summarize the variety of programs that
are being practiced by corporations: (See Table 2)
1. New Technology - Perhaps, the most effective program for improving
productivity has been the introduction of new technology, especially into
manufacturing operations. As mentioned previously, many corporations are also
automating the office, but as yet, this has not been found to be as effective
for improving productivity.
2. Human Resource Management Techniques - For the growing white collar
area of employment, companies have been resorting to methods of analysis and
control such as head count management and effectiveness scrutiny (wherein
staff analysts probe whether a particular function is necessary and if so how
it might be donemore productivity.) Also, in this area would be various
programs for controlling absenteeism, although, by and large, companies have
not found that traditional "carrot and stick" methods are making much of a
difference in lowering absenteeism.
About two-thirds of the corporations have experimented with flexible
hours but none placed it in the effective category and about half rated it at
the bottom of the list. This suggests that these efforts to create a more
flexible arrangement for the work force do not help productivity, although
they may be popular with the employees.
V
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TABLE 2
PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS
(29 Respondents to Corporate Survey)
NUMBER OF TIMES SPECIFIC PROGRAMS WERE MENTIONED
Used By
Corporation
Management Methods:
Practices/Tools
Job/Organization Redesign
Absenteeism Control/Employee Assistance
Flexible Hours
Training:
Involvement:
Quality Circles
Labor-Management Committees
Opinion Survey
Communications Program
Employee Involvement
Reward Systems:
Wage Payment System
Awards/Suggestion Programs
Productivity Bargaining:
Technology:
Office Automation
Manufacturing Automation
Other New Systems
13
21
23
16
28
Most
Effective
Top Three
8
6
3
12
19
12
17
5
6
14
10
3
3
1
1
4
6
3
28
25
18
7
4
12
6
vi
Least
Effective
Bottom
Three
1
3
11
8
3
2
8
2
3
2
5
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VInnovations in shift arrangements, weekend shifts, and setting up
12-hour work patterns have been more advantageous from the corporation's point
of view in that they make it possible to get full utilization of capital and
equipment.
By far, the most successful positive program in the human resource area,
and indeed across all of the positive programs, is training. All but one
corporation mentioned it as a key program and 12 placed it in the top three
for effectiveness. In addition to skills type training, many corporations
have sponsored short courses to enhance substantive knowledge.
3. Employee Involvement - This subject covers a number of important
topics and developments. A key mechanism is that of communication which aims
to place relevant information in the hands of workers on the assumption that,
once confronted with the need to improve; change will take place.
The formation of labor-management committees looks promising, even
though it is too early to evaluate their effectiveness. As one of the
respondents from a major manufacturing company noted: "Labor-management teams
are not important 'yet' as compared to reduction in size of the work force or
manufacturing automation."
A particular form of labor-management collaboration is the technology
committee and there are important examples existing in the automobile
industry. The purpose of these committees is to insure that the introduction
of technology enhances quality of work life and that unions and workers are
sufficiently informed and given a chance to discuss the impact of new
technology.
Quality Circles have become a very big development. Some large
corporations have hundreds of these circles in existence and the number across
industry would be in the tens or perhaps hundreds of thousands. Typical
savings have been estimated to approximate $50,000 per circle.
vii
Nevertheless, they are still not ranked as effective by comparison to other
programs for improving productivity.
In general, quality of work life which includes quality circles,
autonomous work groups and a variety of other ideas for tapping the know-how
of workers about operations is a development that appears to be with us in
full force. A number of precepts or guidelines are important:
a. Management will have to relinquish its monopoly on knowledge. This
may mean a loss of power and control and the diffusion process will
take time.
b. Decisions will take longer to make. This will be a function of
both the added time to convey necessary information to all decision
makers as well as the slower process of group decision making.
c. In order to make the program succeed considerable training and
education will be required at all levels of the organization. This
will cost both time and money.
d. Most likely resistance will develop. This may require special
training or the need to replace middle or lower level managers who
are unable or unwilling to adopt the more participatory supervisory
style.
4. Wage Payment Systems - It would apear that there is substantially
increased interest in contingency compensation, that is, directly relating pay
to performance. Corporations are using a variety of ways of focusing
attention on the benchmark or the standard to be beaten, such as
subcontracting prices or costs that exist in similar plants.
A variety of arrangements are being used and developed to bring about a
tighter linkage between pay and performance. Gainsharing plans which are
becoming much more widespread appear to increase labor productivity (a one
shot effect) by approximately 17 percent.
Profit sharing possesses the advantage of only sharing awards when the
performance of a particular organization is better than its counterparts -- a
very strong economic argument for this form of wage payment.
Suggestion systems are used extensively although their results and
management's ranking of them for overall value is not as high as would be
viii
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Uexpected. Aproximately two-thirds of the companies surveyed had some type of
formal company-wide suggestion program. The monetary award ranged from $10 to
$100,000 based on a sharing of between 10 and 25 percent of the first year
savings. However, only two of the companies listed suggestion systems as an
effective productivity program. This can be amplified by the fact that, for
those companies that provided results information, the savings per employee
averaged about $50 per employee per year.
A recent study of Japanese suggestion systems indicated that in 1980
they experienced a suggestion rate of 12.8 suggestions per employee. On a
very limited comparison base, our survey indicated a yearly rate of
approximately 0.1 per employee. However, select success stories in this
country can be found to surpass the Japanese rates.
5. Reorganization of Work - With this topic we come to the subject of
productivity bargaining. Basically, the rationale for this program is to
bring about a realignment of the internal work organization to the
requirements of the technology and the marketplace. In tabulating the content
of concession agreements (another current development) approximately 30 to 40
percent of these agreements deal with changes in work rules. Generally
speaking, organizations have followed the "buy out" rather than the more
open-ended, organizational change approach to improving productivity through
collective bargaining.
Productivity bargaining should not be utilized unless the gap that
potentially can be eliminated through this process is sufficiently important
to make a difference for the viability of the enterprise over the foreseeable
future. Too often companies have engaged in productivity bargaining, achieved
results and then subsequently shut down or cut back the operations --
resulting in substantial bitterness and dismay that comes when people "were
asked to do their part, make a contribution, and then were let go."
ix
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Productivity bargaining works best when the practices to be changed can
be identified and they can be removed by agreement of the parties. Work rule
changes certainly fall into this category.
The closer the productivity agreement can be fashioned to the operations
involved, the better the results. Agreements that state broad principles at
industry level often do not bring about any changes in actual practices.
Thus, plant-by-plant agreements are more effective.
The kinds of rewards that are given depend upon the circumstances. In
many situations today, the real reward is survival of the plant and this can
be a very powerful incentive; and nothing else may be needed if management is
in a position to say that it will keep a given plant open assuming it gets
certain kinds of changes. Where survival is not the motive, some financial
rewards may be necessary but given the fact that the changeover represents a
one-shot adaptation, then the argument can be made for having the rewards be
one shot; in other words, some type of bonus paid at the time that the
agreement is reached or better yet at the time that the changes are actually
implemented (a type of C.O.D. arrangement). Given the fact that in many
situations wages are already above competition, it may not be appropriate to
pay additional rewards on a continuing basis for productivity improvements
reached through collective bargaining.
6. Employment Security -- While not a positive program in its own
right, the provision of some type of assurance about employment continuity can
serve to increase the productivity by freeing up workers to think about
involving themselves in some of the other programs mentioned in this section.
The basic proposition and overriding theme is that in the absence of other
arrangements for insuring adequate output (such as machine pacing, close
supervision, positive incentives, and disciplinary penalties) the perception
of impending unemployment will lower output or productivity.
The key contribution of an assurance about employment continuity is to
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'deal in an affirmative manner with worker expectations. The object is to
prevent expectations about future employment from deteriorating. In research
work that has been done about the impact of prospective layoffs it has been
shown that labor productivity drops a minimum of two percent and in some
instances much more. Consequently, if the work force can be managed through
attrition and other devices of human resource management, such as voluntary
separation arrangements, then these productivity slowdowns can be largely
avoided.
Not all layoffs can be avoided, per se, by management's good planning.
In some instances it is necessary to confront the reality of insecurity and to
turn it in a positive direction. This is where the linkage often takes place
between changes in work practices and management's commitment to see the
operation through the difficult period, perhaps with some new investment. The
enhanced ob security derives from this linkage of investment and productivity
improvements.
STRATEGIC THEMES
At this point we would like to attempt some closure between the problem
and program side by picking up on the notion of strategies or clusters of
program ideas that can be dealt with under some broad themes. In large part,
the need to move to this overriding level stems from the important mismatch
that appears to exist between the basic underling problems of resistance to
change, work rules and motivational difficulties and the "business as usual"
programs that do not come to grips with the basic industrial relations
problems that are impeding productivity improvement.
Another way to make the point is to use the currently popular term of
culture. Too many organizations are characterized by a low productivity
culture. The approach taken to changing the culture is piecemeal, faddish and
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superficial. The strategies that we have distilled out of the field work
start first with the context or the investment arrangement for the
enterprise, then move to the arrangement of the work organization and the
process by which technology and workers are combined, and then finally, to the
level of the individual workers and the need to intensify the motivation and
commitment of the organization.
Creating the Right Context for Productivity Improvement -- Given the
fact that many organizations are characterized by a culture of low
productivity the interesting question is the following: What are the
strategic alternatives for making a sharp break with an existing pattern? The
two alternatives that we have isolated involve development of a new
organization (usually at a new location) versus realignment and retrofitting
of the existing organization. The first works with the premise that "new
beginnings" are needed to create a culture of high productivity, whereas the
second works with the premise that any organization can be transformed: if
proper ideas and programs are applied, then a high productivity culture can
emerge out of an old culture.
The Greenfield Site Strategy For much of the 1960s and 1970s this
strategy represented a frequent response by corporations, usually in the
manufacturing sector, to the problems of a stagnated work culture. By going
to a new site (usually in a section of the country where a work force could be
recruited from scrath) the company gained the advantages of being able to put
in place new technology, appropriate work rules and organizational
arrangements, and a brand new work force that tended to be much more adaptable
to the technology. Often, the new plants have been established on a
socio-technical basis, making heavy use of teams and the other ideas of modern
day organizational behavior. Comprehensive personnel policies have been
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installed that emphasized security, egalitarian arragements, pay for knowledge
and a host of other ideas that would be characterized as the latest thinking
in human resource management for high productivity.
While this strategy has proved popular and successful, it is not the
only approach and other avenues are becoming more important. For one thing,
the greenfield site strategy takes considerable capital that is often not
available today. And while the greenfield site alternative creates a new
beginning, eventually it may develop procedures and rigidities unless other
things are done to prevent the development of a routinized pattern. In other
words, the establishement of the new plant creates a "step up" but the
challenge of continuing improvement still remains.
The Retrofit Strategy -- An approach that is becoming increasingly
important is the reforming of an existing organization in the direction of a
high productivity culture. Often this means scaling down a large
manufacturing operation to a smaller, more manageable size, in the range of
500 to 1000 workers. The reform of the enterprise is multi-faceted. New
capital is committed, changes take place in work rules and in the arrangements
for the deployment of the work force, often through the mechanism of
productivity bargaining. It is here where the work rule problem is confronted
directly with labor and management finding a way to bring about a realignment
of the internal organization. Important examples can be found in almost all
of the major manufacturing industries in the United States wherein, after a
process of change and sorting out, a new type of enterprise emerges.
Capitalizing on the skills and experience of the existing work force, on the
close relationship to a particular community and its labor supply, companies
with the cooperation of unions have been able to "turn the corner" and to
achieve much more viability for operations that many people would have said
were irredeemable.
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The Adapting Oranization - The basic problem with both the greenfield
site and the retrofit alternative is that they represent "step-up"
improvements but they do not in and of themselves set in motion forces for
continuing adaptation. Some ideas from organizational behavior that
deemphasize status distinctions, as well as the concepts of Job enlargement
that put in place flexible work assignments, are important for helping an
organziation adapt on a continuing basis. In addition, several other
mechanisms are vitally important. First is the provision of employment
security and the elimination of the downside influence on motivation. Second,
and more on the positive side is the subject of communication which is playing
an increasingly important role. One of the reasons that organizations develop
a culture of low productivity is that they become parochialized and become
more related to their own past than to the economic realities of the industry
or the world market within which the enterprise finds itself. More and more
the function of communication is to provide workers with information about
costs and market alternatives so that they can comprehend the need for changes
that must take pace continually, if jobs are going to be secure and if the
enterprise is going to prosper over the long run.
The best examples of organizations that continue to adapt on a regular
basis are to be found in apan and to some extent in Germany. Interestingly,
in both countries trade unions play a dramatically different role at the plant
level than they do in the United States. Herein is a challenge for our system
of industrial relations. In these two countries, the adversary system does
not exist at the plant level (it may exist to some extent at the central level
where the borad economic parameters are established). At the local level the
role of the union is much more supportive and cooperative than is generally
the case in the United States. This cooperative stance helps with the
adaptation process.
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EThe High Commitment Strategy - This approach focuses attention on the
individual and the small group, and their involvement in improving the labor
productivity of the enterprise. Basically, the test of this strategy is the
extent to which the human resources of the organization are being used to
their fullest capacity. This means much more than eliminating absenteeism or
accident costs. It goes to the training and the capability of the human
resource factor in the organization and the maximimzation of its potential and
its value to the organization. Similarly, from the viewpoint of industrial
relations, it means much more than the minimization of costs due to
grievances, strikes and the like. It goes to the maximization of the
potential and the realization of the value of problem solving and the larger
subject of labor-management cooperation.
Businessmen now talk about human resource management or industrial
relations as being a second bottom line. We need to find ways to measure the
capability and the performance of the human side of the organization much as
we do for the technology or the physical asset side. When we are able to
measure this side of the enterprise, then we will be in a position to know the
extent to which it is being totally utilized or whether there is a shortfall.
The Integration of Human Resource and Industrial Relations into Key
Business Decisions -- Ultimately, the strategy that brings all of the thinking
that we have been developing in the paper together is the linkage of the human
side of the organization to the key business decisions of the firm. For some
organizations this happens as a matter of policy or commitment. For example,
in these companies no decision is made that impacts upon the work side of the
organization (and it is hard to think of a decision that does not have this
effect) without involving the top human resource people in thinking through
the implications of a proposed business decision for the human resource side
of the organization. Where such commitment is not present, there is always
xv
the danger that management will consider investment decisions and other
changes in operations strictly from a financial or technical point of view.
Some of this is inevitable given the short run orientation of many business
decisions in the United States, One way to offset this tendency is to develop
ways in which workers, either through union representation or through other
mechanisms, can play a role in the linkage of the human and economic sides of
the organization. We do not envision co-determination or any kind of joint
decision making, but rather a linkage of the job and investment side of the
organization.
Representatives of the "people side" of an organization need to present
the perspective that emphasizes the preservation and enhancement of human
capital rather than allowing decisions to take place that liquidate it
precipitously and unfairly. The experience of Japan and Germany presents some
dramatically important examples of how this linkage takes place and how the
financial side of the organization is better served by the integration of
human resource considerations into the economics of the businesses than is
usually the case in the United States.
A number of examples are included in the report that illustrate the
progress that is being made towards achieving the new integration or what some
analysts have termed the new industrial relations.
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ECHAPTER I
AN ANALYSIS OF PRODUCTIVITY RESTRAINTS
Introduction
In this section of the report we consider the problem side of the
productivity subject. As part of our data gathering program, we asked
management at the plant or operating level to describe and rank the various
inhibitors or restraints to greater productivity. Given the manner in which
we framed the questions about productivity at the operating level and given
the fact that the questionnaire was completed by management concerned with
day-to-day results, the responses primarily focused on the short-run.
Therefore, in this part of the report our attention will be on the
micro-influences on productivity that operate at the level of a particular
enterprise. Table 1 summarizes the types of productivity inhibitors cited by
survey respondents. (Background on the survey as well as elaboration of the
findings are contained in the Appendix.)
The Size of X-Inefficiency
In terms of the concept of X-inefficiency, it would appear that we are
talking about a range that can vary up to as much as 40 or 50 percent.1 The
term X-inefficiency describes the slack that exists in an organization, in
other words, the headroom between the operating efficiency that an
1Leibenstein, Harvey, "Allocative Efficiency vs. 'X-Efficiency',"
American Economic Review, LVI (June 1966), pp. 392-415. The term
X-inefficiency describes the slack that exists in an organization, in other
words, the headroom between the operating efficiency that an organization has
reached versus the higher state of efficiency that can be realized through
better management, better programs, better motivation and a wide range of
ideas that we will explore in this paper.
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Eorganization has reached versus the higher state of efficiency that can be
realized through better management, better programs, better motivation and a
wide range of ideas that we will explore in this paper. One study of economic
efficiency across 18 assembly plants of a large automobile company found the
productivity index ranged from 95 to 137. These numbers were for plants
producing the same product with almost identical technology. The range can
be even larger when one moves across different work cultures. For example, a
recent article contrasted productivity for the Ford Motor Company as between
its German and U.K. operations and showed a difference of almost
two-to-one.2 Some of this variance is due to different volume or market
conditions, but industrial relations factors also play a role in the
differences. For the typical plant that is operating at an average level of
productivity there is often an upside potential of from 20 to 30 percent.
This is in line with the outlook of industrial engieers who generally feel
that if methods are improved, workers are better motivated (perhaps through
the establishment of incentive systems) and in general the operations
tightened up, then productivity can be improved by 20 percent. The other
portion of the range comes from the down-side possibility, wherein especially
poor management and worker commitment can drop a plant 20 to 30 percent below
what would be considered average or acceptable levels of productivity.
1Katz, Harry, Thomas A. Kochan and Kenneth R. Gobeille, "Industrial
Relations Performance, Economic Performance and the Effects of Quality of
Working Life Efforts: An Inter-Plant Analysis," January 1982, unpublished.
2New York Times, p. D1, Rattner, Steven, "A Tale of Two Ford Plants,"
October 13, 1981.
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UTABLE 1
Productivity Restraints Identified by
Respondents to Plant Survey
Number of Times Identified
As a Restraint
Resistance to Change
*orker/supervisor resistance to change 43
first-line supervisory resistance 2
adapting to change 1
uncertainty of change 1
Motivation
*absenteeism .37
attitudes 4
work ethic 1
union-management relationship 1
Work Rules
*subcontracting 21
*crew size 19
*seniority 30
contractual restraints/work rules 11
Paid Time Off
*paid time off 34
Government Regulations
*OSHA regulations 25
other government regulations 5
Business Conditions
limited resource dollars 8
volume 2
lack of sufficient information systems 1
product complexity 1
behind in.technical improvements or equipment design 3
Training
insufficient training programs 5
lack of technical personnel 2
Other
outdated incentive pay systems 1
inability to perform time studies 2
Job security 1
work stoppages 1
overtime 1
turnover 1
*Restraints listed on questionnaire
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How We Plan to Organize the Subject
There are various ways to organize the extensive list of restraints
which has been cited over the years in the literature and popular press. An
important point to remember is that many of the restraints have been around
for some time and unless a particular subject has intensified then it cannot
in itself explain why there has been a recent downward trend in productivity.
The survey pointed to three major areas of concern facing today's
manager -- motivational problems, resistance to change, and work rules. It
strikes us that motivational issues usually appear at the individual level
while resistance to change and work rules more often operate at the group or
organization level. Actually, these latter subjects are two sides of the same
coin. For a variety of reasons workers develop norms and customary pactices
to provide predictability. These arrangements can be called work rules. One
function of the work rules is to make explicit the desire of the work group to
remain with the status quo, in other words to resist change. This section of
the report will focus on these three major areas.
Resistance to Chance
Our survey placed resistance to change as the number one restraint.
This was true across almost all demographic groups, such as large versus
small, unorganized versus unionized plants, etc. However, other studies that
1By focusing only on these three types of restraints we do not want to
imply that the many other restraints mentioned by the survey respondents are
of less importance in particular stiuations. However, these three areas
appeared to be more universal across all industries. The other areas are
discussed in the Appendix and briefly at the end of this chapter.
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III
Ehave analyzed the general disposition of workers, have pointed to worker's
readiness to be redeployed and to accept change. For example, the Sentry
study indicated that 74 percent of the workers are willing to work whenever
help is needed in their company.l Another survey of 3,000 manufacturing and
clerical workers across the country indicated they wanted to be more
productive. 2
In light of our survey findings and given the importance of introducing
new technology for improving productivity, especially for manufacturing
operations, it is useful to focus on a few particulars from the survey. While
outright opposition to new technologies appears to have declined from about 30
percent of responses in a 1976 Conference Board Survey 3 to approximately
five percent of the respondents in our survey, the approach of workers and
their union representatives is still limited to cautious acceptance of new
technology. And with respect to the establishment of new classifications,
duties, shift arrangements, i.e., the design of the new organization required
by new technology, there is substantially more opposition; indeed, what might
be considered outright resistance to change. In other words, the event of new
technology itself is not resisted but there is difficulty in getting the
social organization in line with the technical requirements; what could be
called the harmonization of the socio-technical interface. This lack of
1A Sentry Study - Perspectives on Productivity: A Global View,
Conducted by Louis Harris & Associates, Inc. and Dr. Amitai Etzioni, Center
for Policy Research, 1981, p. IX.
2Wall Street Journal, August 10, 1981.
3Hershfield, David C., "Barriers to Increased Labor Productivity," The
Conference Board Record, July 1976. Additional data from this survey is
presented in the Appendix.
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accepting new technology appears to be the case for supervision as well as for
non-exempt employees. A number of writers have identified the management
component as a key factor in explaining resistance to change.l
One of the most important challenges in the administration of change is
in the office, with respect to the introduction of data processing. Several
companies indicated that they had made extensive use of office automation but
had not derived the productivity benefits that had been expected -- because
the people who presumably were no longer needed still remained in the
operation. As one of the large utilities made the point: "We have had plenty
of technical change but we have not been able to get the savings that we
anticipated because we have not been able to shrink out the personnel."
Office automation promises a theoretical advantage but presents practical
limitations -- a contrast that underscores the importance of administering
change.
Aggravating Factors
In reviewing the possible explanations for organizations not being able
to realize their full production potential, several factors loom in importance:
1. The technical requirements have moved ahead of the human
capabilities of the organization. A number of
articles2 have appeared suggesting that as more and
more technology has been introduced into different
industries, the ability of the workforce to operate and
maintain these sophisticated pieces of equipment has not
kept pace. One dramatic example was given to us by a
consulting firm. It deals with the use of bunker fuel
oil in ocean-going vessels. The shift to this heavy
Neal, Clap, "Management Resistance to Industrial Robots," unpublished
paper, 1980.
2Wall Street Journal, January 8, 1981. One of the oil companies
identified the shortage of adequately trained technical personnel as a major
factor holding back productivity.
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Ccrude was triggered by the oil crisis and the fact that this grade
costs a lot less. However, to operate the engine rooms requires
considerable sophistication and maintenance. Unfortunately, many
of the crews, often drawn from underdeveloped countries, could not
maintain the equipment when the new crude was being used.
Consequently, a number of shipping companies have had to go back to
the "drawing boards," which has meant shifting back to higher
priced crudes and/or engaging in intensive recruiting and training
programs to the end that engineering personnel aboard these ships
can cope with the new fuel oils.
2. Management has lost some of its effectivenss -- especially the
front the line supervisor. It has always been recognized that
front-line supervision plays a crucial role in keeping a system
operating efficiently. For a variety of reasons front line
supervision is not playing as decisive a role as in the past. Some
of it involves training and the same issue of competence mentioned
in the preceding section. Some of it rests with the shift in
authority away from the supervisor to staff groups, and in some
instances to autonomous work groups. Hence, we see a dilemma
between the advantages of involving workers in the solving of
problems and the role and competence of the supervisor to achieve
and maintain system-wide performance.
3. The measurement and reward systems used by American corporations
over-emphasize short run competitiveness. This often leads to
internal conflict or competition within a company's internal
functions. This lack of coordination and communication can result
in a cost to both the firm and the economy.
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Motivational Issues
Motivation, or the lack thereof, is a subject often associated with the
so-called "loss of the American work ethic." When comparing the American
workers with their Japanese counterparts, many writers cite a difference in
commitment or loyalty to the job or firm. It is asserted by many that today's
worker represents a new breed that brings a different mix of needs and
expectations to the workplace.
Labor economists use the concept of "withdrawal of supply," not just the
final step of quitting but withdrawl in the form of absenteeism and low
commitment -- i.e., a restriction of energy and effort applied to the task at
hand. We know high commitment when we see it and we use such terms as high
capacity groups, involvement, and problem solving. The reverse of good
motivation is not as easy to define but we will attempt to deal with it in
this section.
One of the most frequently cited behaviors that is a symptom of
motivational problems is excessive absenteeism. As can be seen in Table 1,
absenteeism ranked second as the most frequently mentioned inhibitor to
increased productivity. There is no firm evidence to show that absenteeism
has increased over the past decade, although a number of industries indicate
that their rates are in the double digit range. This would be in contrast to
rates that have historically been considered normal, around three or four
percent per year. Since the absenteeism comes on an unplanned basis it is
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difficult for management to prepare itself and to keep operations running
smoothly. Also, in some situations, absenteeism is concentrated on Mondays
and Fridays, thereby straining the organization to find adequate replacements.
Based on our survey, we can present some selected evidence about the
size of the productivity deficit that can be traced to excessive absenteeism.
A large electronics company -- Productivity is two percent
less than what it might be as a result of absenteeism.
A large steel company -- Absenteeism affects productivity
negatively between one and five percent. This plant,
located in Texas (new operation), experiences few other
restraints.
Another steel company -- Between five and ten percent more
employees are needed because of high absenteeism.
A paper converter -- Absenteeism represents the number one
problem and is responsible for between a one and two
percent drop in productivity.
An insurance company -- For two locations absenteeism is
the number one problem. At the first location,
productivity is reduced between five and ten percent and
at the second location between ten and fifteen percent as
a result of excessive absenteeism.
Another manifestation of low commitment can be seen in the accumulating
evidence about quality problems in many industries. Indeed, quality needs to
be emphasized as a dimension of the productivity problem since it is not
reasonable to emphasize quality of output if quality has been sacrificed. As
we will see when we move to the program side of the story, with consideration
of quality circles, this subject is a very dominant theme within the broad
subject of productivity improvement as it is being practiced by U.S. industry
today.
In passing, we should note that we have not sought to establish a
relationship between motivation and productivity more generally. Research
about this connection is quite mixed and many authorities maintain there is no
connection. That is to say, that adequate productivity can be achieved even
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where motivation is low if the operations are such that management can require
performance either through the technology or through close supervision.
However, it is our feeling that there is a direct connection between
motivation and absenteeism and also between motivation and the interest of
workers in achieving quality results.
Causes of the Motivational Problem
Again, we are forced to identify factors that have intensified if we are
to view the motivational restraint as something that has contributed to the
recent productivity deficit. Several hypotheses can be advanced:
1. There may exist a weakening of the links between
performance and pay. Briefly stated, the notion involved
in this proposition is that when more and more pay is
awarded on a basis unrelated to performance, then the
motivation to apply oneself has been weakened. One of
the major contributing factors is inflation with wages
and salaries being advanced by cost of living clauses and
other arrangements, such as annual adjustment programs --
that, for the most part, award pay increases on an
across-the-board basis. In addition, compression of wage
differentials between skilled and unskilled jobs has
lessened the recognition and pride associated with craft
occupations.
2. Another possibility and one that is more speculative
involves the frequently mentioned topic of "new values."
It is asserted by many people that more weight is now put
on leisure and on enjoying the "good life."l To the
extent that this is true, then there may be a tension
between the values that emphasize leisure and activities
outside of work and the requirements coming from new
technology that make it imperative to have a workforce
available on a three-shift basis and in some instances,
on weekends as well. One industry where this issue will
be confirmed in the foreseeable future is the
banking/insurance sector. As computers are applied more
and more to all aspects of the business, it will be
necessary to staff the technology on around-the clock
basis.
lone of the responses to the survey volunteered the comment that
"employees today prefer time off over material rewards."
-10-
Work Rules
As stated earlier, as we move to the level of the group or department we
confront restraints that take on an institutional character. This is why we
have used the label of work rules to capture the network of arrangements that
can impede productivity. By far the most frequently mentioned category of
restraints dealt with this broad subject. Time and time again, company
respondents indicated that one of the serious inhibitors to improving
productivity was the way in which work was organized and difficulties
encountered in deploying workers effectively throughout the enterprise.
The subject of work rules is very broad. It can be broken into at least
three categories. The first has to do with the quantity of labor that is
utilized; sometimes referred to as a crew-size problem or in more popular
terms, the feather-bedding question. A second dimension deals with the
division of work into the separate classifications or craft lines. Here we
confront the tension between the advantages of specialization versus
flexibility. Finally, the third subject deals with the deployment of labor
across the structure of occupations and classifications. This involves
conditions under which workers can be transferred, how overtime is allocated,
whether extra shifts are utilized, and how workers are assigned to these
opportunities.
Industry Pattern for Restraints
Certain industries have been characterized by work rule difficulties.
They tend to be industries where unions have been successful in organizing the
industry and where craft traditions have remained strong. While other
industries, especially in manufacturing, are not characterized by the same
dramatic productivity problems as the "craft" industries, nevertheless many
work rule problems do exist. Rather than being in the category of excess
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manning, or in rigid classification lines, the problems emerge much more with
respect to deployment of labor. For example, in the steel industry one of the
largest companies noted difficulties in using plantwide maintenance gangs at
several manufacturing facilties when the end of the shift arrived. Similarly,
management was not free to continue the person doing the operation into an
overtime arrangement. Rather, the low person on the overtime list had to be
summoned, even though the person might not be familiar with the operation in
progress. At a ship building facility, this often resulted in double manning
on an overtime basis. At a refinery, workers were able to exercise seniority
to choose the shift on which they worked (a non-rotating situation).
Consequently, management found it very difficult to have a complement of
experienced workers on the evening shifts. At an auto-parts company, the
allocation of overtime had become so complicated that the management of the
system had to be done by a staff specialist in industrial relations. At other
facilities, the exercise of seniority for transfer purposes also proved
extremely costly. In fact, it represented one of the major issues behind the
long strike between International Harvester and the UAW. Many manufacturing
facilities find themselves required to honor worker requests for transfers
into openings and to do it on the basis of seniority.
Magnitude of the Problem
It is not necessary to spend more time illustrating the nature of the
work rule problems. The newspapers provide ample illustrative material for
this subject. A more interesting question is: How large, in an economic
sense, are these restrictions? Estimates for the construction industry range
from a negative number (that is, productivity is reportedly higher in the
unionized sector than in the unorganized sector) to a high of about 25 percent
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of labor costs. A mid range estimate is that work rule problems in
construction probably account for about 10 to 20 percent of a productivity
loss.1 It is the case that unionized workers are better trained and
consequently some of this loss is offset by good work pace and by good quality
work. But in terms of a potential for improvement, the range would be of the
order of 10 to 20 percent.
Historical Comparisons
It is our impression that there is less of a work rule problem with
respect to feather-bedding and jurisdictional issues than was the case in the
1950s and 1960s. The article written by John Van de Water in the late 1950s
summarized the extent of work restrictions at that time.2 A review of NLRB
and court decisions for the 1980s does not suggest anywhere near the
prominence of this subject today. A further comparison comes from the survey
conducted by the Conference Board in 1975.3 Respondents at the time ranked
excessive manning as the number one problem 41 percent of the time, while for
our sample the frequency had dropped to 31 percent of the time.
However, with respect to the category of flexible deployment of labor,
it appears to be much more of a problem today than ever before. For example,
two steel companies reported in very graphic language the strong resistance to
any flexibility across craft lines. Our proposition is that the issue of
deployment of labor has intensified more recently. As we will see when we
1Business Week, November 9, 1981, p. 103.
2Van de Water, John R., "Industrial Productivity and the Law: A Study
of Work Restriction," Virginia Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 2, February 1957.
3Hershfield, David C., Op cit.
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turn to the subject of productivity bargaining, most of the restrictions that
are being modified in newly negotiated agreements involve the transfer of
workers and the shifting of human resources to meet changing production
requirements. Work rules guiding the deployment of labor were not much of a
problem as long as the technology and volume remained steady. However, with
considerable economic and technical restructuring and fluctuating levels of
activity, the rules that govern the human resource side of the organization
eventually require revision.
Summary of Restraints
The discussion to this point has focused primarily on the three most
frequently mentioned restraints - resistance to change, motivational issues,
and work rules. These appeared to us to be the ones most closely linked to
institutional arrangements associated with industrial relations. One
additional restraint, paid time off, also ranked high on the list. However,
the distinction between this subject and absenteeism is rather ambiguous. Due
to lack of questionnaire specificity it is difficult to know whether this
restraint refers to holidays, vacations, illness, or other personal paid time
off. Therefore, we have made the assumption that many of the factors leading
to increased absenteeism are also at play in increased paid time off.
The remainder of the restraints listed in Table 1 are addressed in the
Appendix. The only other topic which was listed with some regularity was OSHA
regulations. Because this restraint is more associated with the increased
cost of government regulations (a subject which has been dealt with at great
length in other forums) than with traditional industrial relations
arrangements, we have chosen not to discuss it in this paper.
The remaining restraints did not appear with sufficient frequency to
warrant discussion at this point. However, it is worth noting that although
these restraints may not be of major concern to all corporations canvassed,
the fact that they were volunteered by respondents would indicate that they
are a major problem or concern to those corporations. We see the concern for
investment funds to be a special case which we will address in Chapter III.
Before leaving the downside of productivity, a word needs to be said
about the relationship between organized labor and productivity. The emphasis
of our survey was on the institutional arrangements of industrial relations of
which trade unions have traditionally been a major component. As a result,
the majority of the productivity inhibitors which were identified have been
associated with the labor movement. In Chapter III we will look at the debate
currently going on concerning the impact of unions on productivity. At this
point we will only point out that the jury is still out as to whether the
impact is positive or negative.
The next chapter will shift to the positive side of the productivity
equation and focus on the variety of programs which are being used to increase
productivity.
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CHAPTER II
POSITIVE PROGRAMS
Introduction
In this section we consider a range of productivity improvement
programs. Some of the topics are quite traditional, such as management
methods; some are relatively new, such as quality of work. Some are
results-oriented, such as productivity bargaining, while others emphasize
process, such as communication.
Once again, information obtained from the survey will be used as the
basis for much of this chapter. As an overview, a summary chart of responses
for productivity improvement programs is presented in Table 2. In addition to
the survey information, material has been gleaned from reports and case
studies. Quite a few of the sections deal with best practice and should be
relevant to practitioners interested in various human resource and industrial
relations programs that have the possibility of improving productivity. A few
of the sections are more conceptual and present a way of thinking about key
dimensions.
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TABLE 2
PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS
(29 Respondents to Corporate Survey)
NUMBER OF TIMES SPECIFIC PROGRAMS WERE MENTIONED
Used By
Corporation
Management Methods:
Most
Effective
Top Three
Least
Effective
Bottom
Three
Practices/Tools
3ob/Organization Redesign
Absenteeism Control/Employee Assistance
Flexible Hours
Training:
Involvement:
Quality Circles
Labor-Management Committees
Opinion Survey
Communications Program
Employee Involvement
Reward Systems:
Wage Payment System
Awards/Suggestion Programs
Productivity Bargaining:
Technology:
Office Automation
Manufacturing Automation
Other New Systems
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8
6
3
__~m
13
21
23
16
28
1
3
11
8
12
3
3
1
1
4
3
8
19
12
17
5
6
14
10
8
6
3
2
3
2 2
25
18
7
4
12
6
5
__
Management Methods, Measurements, and Analyses
The most frequently mentioned set of programs can be grouped under the
title of management methods, measurement and analyses. Many of these
techniques have been on the scene for a long time. Hence, the question is
whether this subject adds to our understanding of the problem or helps
contribute to a solution. A variety of different approaches will be addressed
in this section.
Productivity Coordination
One of the most visable new areas of emphasis is productivity
measurement and control. In the past year or so, many large corporations have
established a position of "productivity czar," who is responsible for
monitoring overall productivity growth for the corporation and instilling
productivity awareness throughout the organization. Usually this new position
reports to either the president or vice president, typically in the functional
areas of planning, budgets, or operations (also, but less prevalent, in
industrial relations or human resources).
Also included in this renewed interest in productivity is a widespread
implementation or revision of corporate productivity measurements. Several
corporations are using, or are in the process of developing, multi-factor
measurements which could fall under the label of "total factor productivity
measurements." However, the majority continue to use traditional forms of
labor productivity measurement, such as man hours/unit, units/employee, or
revenue/employee. Whatever the measurement, an increased corporate emphasis
and extensive communication campaigns have led to an enhanced sensitivity
toward the productivity subject in most corporations.
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Extension of Scientific Management to New Areas
A number of white collar industries have begun to utilize the techniques
of Frederick Taylor. For example, the office industries, especially insurance
and other large clerical companies, are extending the use of techniques such
as work simplification and the establishment of time standards. A major
article in Fortune talked about "How to battle your own bureaucracy--a story
of the application of scientific management to a large high tech firm."1
Another area for recent application has been warehousing operations. A
number of large food chains have installed standards in their warehouses,
either for workforce control purposes or as a prelude to installing incentive
systems. (It should be noted that historically, work measurement often was
the first step in the installation of payment-by-results systems.)
In the department of what might be called "old wine in new bottles", the
current emphasis on traditional techniques involves some new labels and some
new slants. For example, methods analysis, which also includes job
simplification, is now approached with the philosophy of "work smarter, not
harder." Rather than the emphasis being solely on the techniques of
scientific management, there is more emphasis on a harmonization of the
technical and social systems.
Organizational Effectiveness
Another new direction is that of effectiveness analysis, wherein staff
people move around the organization and ask searching questions such as:
Should we be doing this particular function?; Do we need to fill out these
reports or send these letters? One large insurance company found that.this
1Fortune, June 29, 1981.
function of organizational analysis often obviated the need to do the second
step of methods analysis because the conclusion (which emerged after posing
the question of why are we doing this) was that it did not have to be done
afterall.
The modern garb for the second step of this process, namely, measurement
of standards and indicating how much work should be done by a particular
person in a particular period of time, is now labeled goal setting, management
by objectives, and feedback of results (compared to budget or standard).
Considerable behavioral knowledge is being applied to the process of setting
goals, involving people, and providing them with "knowledge of results". The
literature has emphasized for a long time the point that if people participate
in setting a goal and then are told how well they have done against the goal,
then motivation will be much stronger.
Headcount Management
As a result of shrinking or stabilizing output levels in many
industries, the management of the human resource has shifted in emphasis to
reduction of the numbers employed. A variety of human resource techniques are
brought to bear on the task of controlling and indeed reducing the number of
workers utilized. A common label for this approach is "head count
management." It is often the function of methods analysis and work
measurement to establish staffing levels that would be realized by the
organization for the relevant time period. The monitoring and controlling
function is then performed by finance or human resources personnel. One large
insurance company set the productivity goal of improving the productivity
ratio by three percent each year, which in the face of stable output meant
that the denominator or the number of workers employed had to reduced by three
percent each year.
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In another instance, a large oil refinery, considerable emphasis was
placed on controlling the number of employees, given a commitment to avoid
layoffs as well as the high cost of fringes for any new workers brought onto
the payroll.
Absenteeism Control
As outlined earlier, increasing absenteeism is perceived by many
managers as one of the major inhibitors to productivity growth. While most of
the survey respondents identified that absenteeism control programs were in
use, many listed them as their least effective program. Some would argue that
this problem is a sign of "soft" management practices, but the magnitude of
the problem seems to indicate other underlying issues, such a changing work
values and increased emphasis on leisure or family time.
Some companies are addressing this problem by improving or updating
traditional systems, as one survey respondent noted:
In September, 1980, the absenteeism recording and monitoring
system was converted to a computerized system. The system has
reduced the amount of time spent on clerical duties and the ultimate
goal, a reduction in the absenteeism rate is becoming apparent. The
plant's absenteeism rate has decreased during this period.
Other companies are placing an increased emphasis on assisting employees
with personal problems. Several corporations have initiated Employee
Assistance Programs to assist employees with physical or emotional problems,
such as alcoholism, which affects their job performance. One large consumer
products manufacturer recently agreed to grant personal leave of absence to
employees at intervals of one week, provided a qualified replacements are
available.
Flexible Schedules
Another approach has been to change the configuration of employee work
hours by establishing flexible work patterns or schedules. One large steel
company noted that flex-time "has been effective in selected staff department
areas in permitting employees to adjust work hours around defined core hour
periods." In a survey conducted by Stanley Nollen it was estimated that at
least six percent of the labor force are covered by some aspect of this
method. The most frequently cited productive improvement in his survey was in
the vicinity of 12%.1 However, respondents to our survey were not as
positive about the benefits of flexible work hours. When mentioned, it was
usually included as one of the three least effective productivity programs.
A second innovation in changing patterns of hours is the emergence of
weekend shifts. Several companies in the tire industry have hired separate
groups of workers to be employed on Saturdays and Sundays on a regular basis.
For the workers, it involves only 24-hours of work, but they usually receive
time and a half or the equivalent of 36 hours of pay. Often, these workers
hold other jobs, but the sizeable pay packet for two days work makes the
arrangement attractive. The arrangement is also congenial to the weekday
workers (who handle the 24-hour routines Monday through Friday) because they
have their weekends free.
Another variation on this theme is the three or four-day work week which
is being used in large computer operations of several corporations. The
arrangement is to have four shifts cover 24 hours a day, seven days a week on
a 12 hour tour basis. Days off in the middle of the week help to reduce
absenteeism resulting from personal matters such as doctor appointments, court
appearances, and school meetings.
IStanley Nollen, "Does Flex-Time Improve Productivity?" Harvard
Business Review, September-October, 1979, p. 12. It should be noted that
Nollen's findings are not consensual. Others have found little if any
productivity improvement.
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Summnary
The scope of management methods, measurements and analyses is extremely
broad and varied. Therefore, it is difficult to present a unitary view of the
total area. As a result, we have opted to discuss only what we view to be
some new emerging trends which appear to play a role in improving
productivity. This topic, more than others, leads one to look at the total
system and ways in which all the pieces can be fitted together to make a
productive whole.
Human Resource Development
From an industrial relations perspective, there has been a major change
occurring in the structure and importance of the "people" function. In the
past it has been primarily viewed as a maintenance function for union
relations, and the recruitment and compensation of the workforce. However,
many of these functions are now coming under a new title called "Human
Resource Management", which has been elevated to the top levels of the
organizational heirarchy. A major emphasis in this new function has become
training and development.
Twenty-eight out of 29 corporations responding to our survey identified
training as one of their productivity improvement programs. Of these, 12
listed it as one of their three most effective programs. No one would
begrudge the importance of training. The question, though, is one of cost
effectiveness and the purpose and direction for training efforts.
Several factors have focused attention on training as a key program
area. First, more and more sophisticated technology requires a more highly
trained work force. Secondly, the apanese (with their heavy emphasis on
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training) have shown how important this critical ingredient is in achieving
high productivity and high quality in manufacturing operations. And thirdly,
changing demographics of the American work force has put an additional strain
on educating and assimilating many new members of the workforce.
- It is very difficult to make a distinction between training and many of
the other programs for improving productivity because training represents such
a critical prerequisite factor in the development and effectiveness of those
programs. Training can play a critical role in a variety of different ways.
In many respects training can be viewed as a socialization process to educate
both new and current members of an organization in its particular way of doing
things and helping to assure a desired level of organizational efficiency and
productivity. Such training comes in various forms - skills or apprentice
training, short refresher courses, and entry or orientation programs.
Skills Training
Probably the most common type of training used today focuses on the
acquisition of new skills to perform specific tasks in different areas or
functions of an organization. This includes apprenticeship training to
acquire traditional craft skills or, as many organizations are now doing, the
running of after-hours courses to help employees develop skills in specific
areas, such as Stenography and machine repair. Included in this area is also
the acquisition of professional skills, such as engineering or accounting.
One of the best known and most highly respected company-funded programs in
this area is the General Motors Institute, which has for many years served as
a source of high quality automotive engineers. A number of high technical
organizations are now following suit, as with the new Wang Institute.
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Another aspect of this type of training involves the development of
skills to promote employees to higher levels of responsibility within the
organization. Many corporations now appreciate the need to provide skills for
traditionally blue-collar workers as they are being elevated or promoted to
first-line supervisory positions. This also includes the entry-level
management training programs of many large corporations. One of the first
corporations to make extensive use of this type of program was General
Electric. GE runs extensive training programs in all functions which include
a minimum of two years working on assignment in a specific area of expertise.
Some of the programs involve six-month assignments, usually with a rotation
between different business sectors to enhance exposure to the total
corporation.
Short Courses
This type of training is closely tied in with many of the programs aimed
at improving the quality of worklife and enhancing employee participation.
Most organizational development consultants stress the need for intensive
training at all levels of the management heirarchy in order to change the
culture or management style of an organization. Popular literature abounds
with examples of such training. Many of these focus on the first line of
management.
As an important part of a productivity improvement program at one
company the capital side was increased by one billion dollars, the
company felt that "the interface between front line management and the
bargaining unit people would be a crucial element in making the
investment pay off. To get this done, Inland has put 1600 foremen
through six days of training in such subjects as "how to listen and how
to resolve conflicts".
At IBM, a company long known for its unique culture, all supervisors on
a regular basis spend at least a week in a formal training program.
At Shell Oil, all supervisors have been put through a three-day training
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program which is part of a high commitment, high morale system that the
company emphasizes.
In addition many corporations are developing system-wide programs to
update their employees' skills. Two specific examples from the survey will
help to illuminate these types of efforts.
1. A major steel corporation has set up extensive in-plant classroom
sessions which are accompanied by instructional materials to cover
a wide range of subjects, including basic accounting, cost
accounting, computer terminal use, and computer programming. In
addition, other programs have addressed participative management
style, appraisal techniques, and enhancement of managerial skills.
Although evaluation of the program has been difficult, response to
the initial efforts has been very encouraging.
2. One of the large automotive parts manufacturers has set up a
"quality college" through a teaching division of a major consulting
organization. The purpose is to teach "quality management" i.e.,
minimizing errors and maximizing results by doing the job right the
first time. The course stresses the prevention of errors by all
functions of the comoany, not just the manufacturing function. The
program encompases all employees of the company from the CEO down
through the hourly operator and clerk.
There has also been a,renewed interest in management development
training seminars for middle and executive level managers to update their
quantitative and analytic skills. These programs, often conducted by business
school professors, can be extremely costly. A six-day training program held
for Rockwell International's top level executives, which included eleven case
studies developed from real-life cases within the corporation, cost
$300,0o0. 1
In addition to the above types of training which have traditionally
occurred in most organizations, there is now an additional need for
organizations to update their skills and keep pace with the changing world of
1Fortune, May 3, 1982.
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work and technology. As new technology and equipment becomes more
complicated, companies have found it necessary to institute special training
programs and, in effect, to develop their own advanced apprenticeship
programs. In a conceptual sense, the internal labor market is playing a much
greater role relative to institutions of the external labor market which have
historically supplied the talent through formal arrangements and craft
referral systems. In addition, with reduced government spending many
government-funded programs, such as CETA and the like, are now being taken
over by private institutions.
Orientation/Cultural Training
Another type of training is what is commonly known as "learning the
company politics or culture." This is specifically important for new members
of an organization in order to be quickly accepted by the current employees
and to be able to understand the jargon and ways of doing things within the
organization. Texas instruments has found that if it spends enough time
training employees at the beginning then costly turnover is reduced
substantially thereafter.
This type of training is especially important for minorities and women
entering organizations that have been traditionally all white and male. These
new members, who are physically different, need to have a way of learning the
culture of their new environment so that they can more quickly be assimilated
into the organization, thereby lessening the impact of their differences.
Summary
In general one would be hard pressed to find an organization which does
not have some type of training activity ongoing, either formally or
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informally. However, actual cost benefit analyses are difficult to conduct.
The general consensus is that training is important and that only through
increased workforce knowledge and awareness of the basics of the business will
organizations be able to improve productivity.
Employee Involvement to Improve Productivity
Ever since the Hawthorne studies in the 1930s managers have been torn
between striving for maximum operating efficiency while at the same time being
concerned about the human needs of their employees. Although empirical
researchers have long argued as to whether or not increased job satisfaction
will lead to greater productivity, most practitioners intuitively believe that
"happy workers are productive workers." In many respects this belief is
helping to fuel the current efforts to increase the involvement, and thereby
the commitment of the workforce. The responses to our survey appear to mirror
the growing interest in industry for such programs. At present, many of these
programs are in their infancy and serious evaluation of their effectiveness
has only Just begun. Hence, we received a rather mixed rating as to their
effectiveness in improving productivity.
Communications
An important program area is improved communications. Although this may
be an end in itself, it is also a prerequisite for more elaborate forms of
involvement which will be discussed next. Even by itself, improved
communications can reap significant benefits. More informed employees can be
viewed as more knowledgeable. This in turn can result in more congruence
between worker and organization goals, enhanced quality and improved
productivity. The Dana Corporation has been cited as one of the trend setters
-28-
in this area. They have conducted regular meetings to inform their workers of
where the company stands and the market outlook. In addition, they have
established an intensive internal system of communication which include a hot
line where employees can ask any questions they desire with the answer being
posted on a bulletin board. They also have developed a new format for their
corporate report which is more employee oriented.
One of our survey respondents mentioned that for the past several months
one of their department managers has been meeting with each employee for a
one-to-one talk to discuss where the department currently stands in relation
to its objectives and the employee's part in achieving that goal and any other
topic which is of interest to the employee.
Participation
Many managers are beginning to recognize that their workers may be more
knowledgeable in some areas of shop floor (or office) practices and procedures
than the engineers who initially designed the work or put it into place. Over
the past several months business ournals have been filled with accounts of
how labor and management are improving their relationships via various types
of participation programs. For example, in a recent series of roundup
articles in Fortune as well as major articles in Industry Week and Business
Week a wide number of illustrations have been presented about the direct way
in which the parties are improving their labor management climate. We would
like to summarize some of these experiences under several key headings --
labor management committees, technology agreements, quality control circles,
and autonomous work groups.
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Labor Management Committees
One of the most commonly mentioned approaches is the establishment of
labor-management committees that operate away from the adversarial atmosphere
of normal negotiations. Although this method of improving productivity dates
back to 1920s, there has been limited enthusiasm in this country, except in
times of national crisis such as World War II. Indeed, the rebirth of
labor-management committees today in industries such as steel and auto, may be
attributed to their adverse economic environments. The underlying hypothesis
for the establishment of labor-management committees is that through mutual
understanding of each others problems, there will be increased goal
congruence, reduced grievances, fewer work disruptions and increased
productivity. Where trade unions are involved, there must be mutual
recognition and agreement to keep issues of conflict, e.g. over wages and
benefits, separate from those areas where both parties can work together to
create a better work environment and improved productivity. This is not the
place to describe all of the mechanics of how these committees are set up and
operated, but in many instances they appear to be improving labor-management
relationships and enhancing productivity. Two examples will suffice.
1. After a labor-management committee was set up under the auspices of
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (as part of their
Relationship by Objective Program) productivity at United Parcel
increased by 20%.l
2. A number of dramatic improvements have occurred in the construction
industry as a result of labor-management committees. Perhaps one of
the most publicized is in St. Louis where an organization called
Pride has fostered many positive steps. It is asserted that
productivity there has increased between 10 and 15%.2
lRosow, Jerome M. (ed.), Productivity: Prospects for Growth, New York:
D. Van Nostrand Co., 1981.
2Fortune, November 16, 1981.
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The mere formation of labor-management committees is not enough in
itself to guarantee good results. For example, the joint labor-management
committee for retail foods has brought the parties together at the national
level, but it has not realized any general agreement on some of the major
challenges faced in the industry, such as automated checkout. The point here
is that productivity improvement more readily occurs at the plant or operating
level. Therefore, labor-management committees that operate at this level give
the best evidence of success.
Many of the recently formed labor-management committees are too new to
evaluate properly their degree of success. As one of the survey respondents
from the steel industry noted: "Labor-management teams are not important
'yet' as compared to reduction in the size of the workforce or manufacturing
automation."
Technology Agreements
A subject that is coming into prominence with increasing frequency is
the Joining of labor and management efforts around the challenge of new
technology. This development has not gone as far in this country, as in some
other countries where labor and management have formulated and agreed upon
principles of how new technology will be introduced. Nevertheless, there are
several important examples of labor-management cooperation in this arena.
1. Both General Motors, and Ford Motor Company in conjunction with the
UAW have established technological change committees. The purpose
of these committees is to insure that the introduction of
technology enhances quality of worklife and that the unions and the
workers are sufficiently informed and given a chance to discuss the
impact of new technology. It is important to note that the UAW has
always been very supportive of change and, indeed, in the language
of the historic 1948 agreement it agreed to the following clause:
"The annual improvement factor provided herein recognized that a
continued improvement in the standard of living of employees
depends upon technological process, better tools, methods,
processes and equipment, and a cooperative attitude on the part of
all parties in such progress."
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2. During the 1980 negotiations the AT&T system agreed with its three
major unions (CWA, IBEW, and the Federation) to establish oint
committees on technology. These committees have just begun to meet
and it is not possible to report any specific accomplishments as
yet.
This present attitude is an evolution of labor's thinking about new
technology. By and large the approach has always been one of cautious
acceptance. The 1940s and the 1950s did see some examples where unions,
especially craft unions, opposed the introduction of new technology on the
docks, in newspapers, and in a limited way in construction. These hurdles
have been removed and there are no major examples on the scene today where
management would like to install new technology but is being prevented from
doing so by overt union opposition at the national level. Unions may still be
concerned about the employment consequences of new technology and will
certainly ask for adequate compensation. But the issue is not being drawn
about technology itself. Unions appreciate the need for new technology as was
illustrated by the UAW clause and, with the increased competitive pressures
that have been placed on many industries, there is an increased awareness
within the highest levels of union leadership that technological change is
necessary.
Quality Control Circles
Probably one of the most talked about new programs is quality control
circles. The main reason for the recent explosion of interest in these
programs is their low cost and ease with which managers can introduce them.
Quality circles were originally introduced in Japan after World War II to
heighten the quality consciousness of the workforce and to train their
employees in statistical quality control analysis.
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Since 1972 when Lockheed imported this technique back into this country,
quality control circles have become the latest savior for the American
productivity problem. However, unlike apan where the emphasis has been on
training in statistical quality techniques (thereby increasing the quality
consciousness of the workforce), U.S. management has implemented quality
control circles in an effort to increase participation of its workers with a
focus towards increasing productivity.
Since quality control circles are often viewed as merely an extension of
existing suggestion programs, they are not viewed as a threat to the authority
and status of management. They are sold as a package which management can
easily put into place in any environment with little or no change in existing
management practices and styles. Popular literature abounds with success
stories where companies have obtained significant cost savings as a result of
implementing circles. Lockheed has claimed a savings of almost three million
dollars in two years, or a six to one return on investment.l A sample
review of several companies cited in recent articles reveal that average
annual savings of $56,700 per circle.2 However, this level of success is
quite misleading and ignores the short-term nature of these rewards.
Few companies have been able to sustain these returns for more than a
year or so at best. In addition, several companies have invested heavily in
starting a quality circle program and found they had to abort their efforts
due to employee or union resistance. Unless there is a sincere commitment by
management to listen and follow through on employee suggestions as well as a
high level of trust between employees and management, many employees will view
1Qualit, May 1977, p. 14.
2List of citations available upon request.
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the program as one more attempt at squeezing additional work out of them. In
addition, many may fear a loss of ob security for suggesting work
improvements if no employment guarantees are put in place.
Resistance may also be found in the managerial and professional ranks.
In many respects, worker discussion of traditionally managerial production and
quality problems is one more attack on distinctiveness and integrity of
professional skills. As a result a significant amount of subtle middle
management resistance can undermine the implementation of these programs and
often help to fuel worker resistance.
Autonomous Work Goups
Probably the most revolutionary of the quality of worklife interventions
has been the emergence of autonomous or self-managing work groups. The roots
of this current effort date back to the human relations school which held that
if jobs are vertically enriched, then employees will be more satisfied and
thereby more productive. Experiments such as Sweden's Volvo Kalmar plant led
some U.S. managers to reexamine traditional ways of organizing and managing
the workforce.
Success with autonomous work groups requires significant changes in both
management style and practices, not only in work organizations but also in the
delegation of responsibility and authority. Many employees as well as
managers have difficulty with such transitions and, therefore, many of the
major success stories with autonomous work groups have occurred in new plant
startups. One example is the Shakely Corporation's Norman, Oklahoma plant
where all employees are organized into work teams which are responsible for
establishing their own production schedules, work hours, selection of new team
members, peer evaluation and discipline. The company claims that they are
producing the same output as older more traditional plants with forty percent
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lower labor costs -- attributing two thirds of the savings to management style
and the remainder to new equipment.l
On a lesser-scale, such as individual work groups, many companies have
also found redesign of the work to result in increased productivity. Over a
four year period Guardian Life Insurance increased productivity by one-third
by giving each employee full responsibility of a client's complete file as
opposed to their former assembly line approach.2
Establishment of autonomous work groups has given American trade unions
a serious problem in that they eliminate many of the grievable issues
concerning management of the workforce. There have also been questions raised
as to the legality of such efforts in light of the loss of distinction between
managerial and nonmanagerial employees.3 However, the severe economic
pressure in many industries, such as automobiles, has led some unions to
cooperate in several experiments.
Summary
Although a number of firms initially embarked on a program of quality of
work life for reasons other than productivity this phrase has now become a
catch all for numerous varieties of productivity endeavors in the United
States over the past decade. Even those firms which implemented QWL programs
to improve employee/management relations or quality readily admit now that
increased productivity has been a welcome byproduct.
1Business Week, May 11, 1981, p. 92.
2The Boston Globe, December 17, 1979, p. 29.
3NYU Law Journal, "Collective Authority and Technical Expertise:
Reexamining the Managerial Employee Exclusion," October 1981.
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In practice QWL has evolved into a variety of programs designed to
create a work environment were employees have an opportunity, if they so
choose, to have a voice or to participate in the decisions which affect their
life at work. The basic hypothesis behind these programs has been that when
employees better understand corporate problems and goals and are given an
opportunity to participate in the setting of these goals or the solving of
these problems, they will become more attached to the firm, feel a greater
sense of personal commitment, and work harder towards achieving these goals
and solving problems. Hence, improved productivity results. There has also
been an attempt to break down traditional barriers between workers and
management by recognizing the value of employee opinions and abilities at all
levels of the hierarchy.
There exists a difference of opinion as to whether QWL programs produce
·merely temporary or truly long term productivity improvements. Any real
success requires a genuine change in management philosophy or style from a
Theory X to a Theory Y (and now Theory Z) and a climate of trust and respect
between mangement and employees. Organizational development specialists who
have designed QWL programs stress the need for gradual change and the long
term nature of these efforts. Unfortunately, the pattern has more often been
a sequence of immediate short-term improvements, a la the Hawthorne effect,
followed by a tapering off and a return to prior states.
For a quality-of-work program to succeed a number of key precepts are
involved:
1. Management will have to relinguish its monopoly on knowledge. This
may mean a loss of power and control and the diffusion process will
take time.
-36-
2. Decisions will take longer to make. This will be a function of
both the added time to convey necessary information to all decision
makers as well as the slower process of group decision making.
3. In order to make the program succeed considerable training and
education will be required at all levels of the organization. This
will cost both time and money.
4. Most likely resistance will develop. This may result in the need
to replace middle or lower level managers who are unable or
unwilling to adopt the more participatory supervisory style.
All in all, this area is probably the fastest growing of all
productivity efforts and the one receiving the most positive comments from
employees involved. It will take time, though, due to the long term nature of
programs, to be able to evaluate adequately its total benefits.
To date the most successful programs have been focused on individual
work groups or specific projects, as opposed to the overall workforce, in
order to create more immediate personal involvement. However, there still
remains the challenge of finding the right balance between traditional
controls (rules, policies, lines of authority and ultimate responsibility for
decision making) and individual involvement and autonomy. Improving the work
environment (what some might call improving the quality of worklife) by
dressing up the work place, providing a more benevolent boss, or implementing
pre-fabricated, quick-fix package programs, will not automatically lead to
increased productivity. The key is to create an environment wherein all
employees are motivated to do a more efficient and effective ob which thereby
increases productivity.
Wage Payment Systems
The way in which money is related to performance has always been at the
center of the productivity challenge. One possible explanation for the
productivity deficit has been a weakening in the connection between pay and
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performance as a result of COLA causes and other systems for automatically
keeping workers up with the cost of living. Interestingly, in a recent survey
conducted for Sentry Insurance, it was noted that 63 percent of employees are
willing to have their salaries linked to personal productivity. 1
Increased Interest in Continaency Compensation
It seems clear that the future will see more compensation that is paid
contingent on performance and results. One way of insuring that a
productivity or performance objective is met is to make the payment of rewards
contingent on the accomplishment of the stated objective. The recent
automobile negotiations illustrate a move in the direction by the
establishment of profit sharing programs.
This movement towards some increase in payment by results, comes after
several decades wherein traditional incentive systems declined in use. In
industry after industry, management where it could, abandoned individual and
small group incentives in favor of measured day work. For example, a large
electronics company used traditional incentives in the 1940s and 1950s for
approximately 50 percent of the production and maintenance workers; this
number in the 1960s has dropped to 35 percent and today it is down to 20
percent. The abandonment of "demoralized" incentive systems produced a number
of important gains: generally speaking, labor relations improved as numerous
grievances (that complicated incentive systems engender) diminished in
volume. Also, management found it much easier to introduce advanced
technology and to set up classifications when there was no issue about
1Sentry, op cit.
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incentive earnings at stake. In effect, management was saying with its
adoption of measured day work: "Leave the management job to us, we'll specify
the procedures and the factors of production, and all we're asking from you,
the workers, is a fair day's effort."
But, in the steady movement away from traditional incentives, management
has lost some of the impetus and regime that comes with any system of payment
by results. In effect management found itself always looking over the
shoulder of the worker to make sure that the worker was applying himself. In
many instances, measured day work has represented a coercive system with
substantial reliance upon discipline to ensure a fair day's work.
An often overlooked advantage of traditional incentive systems is that
they foster a type of mutuality, in that, management and the workers must
agree upon the methods and the price for the job. Once this agreement is
reached, the system can usually run itself. Indeed, the autonomy that is
present with piece work incentives is in some ways similar to the autonomy
that management is reaching for with teams and other group emphases that have
emerged under various quality of work programs.
The Current Picture
The current picture for the use of various incentives versus measured
day work is quite complicated. There are industries such as steel that
continue to make extensive use of traditional incentives and if anything
appear to be applying them to all operations, even coke ovens and other parts
of the operation that are paced by machinery. Even, the new "minimills" are
making heavy use of incentives, although in this case the emphasis is more on
group incentives or a type of gain sharing.l
1Savage, John, "Incentive Programs at Nucor Corporation Boost
Productivity," Personnel Administrator, August 1981, p. 33.
Another heavy utilizer of piecework incentives continues to be the
unionized sector of the garment industry. It has been noted that with
computers it is possible to use very elaborate incentive schemes that
encourage workers to move to new jobs -- during the transition, they are
protected by the payment of average earnings.l
And then there are some industries that are installing incentives for
the first time. For example, the warehouse industry is establishing time
standards and paying incentive earnings based on performance against these
standards. Even the chemical industry, that has theretofore been thought of
as not feasible territory for the use of incentives, has been experimenting
with incentives. For example, one large plant in the Rocky Mountain area has
a program called "Success Sharing Plan" wherein a group incentive is paid for
improvements in yields. In this case, the standard is changed each year on
the rationale that increased performance follows a learning curve and once a
level of yields is realized this then becomes the norm (on the assumption that
it should be straight forward for the work group to achieve this level of
performance on a continuing basis). To some extent such a system represents a
type of "running faster to keep even" system - but, of course, if the
emphasis is on "working smarter rather than harder," then the effect of such
an approach is not one of speed-up but one of motivating the crew to achieve
more and more out of the existing technology.
Gainsharing
The increased emphasis on contingency compensation is, in most cases,
being focused on what generically could be called gainsharing plant.
1Charles Sabel, "The Division of Labor: Its Progress through
Politics," unpublished manuscript, p. 387.
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Usually, the achieving unit is plant wide to emphasize team work and
coordination within a large system. Often, rather than setting precise time
standards, historical data are used and the group is rewarded if they improve
upon past performance. The Scanlon Plan is one of the best known
formulations.1 The Rucker and Impro-Share plans are also examples of
systems that fall into this category. Two of the plans noted earlier, the one
for mini steel and the one for the chemical plant in the Rockies, could be
included in this category of gainsharing plans.
One report of a successful introduction of gainsharing plan, of the
impro-share variety, appeared in a report by the American Productivity
Center. It describes a company named Corry-Jamestown, wherein the results
have been impressive. Productivity increased 17.2 percent in the first year,
and another 17 percent in the second year. The evaluation was that "labor and
management leaders agree that the increases would have been impossible under
their earlier, more adversary relationship".2
It is difficult to see any pattern of utilization in the instances where
gainsharing plans are installed. In some cases, such as at Dana Corporation,
they are installed in existing plants that have not used incentive systems
before. In other cases, they replace traditional incentives and play the
crucial role of "picking up the slack" after individual incentive systems have
been abandoned.' After the installation of the gainsharing plan at one large
consumer products company, it took about 18 months before productivity reached
levels that had existed under the earlier piecework systems. In the case of
some new plants of this same company the gainsharing plans have achieved
1 Lesieur, Frederick G. and Elbridge S. Puckett, "The Scanlon Plan has
proved itself," Harvard Business Review, September-October 1969.
2
"How One Manufacturer Moved From Labor Tension To Productivity," The
Productivity Letter, American Productivity Center, Vol. I, No. 1, April,1981.
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levels of productivity higher than have been obtained elsewhere in the company.
Although gainsharing programs have received a lot of publicity, they
have not been widely installed, as of yet. Our best estimate would be that
there are between 500 and 1,000 large group productivity schemes installed at
the establishment level in the United States. Nevertheless, those who have
used these schemes tout their effectiveness and there appears to be
considerable interest in these methods for relating pay to performance.
Recently, a fairly comprehensive study by the General Accounting Office
entitled Gainsharing Plans concluded that on average they increased
productivity about 17 percent, a healthy result.l E. Robert Livernash, who
has followed gainsharing plans closely for several decades, has concluded that
they either work quite well, or they are a "flop". Given the dynamics of
group efforts, if it appears that a decent bonus is not in the offering, then
the plan will not have any impact. While it will not be a drag on
productivity, it will not give the upside potential as is the case when groups
see the prospect of bonuses of between 10 and 12 percent, the typical range of
payouts for gainsharing plans.
Profitsharing
Conceptually, profitsharing has much to recommend it. It meets the test
of market performance because bonuses will only be shared if improved
productivity has contributed to profits (which means that productivity has
been improved more in the establishment than would be the case for the rest of
the industry). Another advantage is that the standard for rewards is
constantly adjusted by the test of the market.
1U.S. General Accounting Office, "Productivity Sharing Programs: Can
They Contribute to Productivity Improvement?", GAO Report #AFMD-81-22, March
3, 1981.
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A major problem with gainsharing or other systems that establish an
internal formula or yardstick is that rewards will continue to be paid against
the standard even though external conditions have changed. An internal
incentive system initially encourages the elimination of slack, but such a
system often serves as a deterrent for the elimination of additional slack
since bonuses are being earned and there is not any financial motivation to
"go for more". All of these problems are eliminated with profitsharing.
Of course, profitsharing suffers from other problems. Profits are
affected by many things beyond the control of workers inside the organization
and consequently the approach may not meet the test of reliability or equity;
namely, that additional worker contributions are rewarded with additional
bonuses.
Obviously, there is no ideal reward system. The point is that in some
situations gainsharing may be best because of its close connection to matters
that workers control, while in other situations profitsharing may be
preferable because of its economic viability.
Suggestion Systems
Suggestion systems have been on the scene for a long time, albeit, in a
quiet way. But with the growth of quality control circles, they are
re-entering the limelight. Although conceptually different, some companies
are combining the two programs in an effort to stimulate worker motivation and
ideas. More often, companies are just revitalizing their existing programs.
As one large manufacturer stated: "The main (productivity) program we have is
C.A.P. (Cost Awareness Program). This program is voluntary and all employees
submit ideas to increase productivity by eliminating manpower, change in
method, design of new equipment, etc. Suggestions are also submitted to
reduce cost of materials. Since 1977 through 1981, 3,332 project ideas have
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been accepted and implemented, 2,210 different employees had suggestions
accepted."
Approximately 2/3 of the companies surveyed had some type of formal
company-wide suggestion program. The monetary award ranged from $10 to
$100,000 based on a sharing of between 10 and 25% of the first year savings.
However, only two of the companies listed suggestion systems as one of their
three most effective productivity program. This can be amplified by the fact
that, for those companies that provided result information, the savings per
employee averaged about $50 per employee per year. Thus, suggestion systems
help but do not have big payoffs.
A recent study of Japanese suggestion systems indicated that in 1980
they experienced a suggestion rate of 12.8 suggestions per employee.1 On a
very limited comparison base, our survey indicated a yearly rate of
approximately 0.125 suggestions per employee. However, select success stories
in this country can be found to surpass the Japanese rates. Consider an
illustration from the IBM Corporation that has taken methods-improvement
training one step further than most companies. At its Lexington, Kentucky
office products plant, it undertook to train all employees in methods
improvement. The results were impressive. The number of suggestions accepted
by the company increased from 500 in the base year to 2,600 three years
later. Three out of four employees turned in suggestions, and the employees
received $270,000 in awards for savings produced of over $1,000,000. The
facility has been regarded as one of their most productive.2
l"Quality Control Circle Activities and the Suggestion System," Japan
Labor Bulletin, January 1, 1982.
2Baytos, Lawrence M., "Nine Strategies for Productivity Improvement,"
Personnel Journal, July 1979.
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Indeed, there is far from concensus on the effectiveness of suggestion
systems as substantiated by the significant number (1/3) of survey respondents
who did not have formal programs. The decision not to have a program was, in
several cases, a well thought out decision based on experience or research, as
indicated by the following two examples:
1) A large steel company cited that:
"After researching various formal employee suggestion programs
used by several major corporations, it was realized that while we
wanted to solicit employees' ideas, we did not want to implement a
formal on-going suggestion program as we did not want to:
1. permanently increase our personnel costs by adding
additional staff to administer the program;
2. establish a continuing need for on-going advertising and
promotional expenses.
3. relate the award or payout to the employee directly to
the cost savings that would be attributable to an
employee's suggestion; and
4. lose employee interest as opposed to developing a program
which would stimulate employee participation.
As a result of the above factors, we developed a contest-like
program whereby we solicited ideas from eligible employees for a
three-month period of time and awarded either cash or merchandise
to those employees to submitted the best ideas..."
2) A large electrical product company reported:
"Employee Incentive Suggestion Plans have essentially
been phased out over the past few years. They were found to
be ineffective--requiring an administrative apparatus that was
often more costly than the real savings generated via
suggestions.
With phase-out of Suggestion Systems and associated
payments, rewards would focus on writeups in plant newspapers,
publicizing the employee's idea and the savings it generated
in plant wide meetings, etc. In special situations, expense
paid one week vacation trips have been given to employees for
particularly meritorous recommendations. In general, rewards
are designed not on financial grounds, but to give the
employee recognition among his peers and throughout the
organization of which he is a member."
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Summary
It is clear that we are in a period where there is a movement of
the pendulum back in the direction of incentive compensation. Incentive
compensation makes it possible for a firm to bring the workforce closer
to the realities of the market. One step that represents the acid test
of whether an operation is effective in an economic sense is to test the
cost for component operations against those that obtain from competition
or those that subcontractors experience.
In this regard the history of the printing industry is
instructive. Historically, the industry operated on a piecework basis
and the standards were often established on a "market" basis, that is,
the foreman would be given a sum of money to cover his phase of the
operations. The allocation equalled the price that the publisher or
employer could "farm out" the work on the outside. Thus, the method of
wage payment constantly placed in front of the workforce the cost
standard of what competition was able to offer. However, as the printing
organizations became bigger and especially when they abandoned piecework,
the relationship between the outside market alternatives and the
awareness and performance of the inside workforce weakened considerably.
The contract between management and the work crew was no longer to
deliver a given product at a given price, but the purchase of time and
availability of the workers and it was up to management to do what it
could to get the best utilization of that time.
Quite significantly, when the piecework system was abandoned, the
unions insisted on the establishment of the bogus rule which meant that
any work that was put out to a subcontractor would have to be reworked
within the shop, or at least the workers paid accordingly.
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Our proposition is that the bogus rule, or this form of featherbedding
would not have developed if the piecework system had remained in place and
everyone had been kept aware of the "alternate price". Today, as companies
confront their organizations with information about what foreign competitors
are able to do, we see a cutting-through of the organizational insularity that
has developed. Whether wage payments systems will actually rely upon the bids
of subcontractors and the prices of competitors as the benchmarks against
which to pay rewards will be an interesting possibility to follow.
Productivity Bargaining
Although productivity bargaining was not mentioned by a large number of
our program respondents, we believe it deserves some discussion especially in
light of our current economic environment.
The essence of productivity bargaining is the realignment of the work
organization with technology and operating requirements. One can think of an
organization as the internal structure of work within a technological and
economic context. Often what happens is that the internal organization
remains intact while the external circumstances change. In this sense,
productivity bargaining helps achieve a better match between the work
organization, the deployment of the workers and the technological requirements
of the operation.
This history of work organizations appears to be an ebb and flow between
specialization and flexibility. Productivity bargaining then becomes a means
for helping shift from one design to another. In some respects the important
event is chane itself, which gives the organization an opportunity to sweep
out the old, rather than the particular work organization that is being
introduced.
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Frequency of Use
Given the thesis that change comes about during periods of intense
readjustment (followed by periods of stability), we would expect to find
productivity bargaining appearing on the scene at regular intervals. There is
some support for this proposition.
The last time when productivity bargaining was being practiced with some
frequency was during the late 1950's and early 1960's. This was the time of
the historic Mechanization and Modernization agreement on the West Coast docks
and it was also the period when considerable attention was given to the
subject as a result of a wave of activity in Britain.1
Currently, there appears to be a surge of interest in what could be
called productivity bargaining. Given the attention to "give backs" and other
efforts to save obs through concession bargaining, it is not surprising that
a number of the agreements contain significant changes in work rules aimed at
improving productivity. Dan Mitchell has analyzed 46 concession agreements
that have appeared recently and ten of these involve changes in work rules.2
A variety of surveys also indicate that workers and their union
representatives are quite receptive to using the collective bargaining process
for discussing the subject of productivity. Whereas a few years ago the word
productivity would have been viewed as a "no-no" term in collective
1See Robert B. McKersie and Lawrence C. Hunter, Pay, Productivity and
Collective Bargaining (London: Macmillan, 1973). In addition to the academic
studies of productivity bargaining a number of articles appeared in the trade
Journals about the importance of work rules. For example, Dunn's Review and
Modern Industry carried this statement, "Work practices may well be the key
bargaining issue of the 1960's." (Volume 76, Number 4, October 1960, p. 38.)
2Daniel J.B. Mitchell, "Recent union contract concessions," paper
prepared for the Brookings Panel on Economic Activity, 1982.
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bargaining, such is not the case today. About a quarter of the corporations
that we surveyed have made use of productivity bargaining.
One of the clearest indications that productivity bargaining is being
practiced on a reasonably wide-scale basis is the fact that the recent
settlements in the automobile industry have major elements that deal with
changes in work rules. This is especially significant since many people have
assumed that work rules were not a problem in automobiles, given the "blank
check" that the UAW had given to management to mechanize and improve
productivity. Indeed, as a quid pro quo for the annual improvement factor the
union had committed itself to progress through technological change and
improving productivity. Nevertheless, a variety of rigidities have crept into
automobile operations -- these work rule problems have been highlighted by the
dramatic contrast presented by Japanese factories. Consider a quote about
operations within Toyota:
"Another feature that becomes clear is the company's penchant for
training workers to do more than one job. The man who runs one
machine switches off every few moments to run another. The man who
feeds rear windows to a robot also 'tags' car shells with
instructions telling workers further down the line what to install
in them. This versatility allows Toyota to realign its work force
more efficiently when business is bad."1
One of the most significant clauses in the recent agreement between Ford
Motors and the UAW is one that allows the local union to engage in
productivity bargaining in order to save jobs.
1The Nuts and Bolts of Japan's Factories", Wall Street Journal, March
31, 1981.
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"In the event that changes in labor costs can make a difference in the
reasons for a major outsourcing action, the Union shall have 30 days
from the notice to propose any changes in work practices or any local
deviation from the Collective Bargaining Agreement that might make it
feasible for the company to ontinue to produce without being
economically disadvantaged."
Productivity Bargaining Compared to Other Methods for Updating the Work
Organization
Before moving on to describe some of the specific examples of
productivity bargaining, it is useful to compare productivity bargaining as-a
mechanism for change to other methods for updating the work organization.
Certainly, technological change by itself provides an opportunity to "sweep
out the old" and to "bring in the new." In situations where a new generation
of technology is involved, management may not need the vehicle of productivity
bargaining to rearrange the work organization. However, in most situations
the extent of technological change at any one point in time is not
sufficiently dramatic to provide the basis for completely redesigning the work
organization. For example, in the case of automobiles, mentioned above, even
with the introduction of robots and other new forms of new technology, such
things as craft demarcation, limitations on transfering workers across
department lines and inappropriate shift arrangements remain in place and can
only be changed through mutual consent. Thus, in most cases management is
required to bargain through the changes rather than using new technology or a
major reorganization to accomplish the result.
Productivity bargaining can also be contrasted to quality of work and
other ongoing and open-ended processes that may result in changes in the way
1Ford-UAW Agreement 1982.
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in which work is organized and workers are deployed across the enterprise.
Productivity bargaining tends to be more specific and to focus on changes that
can be identified in negotiations. In this sense, the process is focused in
time and is not a rolling agenda of change. The activity can be thought of as
involving two phases, first, the identification (and with relevent parties)
agreement regarding the desired changes and second the implementation of these
changes.
Types of Changes
Conceptually, we can distinguish several categories of changes in work
rules that are dealt with in a productivity bargaining: crewsize or manning
decisions, work jurisdiction (e.g., craft lines), and the deployment of labor
(overtime, transfer, and seniority rights.)
As we indicated in the earlier section dealing with restraints, crewsize
problems are not as prevalent today as they were 10 or 15 years ago. A few of
the companies did respond with phrases like, "we eliminated restrictive
practices of manning operations with two men, when one would suffice," but for
the most part the changes reached through productivity bargaining fell in the
second and third categories.
Work Jurisdiction - This often involves the classic subject of craft
demarcation lines and we can give a number of instances that capture the
flavor of changes that are being made in this subject area.
- One large oil company has achieved the concept of zone operator, a
person who is responsible for all of the operations as well as
maintenance. With respect to maintenance activities when they are
necessary, they are performed by a refinery mechanic, a person
possessing a range of skills rather than the traditional breakdown
of craft skills.
- A large auto parts company has achieved one classification for
craftsmen.
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A steel company commented as follows, "We have consummated an
agreement eliminating craft jurisdictional lines and combined
several crafts. These changes should lead to a substantial
reduction in the number of workers required."
A company in the electrical equipment industry commented, "We have
combined all trade crafts, such as bricklayer, carpenter, heavy
equipment operator, into a single job description. Thereby, we
eliminated the need for several crafts in order to complete a
project."
Deployment of Workers - This subject can be thought of as involving
flexibility in the assignment of workers both through space and time. With
respect to space, several agreements have enhanced management's ability to
shift workers (Japanese-style) to operating areas where their services are
needed. The emphasis is on increasing the flexible deployment of labor at
management's discretion and reducing worker initiated moves, such as requests
for transfer.
- In the retail food industry a recent agreement has eliminated
bumping to within the home store rather than across stores in the
geographical area.
- The concept of inter-divisional runs in the railroad industry
illustrates the flexibility of deploying people on a wider
geographical basis. Rather than putting a new crew on the train at
the existing division points, the railroads continue to use the
same crew and obtain more useful time for the paid hours.
- The same is true with airlines, with some of the recent concession
agreements enabling the carriers to schedule pilots for a longer
stint during the afternoon and evening hours rather than returning
them to their home base.
The ability to deploy workers to different operations is enhanced by
simplifying the classification systems that have grown up in many
organizations. One company commented that they had reduced 125 job
progressions to 39 and correspondingly had reduced the number of Job
descriptions from 480 to 169 Jobs. Thus, there is a greater likelihood that
workers can be assigned to different tasks because their classification
carries more components.
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. Another aspect of workforce flexibility is scheduling overtime. More
and more companies are insisting on mandatory overtime and flexibility in
deciding ust who actually works the extra hours, i.e., abandoning the strict
use of seniority in allocating overtime. Some of the productivity agreements
that have been reached at the plant level in the automobile industry provide
management with considerably more flexibility in scheduling overtime. Not all
of these changes are made without some difficulty, however. While some of the
changes that are made in hours and the scheduling of the workforce are quite
minor, they can have significant productivity implications. For example, a
large electronics company indicated that it had instituted overlapping shifts
by ten minutes, thereby substantially increasing contact and coordination.
Results of Productivity Bargaining
Unfortunately, we have very little hard data on how effective
productivity bargaining has been in achieving its stated objectives. Evidence
from the earlier period, the 1960's, in this country and in Britain, would
suggest that anywhere from a quarter to a half of the agreements produced
substantially positive results. In another quarter of the agreements,
management was not able to obtain the changes in practice that had been agreed
to at the bargaining table. The remainder of the cases fell into a rather
inconclusive category.
It is too early to tell how large will be the gains from the work rule
changes that are being agreed to in the many concession agreements that are
currently being negotiated and implemented. Given the size of some of the
alterations and given the willingness of companies to commit capital and to
remain in business at existing locations, the size of the productivity gains
may be significant. We will return to this theme in a subsequent chapter.
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Guidelines for Productivity Bargaining
Productivity bargaining should not be utilized unless the gap that
potentially can be eliminated through this process is sufficiently important
to make a difference for the viability of the enterprise over the foreseeable
future. Too often companies have engaged in productivity bargaining, achieved
results and then subsequently shut down or cut back the operations --
resulting in substantial bitterness and dismay that comes when people "were
asked to do their part, made a contribution, and then were betrayed."
Productivity bargaining works best when the practices to be changed can
be identified and they can be removed by agreement of the parties. Work rule
changes certainly fall into this category.
The closer the productivity agreement can be fashioned to the operations
involved, the better the results. Agreements that state broad principles at
the industry level often do not bring about any changes in actual practices.
Thus, plant-by-plant agreements are more effective.
The kinds of rewards that are given depend upon the circumstances. In
many situations today, the real reward is survival of the plant and this can
be a very powerful incentive, and nothing else is needed if management is in a
position to say that it will keep a given plant open assuming it gets certain
kinds of changes. Where survival is not the motive, some financial rewards
may be necessary but given the fact that the changeover represents a one-shot
adaptation, then the argument can be made for having the rewards be one-shot;
in other words, some type of bonus paid at the time that the agreement is
reached or better yet at the time that the changes are actually implemented (a
type of C.O.D. arrangement). Given the fact that in many situations wages are
already above competition, it may not make sense to pay additional rewards on
a continuing basis for productivity improvements reached through collective
bargaining.
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Summary of Programs
As can be seen from the preceeding discussion, there is a wide variety
of programs being used by American corporations. The efforts have focused on
all areas and levels of the organization -- white as well as blue collar. The
one remaining topic, technology, received high marks as one of the most
effective areas. However, these programs have a weaker link to many of the
traditional industrial relations arrangements. As a result, we have chosen to
incorporate the discussion of technology and other investment decisions into a
separate chapter of this paper.
After reviewing the multitude of efforts, one comes away wondering
whether or not there is any real focus to the efforts. Are the programs
really addressing those issues which have been identified as the major
inhibitors to productivity growth, or has there been a scatter-shot effort to
fix short term crises? This is a question we will address in a later chapter.
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CHAPTER III
EMPLOYMENT CONTINUITY
Introduction
In this chapter we will consider the subject of employment continuity.
It is a theme that emerges quite sharply from the paper by Martin
Brofenbrenner dealing with the Japanese model. In our survey, we did not
elicit information about employment continuity as a positive program. Indeed,
none of the corporations volunteered any information about their employment
policies as facilitative of productivity improvement. Nevertheless, we feel
that this subject is a fundamental condition. To use the words of Baumol, it
is a necessary condition for productivity improvement.
Two quotations from union and management leaders in the automobile
industry can be offered at this point to underscore the importance of the
fundamental relationship between the workers' outlook with respect to
employment stability and various aspects of productivity, such as the adoption
of new technology and the pursuit of quality of work programs.
Fraser
"The important question here (European countries) was not
the spectre of being unemployed, but whether the worker
felt secure in his own job, or could count on an
acceptable alternative if necessary. This consideration
was evident in all countries, even those socialist states
which had guaranteed full employment. What bothered many
workers was that they might be displaced from a position
they liked and have to move to a less agreeable job or
location. Assurance that this would not happen
stimulated confidence that automation had benefited the
workers and support for introducing new machinery and
equipment. "1
1Doug Fraser, "Employee Participation in Productivity: A Labor
View," Productivity Prospects for Growth, Jerome M. Rosow, ed. (New
York: 0. Van Nostrand Company, 1981).
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Fuller
"Employees must have a high degree of economic security.
Unless employees feel they are economically secure,
quality of work life has little change of developing its
full potential. In Japan, for example, which has a
strong quality-of-work life program, employees are not
laid off when there is a downturn in business. I think
we in this country too must find innovative ways of
utilizing people during economic downturns. This is
critically important because we cannot expect people to
immerse themselves in the organization if the threat of
layoff hangs over their heads."1
The Strategy of Employment Continuity
The pervasive effect of Job insecurity on productivity is not as
observable as the other inhibitors, such as lack of motivation and restrictive
work rules, nevertheless, it is a fundamental force for either dragging down
productivity or enabling it to reach its "natural" level. The central theme
for relating the subject of job security to productivity is the following:
In the absence of other arrangements for insuring adequate
output (such as machine pacing, close supervision, positive
incentives, and disciplinary penalties) the perception of
impending unemployment will lower output or productivity.
The basic point is that any change in expectations about job tenure will
have a direct bearing on worker productivity. Over time workers develop
expectations about the degree of job security that is inherent in a given
employment relationship. Unemployment may be part of the situation as is the
case in craft industries and in many manufacturing operations where workers
are laid off subject to recall, but such insecurity can be taken in stride
with no serious consequences for productivity.
lStephen H. Fuller, "Employee Participation in Productivity: A
Management View," Productivity Prospects for Growth, Jerome M. Rosow, op. cit.
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The problem for productivity develops when there is a change in
expectations for the worse, usually as a result of market developments. Thus,
if workers perceive the possibility of their plant being shut down or a large
group of workers feel that they are vulnerable to permanent layoff, then
productivity will be adversely affected.
Based on some work done by Greenhalgh and McKersie, we can say that the
announcement of impending cutbacks will reduce productivity by a minimum of
two percent.l Such a number would apply to companies like Polaroid and
Xerox which have announced large cutbacks and have said that it will take a
period of time to sort through who leaves on a voluntary basis (with a golden
handshake program) and who is severed involuntary. Xerox announced that over
the next several years it will trim its work force by 20%. More recently,
Polaroid has indicated that it will be cutting 1,000 employees from its
payroll. Other examples that have occurred within the recent past would
involve Equitable Life Assurance and Corning Glass Company; both of these
companies engaged in substantial reductions in work force during the mid to
late 1970s.
From an examination of these examples, the following costs and
productivity problems can be cited:
lGreenhalgh, Leonard and Robert McKersie, "Cost Effectiveness of
Alternative Strategies for Cutback Management," Public Administration Review,
November/December 1980, pp. 575-84.
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Usually turnover increases substantially. For example,
in the case of one of the companies ust mentioned,
turnover increased to 10% per annum in the wake of the
announcement about impending separations. Usually, the
people who leave voluntarily are the younger workers with
more Job opportunities (and often the best workers). In
the case of another company, a number of skilled
electrical engineers have already departed and headed for
openings in other firms.
A substantial drop in morale takes place throughout the
organization. At the headquarters of one of these
organizations, there are 500 people in the management
category who will be redeployed. The individuals do not
know just who will be selected. Consequently, there is
great uncertainty and malaise during the period of waitng
and wondering.
There are remarkably few studies that actually provide data concerning
the productivity consequences of impending layoffs. There are many assertions
of the following sort: "By and large, worker efficiency almost never goes up
when layoffs come. Reaction is just the opposite of what you might
expect."l
The linkage between insecurity and productivity was stated very
poignantly by one of the division industrial relations directors for a large
company completing our questionnaire: "When employees feel insecure, the trend
in productivity is down." More significantly, as we have shown in the
appendix dealing with restraints, when policies for handling excess workers at
the corporate level are correlated with restraints for the same corporations
on a plant-by-plant basis, a strong connection exists between use of layoffs
(in contrast to attrition) and restraints to productivity such as resistance
to change and absenteeism. Thus, the implication is that if a company were
able to modify its work force management policy to one of avoiding layoffs,
then it might be expected that some of these negative factors would be reduced.
1Wall Street Journal, August 6, 1970.
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In situations where unions are present, the rule of seniority serves to
protect most workers against layoffs and in this sense seniority is a positive
device for immunizing senior workers from the fear that they would be affected
by partial shutdowns. However, if the spectre of a total shutdown is present
(as is the case today in a number of industries), then a change in
expectations will affect all workers at the establishment.
The important point to emphasize is that it is a change in expectations
(for the worst) that impacts negatively on productivity. In many employment
relationships workers grow accustomed to patterns of work alternated by
inactivity -- indeed, they may come to prefer this alternation of work and
respite. One can think of the labor market as having jobs with different
patterns of income and leisure and workers with different preferences. Over
time, the workers and the job characteristics sort themselves out so that a
given pattern of work and unemployment may be quite acceptable to a given
clientele of workers. Thus, we are not saying that layoffs, in and of
themselves, are dysfunctional. What we are saying is that it is a change in
expectations, and not primarily expectations about temporary unemployment but
expectations about permanent job loss, that is relevant for this discussion.
This distinction is important for interpreting the agreement between UAW
and the Ford Motor Company which has added a number of items aimed at
enhancing Job security.
The Ford Example
The recent agreement between Ford Motor Company and the
UAW contains a number of very interesting job security
provisions that are worth summarizing at this point in the
discussion.
The major program in terms of coverage is the income
maintenance for workers with more than 15 years of service,
this income guarantee can reach 70% of pre-tax earnings. The
company has constrained its liability by several provisions
which ensure that the worker will only receive the income
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maintenance if other obs in the company are not available
within 50 miles and only if other work is not available to the
individual in the local labor market. Thus, the company has
taken a calculated risk that it will either have work for
employees with more than 15 years of service or other work
will be found so that its financial exposure is kept within
tolerable limits.
A second concept involves experimenting with no layoffs
at two, and possibly as many as four, plant locations. The
objective is to say to 85% of the workers that there will be
no layoffs. As a result of bringing work into the plant, work
sharing and other devices for stablizing employment, the
company and the union will experiment with the concept of
avoiding layoffs.
Finally, the company has pledged itself where excess
workers are present to handle the shifts as much as possible
by attrition.
Generally, the distinction is made throughout the new
agreement as between work force fluctuations that the company
has some control over (such issues as outsourcing and model
changeovers) versus those changes that would be required as a
result of a general drop in demand for automobiles.
The Objective of Employment Continuity
The concept of continuity of employment should be viewed as an objective
or goal, rather than as a commitment. Economic circumstances may not permit
the fulfillment of such a goal and this is a reason for stating it as an
objective rather than as a guarantee.
It is'clear that any assurance about continuity of employment has to
make a meaningful difference. There is little gain if what is involved is the
elimination of temporary periods of idleness when the workers affected may
actually prefer such periods of unemployment. Similarly, there is little gain
in talking about ob insecurity if the workers and their representatives are
in a position to pursue other avenues to the same end. For example, for a
company to proffer assurances about continuity of employment, when the unions
have been able to obtain tariff protection for the industry, is a relatively
weak pronouncement.
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It should be clear that our preference is for realizing economic change,
but in doing so, protecting the employment continuity of the workers
involved. This does not mean attachment to certain Jobs, but it means
maintaining career employment opportunities, to the extent practical for those
on board. This certainly is the emphasis that a majority of Japanese
companies bring to the employment relationship. It also characterizes the
personnel policies of large companies like IBM, and Hewlett-Packard. A
company can go much further in realizing continuity of employment for changes
that it has some control over, such as the introduction of new technology, the
impact of productivity bargaining and the potential for a quality work
program. For example, assurances have been meaningful in the case of
discussions about new technology between ATT and the CWA. And as a result of
the recent negotiatons, the company has guaranteed that no workers would be
laid off as a result of the quality of work efforts and the introduction of
new technology.
A basic point emanating from a number of programs such as productivity
bargaining and quality of work is that satisfactory results will not be
realized without dealing with the importance of employment continuity, that
is, it is difficult to achieve the upside potential without guaranteeing that
there will be no downside risk for the individuals involved. For example, a
recent paper on the U.S. productivity problem commented as follows: "The
disappointing results from the quality of work life effort were attributed to
employee fears that they would be doing themselves out of jobs if they were
successful in improving productivity. These fears were stimulated by the
historic cyclicality of the domestic business and the absence of any
assurances from management that their employment security would be
protected."1l
lJudson, Arnold, "We Have Met the Enemy and They Is Us: A Fresh
Perspective on the U.S. Productivity Problem," unpublished, 1982.
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Employment Security and Productivity Bargaining
Many of the assurances about continuity of employment have been given as
part of the negotiations leading to a productivity deal. The company or
industry in question would like to move to a new generation of technology and
to revise the existing work rules. The employment guarantee comes in as a
type of floor or safety net so that the workers are aware that they will be
"no worse off" than before the productivity deal. The productivity deal is
the exchange of better wage and benefits for the alteration of the existing
situation. We can give a number of illustrations at this point.
1. The Railroad Industry. The railroad industry has seen a
number of major agreements that have brought the
introduction of a wide range of new technology. One
author concluded, the union's ability to bargain for, and
obtain, contract clauses guaranteeing reduction in force
only by attrition has undoubtedly lessened the
possibility of industrial strife when new technology is
introduced.
2. Newpapers. In 1974, the New York Times (and other
newspapers) and the International Typographical Workers
Union signed an eleven-year agreement. The union gave
management a free hand to introduce new technology and
make any other alterations it desired in the composing
room in exchange for a guarantee of lifetime employment,
coupled with the indexing of wages to cost of living. As
a result productivity has increased 400%.1
3. The Construction Industry. The construction industry has
talked quite often about efforts to stabilize employment
as a way of reducing resistance to change. One of the
best examples of this is the agreement between the Sheet
Metal Workers Union and the major employers in that
industry, called The Stabilization Agreement, signed in
1973, that provides the payment of up to 180 hours over a
six-month period for workers whose hours fall below the
average of the local. This guarantee was given in
exchange for commitment to "no featherbedding."2
1Goldberg, Joseph P., "Bargaining and Productivity in the Private
Sector," in Collective Bargaining and Productivity (Madison: WI: IRRA, 1975)
p. 36.
2Goldberg, Joseph P., Op. Cit., p. 33.
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4. Electrical Equipment. A study reported in 1978 that
General Electric at its Lynn operations was able to
introduce new technology into its drafting operation
because it "placed reliance on attrition to protect the
incumbents of jobs made redundant by technological
change."1
Recently, as it has become clear that many obs are in eopardy, because
of foreign competition or because of a basic restructuring in competitive
markets, the desire of workers (and to some extent the union representatives)
to protect the employment base has been used as the fulcrum for improving
productivity. As time passes, more and more illustrations come to the fore of
what has been called concession bargaining or "saving your job through
productivity improvements:"
1. Recently United Airlines has signed an agreement with the
Airline Pilots Association that eliminates costly rules,
such as reducing the size of the crew in the 737 cockpit
from three to two pilots. In exchange for this, United
guaranteed approximately 4,600 pilot jobs at current
levels approximately 800 beyond their needs (it has also
been reported that United will be using some of the
pilots not needed for its main operations in a new
subsidiary called Friendship, which is competing
head-to-head with low-cost operators).
2. Similarly, the employees at Republic Airlines have agreed
to a wide range of work rule concessions in return for a
company pledge to hold layoffs to no more than 2% of the
work force. Quite significantly, in this instance labor
costs are being lowered quite drastically as a result of
cuts in compensation with pay being reduced 10% for six
months.
Given the travail of the automobile industry, it is not surprising that
Job security-driven productivity deals have been emerging with some frequency
as of late. Early in November 1981, Ford Motor Company announced that two
plants would be kept open as a result of the rank and file acceptance for a
1Zager, Robert, "The Problem of Job Obsolescence: Working It Out at
River Works," Monthly Labor Review, July 1978.
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number of important changes. Some of the changes involved more flexibility in
scheduling overtime, use of outside contractors to perform maintenance, and
changing vacation rules to reduce the need for temporary workers. This
particular illustration also contains elements of a new development that could
be called job investment bargaining because, in addition to promising to keep
the plant open, the company also committed (in the case of the Livonia
transmission plant) investment in the equipment necessary to build automatic
transmissions for front-wheel drive cars.
In some cases, the use of job security as a driving force for change is
not done as directly as the foregoing examples would indicate. In the instance
of one company, management was able to get a range of changes by saying that
they needed the changes to "give the company the best shot at keeping the plant
open." In other words, no guarantees were given that the company would hold
the obs in place -- rather the changes were needed so as to increase the
probability, but not the certainty, of employment security.
We have been emphasizing the advantages of employment continuity as a
facilitating arrangement for productivity improvement programs. By eliminating
one of the fears (increasing productivity only to be laid off) the policy can
be seen as a necessary prerequisite condition. The policy also exerts a
beneficial effect on the management side, namely, such a policy puts pressure
on management to look to the long-run in terms of activities that will help
stabilize the business. This long-run orientation, in and of itself, can be
supportive of productivity improvement.
Program Principles
The first precept is to take advantage of the insecurity that is always
present in any employment relationship and to use it as a positive force for
improving productivity, thereby enhancing the job security of the enterprise.
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Thus the connection is reciprocal: it is not just eliminating job insecurity
because of its drag on productivity, but actually acknowledging that some job
insecurity does exist and approaching the organization in a way that informs
and motivates everyone to improve the viability of the enterprise over the
longer run. In the section of the report dealing with positive programs we
described some of the communication efforts and other arrangements that are put
in place to involve workers via economic information concerning the future of
the business. In a conceptual sense, the objective is to take an offensive
position with respect to job insecurity rather than having the organization
react defensively, possibly realizing job retention in the short run, but in
the long run eopardizing the very viability of the enterprise.
Second, it would appear that a reduction in the size of the work force is
better done by attritionI than by layoffs, assuming that the cutback is not
large and that the transition period is no longer than a year.
Another principle, and one that is facilitative of the attrition
strategy, is the active re-deployment of workers from divisions of the business
that are declining to divisions of the business that have openings. This
requires the willingness of workers to engage in training and to acquire new
skills and possibly even to be transferred geographically. The concept is that
the worker is not guaranteed a particular ob, but is guaranteed employment
with the company; or more specifically guaranteed an opportunity or an
alternative if the current position needs to be terminated.
lThe principle of attrition has to be reconciled with the economic
realities. If the displacement of workers is of such magnitude that the
carrying time and the carrying costs would be prohibitive, then attrition is
not a reasonable policy. Of course, in some situations the unions have the
bargaining power to prevent change unless attrition is given as a concession.
This would describe what has happened in railroads,. newspapers and
longshoring. Given the slowness of change in these industries, an
organization should be cautious of outright adherence to attrition in all
cases.
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Several factors facilitate the re-deployment that is necessary if
something approaching continuity of employment is to be realized. There may
be periods of time when the size of the excess complement is such that some
type of work sharing is needed until attrition takes up the slack or an
increase in volume of operations occurs. Re-deployment is made easier in the
absence of sharp jurisdictional lines that may be present with craft unions.
Thus, for example, German companies have been able to manage work force
transitions more easily than companies in the United States because of the
emphasis on industrial unions that represent all workers rather than multiple
unionism at the plant level, as is very much the case in Britain and to some
extent the case in the United States.
The commitment to employment continuity has been implemented by Japanese
companies even in the face of substantial employment cutbacks, as have
occurred in shipbuilding and the steel industries, two industries that have
come under severe pressure from worldwide reductions in demand. In some
instances the numbers of workers involved are very large since Japanese
companies follow a practice of concentrating production of a given product at
one location. A variety of programs are used such as retraining, relocation,
loaning of workers to other enterprises, and early retirement. The fact that
they place such emphasis on making sure that the workers who are affected by
change are continued in some type of employment goes a long way towards
encouraging the acceptance of change and eliminating any fears that working
harder will mean being without work.
The above programs and principles require considerable expertise in a
field that has come to be called human resource management. Based on an
analysis of best practice in Germany, it turns out that the companies that
have been able to handle transitions without layoffs have been those companies
where the personnel function has high standing and where there is considerable
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knowledge and staff in the area of human resource planning. Unfortunately, in
the United States too many companies lack the technical knowledge about the
human side of the enterprise and move ahead with changes only to find
substantial costs that they had never anticipated. Such companies have not
been skillful in fashioning early separation programs, for in some cases these
programs have been oversubscribed while in other cases they have been
under-subscribed, forcing the organization into a program of involuntary
separations. The state of the art is better than most companies think in
terms of making predictions about which workers will do what in terms of
retention and separation decisions. The point of all of this is that the
"messy period" of change needs to be handled as quickly as possible and the
role of human resource planning management is critical in minimizing the
disruption and the deterioration of productivity.
A Balanced Perspective
Before concluding this section on employment continuity, we would like
to put this policy in perspective. A policy of employment security is much
more feasible as a facilitating condition for productivity bargaining or
quality of work life than it is for a major restructuring that involves the
shift of substantial production facilities. Thus, what may be functional for
one context may not be for the other context. For example, we have placed
considerable emphasis on employment security. But such an emphasis needs to
be kept in perspective, for if it becomes a primary objective, then it can
prevent economic restructuring and the process of change that over the
long-run will lead to much better productivity. What is needed is a proper
balance between economic change and cushioning the consequences for the
workers involved. Germany represents a good example of balancing these
interests. Britain, on the other hand, falls at one extreme of putting so
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much emphasis (at least during the era of the Labor Government) on preventing
Job loss and protecting workers that economic change was inhibited. Perhaps,
the United States has fallen at the other extreme of to some extent ignoring
the human consequences thereby creating considerable resistance and turmoil.
The balance to be achieved does depend upon the extent and pace of
economic restructuring. If the restructuring that is taking place is
selective and can be staged over a period of several years, then the German
approach makes considerable sense. However, if the change is widespread and
rapid as has been the case in several U.S. manufacturing industries, then the
U.S. system of severing workers may be preferable, even though there are
substantial short-run costs.
The important point should not be overlooked that an occasional
separation of workers may have a very beneficial impact on the organization.
If seniority rules do not have to be followed assiduously, it may be possible
for the company to "weed out the weak members." In fact, if done properly, an
occasional cutback may give an organization a lift in productivity, to the
extent that marginal employees have been let go.1
lIn executing a cutback and in weeding out employees who are poor
performers, companies typically draw a circle around the event so that others
in the organization will not fear that their "turn is next." A variety of
devices are used to draw such a circle: keep the decision quiet, disguise
elimination of weak employees as a reorganizational move, have the departure
be "voluntary," and finally, indicate to the organization that the elimination
of "dead wood" had to take place and it represented a "one-time only"
arrangement. In some situations the majority of the individuals in an
organization may say "its about time" that certain employeees were
eliminated. Consequently, management finds itself doing a balancing act
between eliminating poor performers and making sure there are no
organization-wide consequences coming from terminations.
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The Outlook
The future probably will see more attention being paid to the subject of
Job security. Whereas in a survey taken several years ago, only 1% of the
executives saw an connection between job security and productivity, that
myopia is now an historical curiosity.l
It is clear that the powerful lesson of the Japanese system of career
employment has created considerable attention and experimentation in this
country.
lIn the Sentry study, only 1% of the executives thought that
increasing job security would help productivity. (The number for workers,
while higher at a 21% level, did not at that time reflect a widely-held belief
about this relationship.) See Sentry, op. cit., pp. XII.
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CHAPTER IV
STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES
Introduction
In this chapter we would like to draw together the highlights of the
earlier sections of the report and extend our thinking about various strategic
options that have a connection to productivity improvement. There are many
strategies for improving productivity but we will discuss only those that deal
with the human resource side of the organization.
As we step back at this point in the analysis and highlight the major
findings of the survey, we come to the conclusion that a very fundamental
mismatch appears to exist between the restraints that were identified as key
reasons for the productivity problem and the programs that companies and
plants identified as being most effective.
On the one hand the major contributors to the productivity deficit all
can be subsumed under the theme of change and restructuring. For example, the
motivational challenge, as exemplified by an increase in absenteeism, can be
attributed to a change in the demography and values of the work force.
Similarly, the pervasiveness of work rule problems stems from the fact that
most industries are undergoing important changes in organization and
technology, and work rules which are less of a problem in a steady state
condition are very troublesome as the need is presented to update and
modernize. The third major factor identified in the survey, resistance to
change, is the best manifestation of the point we have been making namely,
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that productivity problems emerge from the inability of the existing
organization, to wit the internal arrangements, to be adapted to a new
environment -- this is true whether we are talking about the impact of the
market place and economic pressures or the labor market and a "new breed" of
employees.
Thus it is important to ponder the dichotomy between these themes of
change on the problem side and the "business as usual" programs on the action
side. The importance of productivity improvement programs, such as management
methods and wage payment systems, suggest that in many organizations
management is pursuing the improvement of productivity via traditional means.
The emphasis on technology and training does suggest that programs that help
the organization adapt are in the picture but the overall impression from the
action side of the survey is that the programs being used are not responsive
to the basic needs that most organizations face. This is best illustrated
with the subject of absenteeism that ranked as a top restraint, but on the
action side fell to the bottom of effective programs. Companies are
experiencing increased absenteeism because of a changed mileau and a changed
work force, yet their response is to use fairly traditional carrot and stick
arrangements which are not proving very helpful.
One of the reasons for the mismatch between the basic problems of
resistance to change, work rules, and motivation, and the various programs
being used by corporations to enhance productivity is the tendency of U.S.
business to respond to a crisis by looking for ready-made solutions such as
quality circle programs rather than probing more deeply into structure,
strategy, and process. The productivity problem has been a long time in the
making and consequently programmatic responses here and there are unlikely to
make very much of a difference. It is our contention that fundamental changes
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in outlook, policy, and strategy are required if there is going to be a
different productivity result.
Levels of Analysis
In organizing this section, we have decided to separate our discussion
into three levels: the industry, the plant and the work group. The
corresponding themes are technology and investment (rationalization), the
design of work structures (harmonization) and the development of high
commitment (intensification). Before delving into a discussion of these three
strategies, a few words of introduction and comparison are appropriate. (See
Table 3 for summary of main points.)
Rationalization of Investment - This theme has to do with basic business
decisions about the location of capital. The thrust of new technology is a
very important factor governing long-term business decisions. The forces
driving the investment decision are competitive pressures emanating from the
world economic and technological environment. These forces affect all
companies in an industry and sooner or later if a corporation wants to
survive; it will be forced to modernize its operations in some fashion or
other. As we will see, the subject involves important choices or options as
between the new plant (sometimes a greenfield site alternative) versus the
retrofitting of an existing plant.
Industrial relations considerations are vitally involved in this choice --
for example, whether to modernize an existing plant or to move to a new
facility. In turn, the manner in which capital is redeployed and the nature
and extent of the dislocation involved for the workers affect the willingness
of workers and their unions to go along with change. In the United States the
relationship has either been arms length, that is, business leaders make
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investment decisions and workers and union representatives say, "That's their
business," or the relationship has been one of antagonism and protracted
conflict.
The pace of change can vary quite substantially and herein lies a very
important area of choice where industrial relations considerations directly
Join the capital and investment considerations. European countries,
especially Germany, appear to have achieved an integration between the
economic "must" to get on with restructuring and the human "ought" to do it in
such a way that the impact on individuals is minimized.
We see the connection between investment decisions and industrial
relations being mixed motive, with some conflict inevitable but also with some
cooperative potential present even if not realized. Our discussion of this
level and the strategy questions involved will underscore the way in which an
integration of interests can be more pursued successfully by management and
labor in the United States.
Design of Work Structures - With this subject we move to the middle
level, to the plant or to the enterprise where the technology is in place and
the challenge is to design an appropriate work organization for the given
technology. The analysis of strategy at the plant level will draw heavily on
our earlier discussion of productivity bargaining since this process is one of
the main avenues for achieving the correct work organization. Given the fact
that internal arrangements often are out of alignment with what is required by
the technological environment, it is the function of productivity bargaining
to achieve a new harmonization.
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TABLE 3
LEVELS OF STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
Plant
Individual/Small
Group
Rationalization of
Capital Resources
Greenfield versus
Retrofit
Changes in
Technology and
World Wide
Economic Changes
Harmonization of
Work Structure
Productivity
Bargaining: Buyout
Or Organizational
Change
Competitive Factors
Intensification of
Human Resources
Involvement Programs
Versus Administrative
Change
New Values and
Demographics
Productivity
Potential
Large: Shift in
Capital/Labor
Ratio
Moderate: Elimina-
tion of X-
Inefficiency
Moderate: Elimination
of X-Inefficiency
Model System
Industry
Theme
Major
Options
Impetus
Germany U.S. Japan
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For this level of the analysis, there is no alternate industrial
relations system or model that can be emulated. Historically, a key strength
of the U.S. system of collective bargaining has been its ability to grapple
with productivity problems through collective bargaining. Herein involved is
the key subject of work rules and the role that they play in affecting
productivity, both for good and for ill.
As we have shown in our regression analysis in the Appendix, the
presence of work rules is very much associated with the presence of unions.
Consequently, in this section of the report we will need to confront the very
emotional issue of union avoidance, given the assertion by many managers that
their union-free plants show much higher productivity than their organized
plants.
Development of High Commitment - With this level we consider the subject
that has been of primary attention throughout the discussion of involvement,
namely, how to motivate the individual and the work group to perform at full
potential. Against the backdrop of the many techniques and programs that
organizations use to stimulate involvement on the part of individuals and
groups in the pursuit of higher productivity, we would like to present a more
conceptual orientation to the subject and to link activities at this level to
those at the plant and industry levels. The model system for this level is
that of Japan and its proven success with respect to the motivation and
involvement of individual workers.
Respective Productivity Payoffs
When the question is asked about the potential payoffs coming from the
different levels of analysis, the question is not easy to answer. A whole
host of factors with respect to rate of technological change, availability of
investment, cultural factors and the like shape the respective payoffs.
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However, in general we can establish a rank order of importance. We see the
largest potential in the long run emanating from industry-wide developments in
the form of new capital investment, especially for those industries that have
a heavy technological base. In some industries in a matter of five or six
years a whole new generation of technology has been introduced and
productivity has improved several fold. The next, in order of importance,
would be the strategy of designing the appropriate work organization -- where
over a period of several years, productivity might be improved between 30 and
40. This estimate is derived by comparing the impact of different work
organizations (for similar technologies) across comparable plants.l
Finally, at the level of the individual and small group, the contribution is
smallest in the range of 10 or 20%, the margin that is usually assumed to be
available if workers can be motivated to the upmost with some type of
incentive or gainsharing system.
In passing we should mention one caveat, namely because a pay off is
potentially available does not say that it is easily obtainable. If capital
is not available to exploit new technology, then the expected value from the
highest level of decision-making with respect to new plants and new technology
may be relatively low compared to eliminating outmoded workrules or installing
a program for involving workers. In other words, when the feasibility side is
factored in, it is not clear without specifying other particulars which
strategic level will yield the most cost-effective results.
1Katz, et. al., op. cit.
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The Distinctive Connection of Industrial Relations
In a subsequent chapter we will return to the main order of business for
our report, that is, identifying the special connection of industrial
relations to the subject of productivity and the nature of the
labor-management relationship itself. To anticipate some of the main
arguments, we see more and more relationships moving in the collaborative
direction under the influence of the Japanese model and as a result of the
pressures coming from the current economic predicament. One of the concepts
that links a collaborative relationship with work rules and with investment
strategy is what we call - "job-investment bargaining," wherein through a
process of labor management consultation (generally not formal bargaining) the
parties agree on a package wherein additional investment is committed to the
existing operation in exchange for improvements in productivity, such as the
elimination of onerous work rules, abandonment of ineffective incentives and
employment of labor on a round-the-clock basis in order to fully utilize the
capital involved. The approach is not full-fledged co-determination, yet
unions are very much involved in discussing investment decisions and their
implications for employment and the long-run survival of the firm.
One of the policies that facilitates the integrative linkage is
employment continuity. Here, the broad alternatives involve on the one hand
viewing labor as a variable cost to be hired and let go as needed versus
viewing labor as an asset to be recruited, trained, and re-deployed within the
enterprise. Given the stimulus of the Japanese model, more and more firms
have been considering the concept of career employment and enhancing Job
security for their workers. Such an approach can eliminate some of the
resistance to change that is inherent when workers worry about their jobs in
the face of new technology. In turn the new technology and a commitment to
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invest in the operations (especially at existing locations) can enhance the
economic viability of the enterprise and consequently job security. Thus we
have a reinforcement between certain policies with respect to capital
deployment (such as retrofitting existing operations) and approaches to the
employment relationship (such as emphasizing continuity of employment).
Rationalization
Introduction
We have chosen a term frequently used in Europe to describe the process of
restructuring the physical facilities of the business. The process is one
that usually sweeps through an entire industry due to technological
developments or cost factors that lead to a shift in the world-wide deployment
of manufacturing facilities within a given industry. It is a very big subject
and involves many different kinds of investment decisions. We will confine
ourselves to contrasting the movement of facilities to a new location versus
the modernization of facilities at an existing location. It is around these
two options that industrial relations considerations are sharply focused.
The Investment Strategy of "New is Better"
In this section we would like to examine in some detail an investment
strategy that attempts to meet the fundamental problem of resistance to
change. As we noted in Chapter I (and amplified in the Appendix), resistance
to change is a function of the age of facilities. Apparently, an aging or
type of ossification process takes place in most enterprises so that over time
the organization loses its adaptability. This may be due to the accumulation
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of tradition or the aging of the work force or some combination of these two
factors. This process takes place regardless of whether a union is on the
scene.
An obvious response to this "fact of life" is for companies to "abandon
the old and to emphasize the new." The establishment of a new plant also
presents a company with an opportunity to choose the type of social system it
would like to put in place. Many companies are installing participative, open
systems in their new plants and deriving impressive rsults. This can be seen
by the comparison contained in Table 4 which illustrates the dramatically
different systems in place, as well as the contrasting productivity results,
for two plants both within the same company and the same state.
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TABLE 4
DOUBLE-BREASTED EMPLOYER
Industry: Manufacturing
"Traditional" Plant "New System" Plant
Location:
Size:
Age:
Union:
PA
841
100 years
Yes
PA
1068
10 years
No
Restraints:
New Technology
Introduction:
Deployment of
Labor:
1 - product change and
complexity
2 - resist change
3 - crew size
4 - subcontracting
5 - seniority
Cautious acceptance by
union leaders and
members
Not very flexible
None - absentee average =
1.8%
- Two OSHA complaints
in five years
- Seniority systems
reviewed yearly to
keep up with techno-
logical change
Encouragement; over 200
changes in process since
'72: many suggested by
employees
No craft lines; maintenance
trained to do general
maintenance; many
maintenance tasks performed
by laborers and productivity
employees; all on salaried
pay/five classifications
- Quality Circles in
progress
- Negotiation agreements
on wage and seniority
plans
- Early retirement (30
and out)
Productivity
Trend: Relatively constant
- Looking at Quality Circles
- Cost Awareness Program
- Retrained workers when
jobs were eliminated by
computerization
- Elaborate committee
programs
Man hours/unit reduced 40%
by better schedule and
coordinating process in five
years
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Programs:
Examples of the Productivity Advantage of New Plants
Considerable publicity has been given to the advantages of moving to a
"greenfield" site and there are a number of studies that document the higher
productivity that is obtained when a plant is started from scratch with the
latest technology and with the recruitment of a brand new work force. A few
citations can be given:
1. A large tobacco company has parallel operations, one in a
large urban area and another in a rural area of the
South. The southern operation is just several years old
while the urban operation has been at its location for
decades. Productivity at the southern operation is about
twice what it is at the older, urban location. Some of
the differences are explained by very modern equipment,
some by worker flexibility -- operators at the southern
plant do much more adjustment work to operating equipment
and craftsmen perform as "all around" mechanics at the
new plant. However, state of the art machinery and the
need to keep this sophisticated equipment operating
smoothly does require a higher ratio of supervisors and
technicians to operators.
2. For a large company in the electrical equipment industry,
the productivity advantage of a new plant is 20% over its
"mother" plant. In this case, both are located in the
North, with one (the older plant) in an heavily
industrialized area and the new plant in a rural.location.
3. In an example from an automobile company, the
productivity difference between a newer plant in the
south and one in the North (older operation) is
approximately 20%. The newer plant is using team
concepts, as well as exploiting the latest in advanced
technology.
4. Several examples of a "new organization" come from the
movement of the rubber industry into radial tire
production. for the most part, the radial tire
facilities are at greenfield" sites. The rubber
companies have chosen to start from scratch, given the
dramatically different technology involved and the need
to fashion a different organziation of work to handle the
new technology. For example, radial tire plants do not
use piece-work incentives: they tend to have fewer
classifications and more flexibility for deploying
workers; and they operate on a continuous
(round-the-clock) basis. As a result most radial tire
plants either have been introduced by new companies
(Michelin) or at new sites (e.g., Mt. Vernon, IL by
General Tire; Lawton, OK and Union City, TN by Goodyear;
Decatur, IL and Wilson; NC by Firestone; Ardmore, OK by
Uniroyal; and Waco, Tx by General.) Where the radial
tire development has been located adjacent to a
conventional tire plant (Gadsten, AL of Goodyear), some
retarding influences have spilled over from the old
culture and it has been difficult to realize a clean
break in the organization of work and outlook of workers.
5. A large company engaged in the manufacture of aircraft
engines has compared productivity as between an older,
urban operation and a newer rural operation. The first
is unionized and the second is not. In this case,
productivity is 16% better in the nonunion operation,
primarily because absenteeism is only 3-4%, whereas it is
double that level at the older operation. There is also
a difference in capital and technology so that it is not
straightforward to credit the motivational factor as
solely responsible for the productivity difference.
6. In the case of a manufacturer of diesel engines,
productivity in a newer, non-union operation is as high
as (and beginning to surpass) the productivity in an
older, union operation. Again, absenteeism in the new
plant is about 3-4% whereas it is at least double that in
the older operation. It has taken at least five years to
bring quality at the new operation up to the levels
achieved at the older operation. Another facet of the
new operation is a heavy emphasis on quality of work
processes. Management spends about 60% of its time
facilitating the process of involvement at the new
operation, whereas the percentage would be much lower for
the older and more traditional operation. With respect
to the dimension of unionization, the workers at the new
operation - most of them having been members of unions
when they worked at other plants in this city -- have
said that: "We do not want to return to a structured
environment of the sort that typically is associated when
unions are present." The company feels that the
motivation and commitment of the workers is much higher
at the new operation.
7. A direct comparison was made in one shipbuilding company
between a newer and older operation - with the former
having an advantage of 50%. In this case, other
variables intervened, such as a difference between a
unionized status and an unorganized status, which allowed
for flexibility in deploying labor across craft lines.
While this factor may have explained some of the
difference in productivity, management thought that a
great deal of the differece was due to greater emphasis
on assembly line methods in the newer plants.
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8. A dramatic illustration of the difference in productivity
between what can be achieved in a new "state of the art"
facility and an existing tire plant can be seen in the
objectives being set by Bridgestone of Japan as it explores
the potsiblity of taking over the Firestone facility in
Nashville, TN. Bridgestone estimates that the plant is seven
or eight years behind in technology and that "a worthwhile
challenge would be to double production with the present
number of employees."1
Advantages of Mature Plants
While there are a number of distinct advantages to new plants, the
alternative of retrofitting an existing plant has some inherent advantages.
For one thing, the experience inherent in an old plant may facilitate better
system performance than in a new plant. This is because the "teething" period
of a new plant may be quite long, espcially if new sophisticated technology is
required. Let us give some citations for this generalization:
1. A large semi-conductor company calculates that its
productivity is as good as its competitors, that have
been on the scene for only the past decade. This company
is heavily unionized while its competitors are generally
nonunion. It achieves its good performance through very
sophisticated manufacturing engineering that makes the
production process very reliable. The work force, which
is quite senior, is very sophisticated and very well
trained.
2. One of our case studies revealed a very interesting
comparison between a new operation in the South,
unorganized, and an older operation in the North,
unionized, both producing similar products. In this
instance, productivity is higher in the North by 10%.
This is explained by an older, well seasoned work force,
whereas in the South the work force is inexperienced and
there is considerable turnover (in some years amounting
to 50%). The manufacturing facility in the North would
be characterized as low-motivation (there is substantial
absenteeism) -- however, there is high attachment, (only
about 5% turnover; and after a long strike virtually
1Fortune, March 2, 1982.
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every worker returned to his job) and, many work rules
for the deployment of labor (no mandatory overtime and
rigid application of seniority for tansfers). By
contrast, the operation in the South involves much more
flexible deployment of labor (there are no union rules),
but the advantages of flexibility are not enough to
offset the human capital disadvantages of a very
transient work force that is not highly trained.
Summary of the Alternatives
The contrast can be sharpened by comparing directly the alternatives of
establishing a "greenfield" plant versus retrofitting an existing plant.
GREENFIELD SITE
More capital required
New workers require considerable
training
upgraded.
Motivation and outlook of workers
more positive
Flexibility in the deployment of
labor
RETROFIT
Upgrading and the introduction of a
new generation of equipment.
Existing workers have considerable
knowhow, but may need to be
Workers set in their ways
Considerable rigidity in the organi-
zation of work
Certainly, the establishment of a new operation may result in higher
productivity, precisely because it puts in place new arrangements and squeezes
out much of the "old." The opportunity for new beginnings, as we said
earlier, will always be salutory, at least in terms of introducing more
capital, and it will be especially invigorating if there are motivational and
work rule problems that can be shed along with the old p ant.
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Another way to make the contrast is to underscore the difference in
cultures as between the established system of an ongoing plant and the new
culture of a greenfield site. Briefly stated, the established system is
running, the work force trained, and if we believe in any of the advantages of
institutionalization, it has a certain momentum going for it. On the other
hand, the nev plant will have the opportunity to shape a new culture, and to
generate the enthusiasm that goes with new beginnings. Whether the new
culture will gradually evolve, so that in 15 or 20 years it will have some of
the same characteristics as the culture of existing plants is difficult to
determine (and a question to which research should be directed).
A number of other considerations and developments intervene in selecting
the strategic alternative, and it is to these contingencies that we now turn.
Technology - Clearly, technology exerts an important influence on the
choice. We can distinguish two dimensions of the technology variable: site
flexibility and the nature of the new generation of technology.
For some technologies such as steel, the reinvestment needs to be taken
at existing locations.l For other technologies such as electronics, the
greenfield site alternative is feasible. In between are industries such as
automobile and rubber where there may be advantages to locating plants near
existing plants but they are not decisive.2 For industries where new
1Significantly, large integrated steel mills are "site committed" --
but the smaller, mini-mills, have been able to realize the advantages of a
clean start -- several of these new plants are located in the Sunbelt and they
have fashioned industrial relations and organizational systems quite different
from basic steel. For a good example, see John Savage, op. cit. pp. 33-49.
2Some companies in the automobile industry and the rubber industry
have decided to locate new plants in the same labor market areas as plants
being terminated. This makes it possible for workers to be carried over but
it also makes it more difficult to change the social system of the new plant,
since there is a strong spillover of the old culture when workers are brought
over from existing plants.
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technology must follow the location of former investment, these capital
decisions are made without regard to the industrial relations situation
existing at a particular facility. In some cases, the relationship may
actually be perverse. One of the companies we contacted, told of an example
at one of its large Chicago area chemical plants that had a reputation for
very bad labor relations. Recently, the company decided on a major expansion
of the facility, despite the poor labor relations, because of the asset base
already in place and the need to have greater capacity for the Midwest
market. If anything, the commitment of the new capital to the plant enabled
the militant behavior of the union to go unchecked.
The other dimensions of technology relates to the nature of the change
that is underway. If a sharp discontinuity is present, such as a change from
conventional to radial tire production, that factor may be determining, i.e.,
choice of the Greenfield alternative, while if the new technology represents
refinements in the existing equipment, such as the upgrading that takes place
in many process industries that factor leads in the direction of the retrofit
option.
Availability of Funds - The choice between a new site versus upgrading
capital at an existing site is not as one-sided as it was for most of the
1960's and 1970's. With the high cost of capital (and assuming a new site
requires more capital) corporations are looking much more carefully at what
portion of existing operations can be upgraded. Quite significantly, a number
of plant respondents volunteered the point that limited capital resources were
holding back productivity. In other words, the ideas were available but the
funds were not forthcoming from corporate capital budgets. In this context,
the retrofit would be more feasible, compared to the greenfield site
alternative.
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Industrial Relations Considerations - The development of concession
bargaining (and the linkage of workrule changes to new investment) has
introduced a new element into the picture. In a number of situations
recently; the connection has been made quite explicit. As we noted in our
discussion of productivity bargaining, a direct link has been established
between changes in operating practices and the willingness of a company to
reinvest a substantial sum of money to enhance the competitive position of the
enterprise. We think of this process as ob-investment bargaining. Given the
shockwaves that have gone through the established manufacturing sector, there
appears to be a much greater willingness to get rid of old arrangements and to
freshen up the atmosphere via productivity bargaining, quality of work and
labor-management committees. The existing operation contains many assets, not
the least of which is an experienced workforce and routines that are familiar
and easily maintained.
Avoiding the Status Quo
We have framed the discussion for this section on rationalization as
choosing an alternative that involves the commitment of investment funds.
Before leaving this strategic level we would like to make a point that the
other option of allowing operations to drift should be avoided. Many of the
plants in our survey fell in the age range between 15 and 40 years. As we
Just noted, a number of these plants reported that they were unable to secure
needed resources from central capital budgeting programs to modernize their
operations. Based on other studies, it would appear that many plants in
manufacturing have been allowed to deteriorate slowly. The plant and
equipment are fully amortized and as long as there is demand for the product
the establishment is kept in existance. The workforce may also be aging along
with the equipment because new hiring has ceased.
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The problem with the rundown strategy is twofold as far as productivity
is concerned. First, productivity suffers directly since plant end equipment
-are not modernized and the establishment does not derive any benefits from a
new generation of equipment. Secondly, the workforce, aware of the gradual
rundown, often adopts a fatalistic attitude and develops a frame of mind of
"coasting until retirement or until the plant is finally shut down."
Harmonization
Introduction
The previous section dealt with the strategy of putting in place
up-to-date plant and equipment. Such a step can be viewed as creating the
structure or context for the design of the appropriate work structure. The
objective of harmonizing the work organization to the technological and
organizational environment of the plant brings the discussion into the
heartland of what most people perceive as the major connection between
industrial relations and productivity, specificially, the work rule problem.
The operating issue about how to update the organization through
productivity bargaining will not be discussed in this section except for one
comment that should be made in passing. A distinction can be made between
productivity bargaining that deals with outmoded work arrangements via a
direct buy-out ompared to that which is more open-ended and takes place on a
continuing basis. The first approach is more akin to conventional bargaining
and the use of quid pro quos, while the second resembles much more the process
of organizational change and the participation of the organization in a
rolling agenda of harmonization. We will have more to say about the latter
process as we take up the strategy and policy questions for intensification of
commitment at the level of individuals and small groups.
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Unions and Productivity Restraints
The relationship between unions and productivity is a very controversial
subject. Considerable disagreement exists about whether the connection is
positive or negative, and whether it depends upon other intervening
variables. On the one hand there is the view, supported by academic research,
that unions can lead to higher labor productivity. One of the explanations is
that since unions usually raise wage rates, companies, in response, mechanize
and hire higher quality workers, all of which contribute to better labor
productivity. This sequence has been referred to as the "shock effect:" the
pressure presented by unions motivates management to take steps to offset the
higher costs and restrictions of unions, with the net result being higher
labor productivity (although, not higher productivity when measured in a total
factor sense).
The academic work that has been done in support of the "shock effect"
theory has been centered on several industries, specifically cementl and
construction.2 It was concluded that productivity may be anywhere from 20
to 30 percent higher in unionized operations compared to un-organized
operations. The higher productivity may be a matter of survival because the
unionized sector pays wage and fringes that are also higher by a margin of 20
to 30 percent.
1Clark, Kim, B., "The Impact of Unionization on Productivity: A Case
Study," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, July, 1980, pp. 451-469.
2Bourden, Clint Union and Open Shop Construction (Lexington, MA:
Lexington Books, 19803.
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The opposing view, mainly espoused by management, is that unions and
their accompanying restrictions lead to lower productivity. The point is
often made by proponents of this perspective that the industries that appear
to be in the most trouble in terms of productivity are the very industries
where unions enjoy extensive representation rights. Usually, the argument is
underscored by the following type of analysis: "We have just opened a new
plant and it is operating on a nonunion basis and productivity is at least 20
percent higher than in a comparable union plant." In several instances where
decertifications had taken place, management has commented with enthusiasm
about its ability to operate the plants and deploy the workforce without
reference to rules that get in the way of productivity. A large chemical
company talked about the many flexibilities that it enjoyed without the union,
e.g., it could "roll the workforce" (that is, layoff a segment) without
getting into the problem of "chain bumping."
Certainly, rules and traditions develop regardless of whether a union is
present, e.g., seniority as a decision rule for deciding how to deploy workers
often emerges in a nonunion plant. For example, one of the large electronics
companies in our survey said that as a matter of self imposition, it used
seniority for overtime allocation in filling jobs even in their nonunion
plants. But while the principle of seniority is often in place in a nonunion
operations, it is usually easier for management to make exceptions. Another
consideration is that even if work rules and the division of labor is fairly
well developed in a nonunion operation, these rules are probably easier to
alter as conditions change.
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Sorting Through the Evidence
To some extent the claims by management that nonunion plants are more
efficient than their union plants overstates the true effect. Management
attempts to relate the productivity results to the fact that the plants are
nonunion but these plants also happen to be new plants, with workers who have
been newly recruited (often from rural labor markets) and newly trained. All
of these factors have a positive impact on productivity and whether a union is
present or not may be a minor consideration. The important question is: What
would productivity be like in a new plant located in an urban area, or what
would productivity be like in some of these plants in 15 or 20 years, after an
inevitable aging process has taken place?
Fortunately, we are in a position to partial out the separate effects of
age and union status that are associated with the investment strategy of
establishing a new plant. Based on the statistical analysis of the survey
data, we feel that the productivity benefit that comes from a new plant
(regardless of whether a union is present) is two or three times greater than
the effect of eliminating formal work rules because a union has not been
certified for the new plant. Since this is a very important conclusion, let
us provide some documentation. The restraint that is most closely aligned
with age is that of resistance to change which occurs uniformly across plants,
regardless of whether they are represented by a union or not. In unionized
plants resistance to change placed as high in the ranking of important
restraints as work rules.1
Resistance to change has a big productivity effect because it holds up
the introduction of new technology. Work rules impede productivity, but the
effect is of the order of 15 or 20 percent at any one time and it is not of
o1f the 40 unionized facilities in the survey sample, 85% identified
work rules and 83% identified resistance to change as productivity restraint.
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the magnitude of two- or three-fold increases that can be obtained with a new
generation of equipment. Thus, we conclude from this further analysis of the
evidence in the survey, that the relationship between unions and productivity
is not as negative as assumed by practitioners.
There is no reason that work rules in and of themselves should exert a
negative influence on productivity. In fact, the regularization and stability
that oes with rules may actually help productivity. Basically, the bind
develops when it comes time to change, for example, the necessity to shuffle
the operations because of a change in product line or volume. It is more
difficult in a union plant to handle a change in volume or to move to another
product line, or to shift workers from one department to another to fill in
the peaks and valleys. Let us develop this point in terms of the growth and
maturation of an industry.
The first phase of a company or industry can be called the development
phase. As volume grows the industry is able to engage in greater and greater
division of labor. Some of this can be explained in terms of Adam Smith's
theorizing ("Specialization is determined by the extent of the market"), or
alternatively, it might be explained in terms of Taylorism and the adoption by
management of techniques for breaking the operations down into components and
assigning semi-skilled workers.
Stage two comes with the entry of unions into the situation. In the
case of the U.S., unions have placed considerable emphasis on seniority as an
explicit decision rule for deciding who gets promoted and how work allocation
decisions are made. 1 In turn, the response of management to work allocation
based on seniority is to require even more specialization of labor so that the
Jobs are narrowly defined and management can be certain that someone who is
assigned on the basis of seniority has a reasonable chance of performing the
operation.
1We are indebted to Michael Piore for these perspectives.
If the operation is large and the volume of activity reasonable stable,
the extensive division of labor and the accompanying work rules may not be a
problem for productivity. Evidence for this point can be seen from the survey
data: work rules are more prominent as restraints in smaller unionized plants
than in larger unionized plants. In smaller plants more flexibility is
required, hence there is a conflict between the contract with its rules and
the operating necessity for movement and alteration.
So, the final phase is a situation of highly structured work and the use
of seniority as a decision rule. Everything is stable, until pressures begin
to develop from the environment. As volume starts to change, as new
technology comes on the scene, the existing arrangement of work, and the rules
and regulations for allocating workers across those classifications, no longer
makes sense. It is at this point that work rules become identified as a major
factor in the productivity problem.
Where This Leads Us
So the general conclusion about the impact of unions on productivity is
that the relationship is possibly negative, but varies much with the
particular context and the imperatives of change. It is unlikely that the
effect is sufficiently negative that a company would be advised to seek the
decertification of a union for existing operations. For operations being
established in a greenfield site, it might well choose to remain nonunion, but
that would be a second step decision after the pros and cons were evaluated as
between expending capital for new operations versus upgrading existing
operations.
The small negative relationship between unions and productivity also
needs to be viewed from other perspectives. The first one is the reality that
in many situations the company is not able to do very much about the question
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II
of representation since this is ultimately a decision by the employees and
secondly, the negative relationship between collective bargaining and
productivity more and more can be turned in a positive direction. We will
elaborate this point subsequently when we take up the subject of industrial
relations and collective bargaining arrangements that facilitate productivity
improvement. The possibility that collective bargaining can be a positive
force for productivity is receiving substantial testing at the present time as
a result of concession bargaining, labor-management committees, and joint
economic forums.
Intensification
Introduction
Finally, we come to the level of the individual and the small group and
the strategic necessity of increasing the intensification of human resources
or commitment of the workforce. In a very basic way the human side of the
organization can be thought of as an asset that can be developed and
intensified, in effect, achieving an increase in social capital. The
strategic assignment is to understand the alternatives for achieving this
objective.
The problem or restraint side that relates most closely to this level is
that of lack of commitment, e.g., the problem of absenteeism. On the program,
or positive side, are the strategies of involvement and developing the
capacity of the organization to handle change.
The Strategy of Involvement
It is helpful to trace the evolution of the worker involvement
movement. The United States industrial relations system, and its legal
framework, has been based on a belief that managers make decisions and direct
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the workforce and workers follow those directions, and if they disagree, they
can grieve after they have performed the assignment. This framework fit well
with the growth of scientific management, in that it was assumed that managers
and professional engineers knew best how the work should be done. Even the
growth of the human relations school in the 1930s was based on the paradigm
that managers knew best and could design more human systems to combine both
people and production tasks. But recent Japanese and European success with
participative management programs has led American managers to take a second
look at the hard distinction between managers and the managed. In addition
the demographics of the new workforce and their associated "new values" are
forcing managers to question the worth of autocratic decision making in
today's environment.
These developments have lead to the U.S. answer to industrial democracy
in the form of employee involvement. The underlying logic is as follows.
Increased involvement of employees will lead to increased commitment or a
sense of identity with the company or a pride of ownership in the product.
Although this is really not a new philosophy for developing good managerial
attitudes and behaviors, it is, in some ways revolutionary, in that it is
pushing this belief down in the organization and now involving non-managerial
employees. It can be viewed as a basic philosophical realignment in American
industry towards a belief in human capital rather than labor, i.e., that
investment is not only in a worker's skill but also in his knowledge and
understanding of the product, process, and workplace. In its purest sense, it
is a return to the basics of talking and listening, and improved two-way
communication between employers and employees,
This involvement has taken a variety of different forms. Initially
experiments involved top down humanization by managers in the form of changing
from Theory X to Theory Y management style or changing the design of jobs to
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enrich or enlarge them. But more recently the move has been toward.an
emphasis on bottom up, or more jointly initiated and designed programs.
The interest in quality of work and other devices for involving workers
must be seen as an attempt to move the culture from a poor IR/poor bottom line
combination to the opposite configuration. The fact that most of the quality
of work efforts have not made much of an impact only reflects the fact that it
is very difficult to change a culture and a system that strongly reinforces
itself.
Goodman, who has followed many quality of work experiments, has
concluded the following: "The problem of maintaining change is .... a
persistent problem .... change had been successfully introduced, some benefits
had appeared but over time the majority of the programs (quality of work) had
become deinstitutionalized."1
Another reason that involvement does not "take" readily is that "the new
industrial relations system" is viewed by many as a direct attack on
managerial authority and status. Even the reward system comes under
question. It used to be that hard work led to a promotion which meant more
dollars, more authority and control, and a higher position in the hierarchy.
But today that authority or control must be shared extensively with
subordinates.
The Organization that is Capable of Adaptation
Essentially, the purpose of increasing commitment or the intensification
of the labor supply is not ust to close the gap of x-inefficiency but to set
in motion a process whereby change and adaptation occur on a continuing
1Goodman, Paul 5., and James W. Dean, Jr., "The Process of
Institutionalization," (Carnegie-Mellon, School of Industrial Administration
Working Paper, 1980) p. 46.
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basis. Ultimately, the successful introduction of new technology, of new
methods and the elimination of work rules only occurs when individuals and
small groups at the operating level agree to accept these new arrangements.
Our approach to thinking about the subject of administering change is to
recognize that in principle workers may be willing to be reassigned and to
accept new work arrangements, but when the changes become specific and the
issues of security, equity and the fabric of economic and social relations are
involved, then resistance may be engendered. Two models of this process can
be presented as well as summarizing some of the concrete programs that are
involved.
An Economic Model for Understanding Resistance to Change
A worker (or indeed management) will resist change because the expected
costs are higher than the expected gains. This can be complicated by the
tendency of workers to be risk adverse, in other words, the uncertainty of the
new operation magnifies the possible costs compared to the gains and
advantages that are known for the present circumstances. ("Better the devil I
know than the one not known.") How, then, does the organization lower costs?
A number of possibilities suggest themselves: job guarantees, training so that
the new responsibilities can be handled in stride and an atmosphere of growth,
so that people feel that they are part of a progressing operation.
Similarly, ways can be fashioned to deal with uncertainty. This is
where communication and participation, as well as exposure to operations that
are organized along similar lines fit into the picture. Trial periods and
experiments also help deal with uncertainty.
Finally, on the gain side, bonuses and learning curve incentives may be
very effective. Another program, that we have called contingency
compensation, can have the effect of tying the economic interest of workers
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much more closely to the fortunes on the enterprise. Much of this interest
has been stimulated by the Japanese model, wherein each year four to five
months of compensation is received in semi-annual bonus payments. The
magnitude of this sum and the potential swing creates a very close economic
identification between workers and the enterprise.
A Social Model
In a similar way we can present a model for understanding the social or
group resistance to change. This dimension probably is much more crucial than
the economic side. Basically, change places a social structure under threat
since it directly challenges the survival of the existing pattern of
associations. Almost any change that moves workers to another department or
shifts them to another line of work will alter their pattern of social
interaction.1
It is not as easy to think through programs to deal with the possibility
of social disintegration as was possible with respect to economic threat.
This difficulty in itself suggests why resistance to change is not easy to
overcome because often it is not possible to leave a work group intact, e.g.,
in the face of the computerization of the office.
The fundamental premise of socio-technical analysis is the need to
harmonize the social structure of the organization with the technical
requirements. Another perspective on administering change identifies culture
as the key concept -- in effect, it is the culture that is preserving the
status quo and making it difficult to move to new arrangements.
1An insurance company reported as follows: "We installed a system for
prioritizing and dispatching claims that made it possible to track
responsibilities. reduced the backlog and improved productivity, but it also
changed the tracitional reporting relationship in the office and met with
resistance."
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Without question one of the most difficult undertakings is to change the
culture of an existing plant. If the business profile for a plant or office
is one of stagnation, then it is unlikely that any change can be made in the
outlook of the organization without more fundamental changes in the underlying
material conditions. Hence, a pre-requisite to a change would be new
investment (and a stream of investments) that convinces the organization that
the establishment has a future. Having done this, the next step would involve
the challenging task of seeking to change values and moving the establishment
in the direction of participation, openness, communication, equality,
security, and mutual responsibility -- attributes of what has been called the
Japanese method. All of this represents extensive social restructuring and
can take the better part of a decade to accomplish.
With the viewpoint of culture in mind, several tactics or programs
suggest themselves. One is to eliminate the opposition, e.g., by retiring
older workers so that younger workers can be brought in and adapted to the new
arrangements. Another is to assure the organization that it can always return
to the former mode if the new work arrangements do not prove satisfactory.
This is the concept of the trial period. Along with this is the assurance
often given that once the change is made, there will be a period of stability
so that people have a chance to re-establish social relations.
Specific Mechanisms
Programs aimed at paving the way for change involve a number of
dimensions. Certainly, emphasizing ob tenure and what we have said about
career employment incentives can help with the process of change. To the
extent that people are reluctant to go along with change because it may mean
that their jobs will be eiliminated, then the provision of job tenure can help
eliminate this resistance.
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A second mechanism is that of information and communication of plans and
consequences. Generally speaking, people go along with new arrangements when
they have had a chance to rehearse the new situation in their minds by knowing
about it in advance and when they have some basis for understanding the
rationale and overall plan for the change. Thus, the Forum Program that is
being instituted by Ford Motor and the UAW can be seen as a mechanism for
providing information that will make a wide range of changes more acceptable.
Communication works best that confronts the worker with information that he
can use to change his behavior. General guidance about the direction of the
industry or the economy will be of some use as background but will not provide
guidance about doing something differently in the enterprise. However, if the
information is about market share of the company and if it is the case that
cost and quality of the product have something to do with market share, then
the workforce is presented with an incentive and an opportunity.
In many large U.S. corporations workers are insulated from the
vicissitudes of the external market. This is a function of size and also
until recently of economic success. The function of communication is to cut
through this barrier and to confront the worker with the economic realities.
Companies that have used the Scanlon Plan say that one of the most
important by-products is the economic education that takes place when workers
are motivated to learn about problems and to see the relationship between what
happens in the market place and the repercussions within the enterprise.
Another way to state the purpose of communication is to avoid two kinds
of errors that often occur in industry. The first is the error of ignorance
wherein the firm is gradually losing out economically but the workers are in
the. dark about this decline. The second error, and one that is happening more
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frequently of late, is where the workers are trying very hard but the economic
situation is beyond retrieval. This explains in some circumstances why union
leaders urge against concessions while workers at the local level are willing
to do anything in an effort to save their obs.
Certainly methods that enhance participation and involvement of workers
through quality of work programs, sensing meetings, opinion surveys and the
like help get the attention of the organization and develop the identification
of mutual purpose and commitment by management and the workforce.
Beyond these ideas for enhancing the adaptability of the organization,
there are several other devices of a more immediate nature that can encourage
change. Analagous to the one-shot incentive mentioned in connection with
productivity bargaining where a bonus is paid for the elimination of
inefficiency, an organization might consider paying a one-shot performance
bonus for shortening the learning curve that is involved in introducing a new
machinery or moving over to a new system of any sort. Such an incentive
arrangement is common practice with defense contracts. The idea would be for
a one-shot bonus to be paid to the organization if it is successful in
fore-shortening the "start-up."
Speaking of profit sharing, this method of wage payment has an inherent
advantage for the objective of continuing adaptation. Since the test of the
market is incorporated into the profit sharing method, members of the
organization only receives rewards if it is performing successfully against
competition. Unlike most other system for sharing productivity gains, profit
sharing does not allocate any extra monies unless the performance of the
organization is higher than what is the norm for the industry. Thus, the
method of profit sharing, if handled correctly, and if accompanied by an
adequate communication program, can keep the orientation of the organization
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focused on competition and the external environment and on the changes that
need to take place internally to meet external challenges and developments.
Another very specific technique and a powerful one for pulling people
through the unknown that is always present with change is to use experiments
and pilot projects before installing new equipment or the new method on an
organization-wide basis.1 Side by side operations, one with the new
arrangement and one using the traditional arrangement can teach very powerful
lessons. The people who are watching see the example of "it is possible to do
it the new way." (In this connection, companies have found that taking
workers to other operations where the method is in place can be a "trip worth
a thousand words."2) Also, it is clear that if the new method does not work
out that the workers will remain in their accustomed machinery and procedures.
The concept of a pilot operation is well ingrained in industry for
research and development work, but it is not as institutionalized as part of a
learning system where workers from other plants come to observe and
participate and where the pilot project is not ust used to solve technical
Problems but is also used to deal with motivational and social problems.
1A publishing company follows this approach by paralleling old and new
technologies.
2TRW used this technique to deal with the opposition of union leaders
to productivity improvement programs. Specifically, they took selected union
members to three plants -- a TRW operation and two owned by other firms --
where productivity programs were in place. "We let them talk to anyone in the
Plant. They saw the entire program in operation." (Fortune, "Labor Faces the
Productivity Challenge," March 19, 1981.)
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CHAPTER V
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT STRATEGIES
Introduction
At this stage we would like to return to the subject of industrial
relations in a much more explicit fashion. Throughout the report we have
dealt with industrial relations in a very broad sense, including such subjects
as human resource management, employee relations, and personnel policies.
However, there is a narrower connotation to the term "industrial relations"
and it is to this dimension that we would like to turn at this point.
When CED asked us to prepare our review of the productivity subject with
special reference to industrial relations, we were mindful of the long
standing question about whether labor-management relations is neutral,
negative, or possibly positive with respect to the subject of productivity.
In the preceeding chapter where we discussed the subject of work rules and the
impact of collective bargaining, we analyzed a key connection between
industrial relations and productivity. Here, we would like to develop the
subject of labor-management relations more extensively.
How To Think About Industrial Relations
The starting point for defining what we mean by industrial relations is
to think of the employment relationship as consisting primarily of two
parties, the employer and the workers. Industrial relations involves the
structuring of that relationship via the presence of a union and the other
institutional activities that flow from that basic fact. Thus,
labor-management relations becomes the shorthand title for the
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institutionalization of the employment relationship when a union is present.
(In the same way, the government could be introduced as an actor, and indeed
over the past several decades the employment relationship has been shaped in
some very fundamental ways as a result of government legislation and the
presence of regulatory agencies.)
When the employment relationship is influenced by the presence of a
union, we can identify a number of themes that relate to the subject of
productivity.
- In some industries the presence of a union helps with the
recruitment and training of the work force. This typically occurs
in craft-type situations and it is one of the reasons that
productivity is higher in unionized construction firms than in the
unorganized counterparts. While for certain industries this
function is a key factor, for the industries that are of primary
concern to us, manufacturing and service more generally, the union
role in the recruitment and training of workers is not an important
dimension and we will not concern ourselves with this subject.
- The presence of a union and the higher wages that often result
usually mean that a higher quality work force can be hired.and
turnover will be lower. All of these effects increase
productivity. Similarly, this dimension of the labor-management
relation will not be of concern to us at this point, since these
aspects of the "shock" impact of unions, while of theoretical
interest, represent a one shot, step-up in productivity -- not a
continuing effect.
- The presence of a union brings with it a contract and in turn
rules, customary practices, and precedents. This important part of
the labor-management picture has been discussed under the subject
of work rules. What remains to be done (and we will return to this
shortly) is to examine the collective bargaining approaches that
might be adopted to facilitate a more constructive relationship
toward the "web of rules" in order to improve important economic
outcomes, especially productivity.
- Finally, the hallmark of collective bargaining is the process of
settling grievances and negotiating agreements. These activities
can have an impact on productivity and we would like to examine
this connection a little more closely.
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Connection Between Collective Bargaining Activities and Productivity
If we take the measure of collective bargaining via such items as
grievances, number of strikes, and time spent in solving grievances and
negotiating contracts, then there is strong evidence that as these activities
intensify there is an association with lower levels of productivity. While it
is not clear that a direct cause and effect relationship exists, it is clear
that a reinforcing effect exists between the labor-management relationship and
the economic outcomes of the enterprise.
The basic proposition is that the character of the labor-management
relationship has a direct bearing on the productivity that is realized in a
given situation. When the labor-management relationship is very negative,
then there is also a negative impact on productivity. The extreme example
most often cited by analysts is the poor productivity in Great Britain -- this
being attributed to poor labor-management relations.
A recent study done by Katz, Kochan, and Gobeille shows a strong
connection between the overall climate or tenor of labor-management relations
(as measured by number of grievances, unresolved local issues, and time to
settle local contracts and a variety of economic performance measures)1.
Another example that has been reasonably well-documented is the coal
industry in the United States. The declining productivity (until recently) of
the industry has been partly attributed to the turbulent labor-management
relations, including wildcat strikes and slowdowns. Wayne Horvitz, former
1Katz, et.al., op.cit.
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director of F.M.C.S. has concluded that unless labor-management relationships
in this country are made more positive and unless the parties engage in more
problem solving, then these negative relationships will act as a "drag on
productivity."1
Clearly then, poor industrial relations can exert a downside influence.
In other words, good industrial relations can be thought of as a pre-requisite
that has to be met before productivity can realize its potential. To use the
language of Will Baumol, good industrial relations is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for increasing productivity.
We might examine for a minute the question of what really holds
productivity back when the labor-management relationship is negative. The
answer lies in the word "system". A poor labor-management relationship
represents a systemic condition and such events as grievances (with
supervisory time spent in arguments) and lack of production due to strikes are
bound to influence productivity in a negative direction. For example, one of
the plants in our survey listed illegal work stoppages as the number ne
restraint. It does not take very much imagination to visualize how a pattern
of illegal walkouts can wreck havoc with productivity.
The next question is to ask whether good industrial relations in and of
itself can make much of a direct contribution to good productivity. The
answer here is not as clear. Many examples can be cited of plants that on the
surface appear to have good industrial relations but productivity is not
1Rosow, op.cit., p. 276.
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up to desired levels. Whether good industrial relations has been "bought" at
a price of lower productivity or whether the explanation is more complicated
and rests with the other factors that are needed for good productivity, such
as sound management, adequate capital and positive programs for coordinating
the factors of production to achieve good results is not clear. But we lean
towards the latter explanation.
Of course, positive industrial relations can not remain in place over
the long run if productivity is not satisfacotry. Here again we can draw the
distinction between a configuration that can exist in the short run, namely,
good industrial relations and low productivity, and the long run
implications. Certainly, the viability of the labor-management relationship
depends upon the viability of the enterprise over the long run and no
labor-management relationship can remain positive if the plant is in trouble
in terms of its market position and cost performance.1
This emphasis on the long-run relationship for both the position of the
firm and the nature of the labor-management relationship, gives us a way of
putting the movement towards collaborative labor-management relations in
perspective. The long-run emphasis focuses attention on the range of mutual
dependence or what might be called mutual advantage. Any employment
relationship has to possess mutual advantage for the parties to remain
attached to the relationship.
It is fashionable these days to say that labor-management relations in
the United States are too adversarial, but this label eliminates an important
part of the story. The sentence needs to be finished to the effect that the
lone of the classic examples of a union-management relationship that
was touted as a model but where productivity was so poor that the firm
eventually closed down was Studebaker.
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parties can afford to deal with each other on an adversarial basis only so
long as it is mutually advantageous for them to remain in the relationship.
It is this latter part of the equation, emphasizing their joint dependence,
that is placed in focus when the perspective is the long run.
Based on research and practice, then we can posit that if grievances are
higher, then it is quite likely that productivity will be lower. But the
relationship is not as straightforward as saying: "Let's lower grievances and
productivity will increase." Lowering the level of grievances may require a
change in management style, an alteration of the technology or the work
structure, and/or the hiring of different kinds of workers. Grievances and
productivity are both outcomes, and the "blackbox" from which they originate
contains very complicated interactions -- another metaphor is that of a
culture that reinforces itself -- a culture is not amenable to change in a
mechanical fashion.
This general point can be illustrated more specifically with the subject
of absenteeism. In the work done by Katz, et.al., absenteeism correlates
positively with the other industrial relations system measures and negatively
with economic performance on a cross-sectional basis. However, in the change
regressions, that is, tracking plants that have had more intensive application
of quality-of work programs, there is little, if any, improvement in
absenteeism as a result of the intervention.
The message from these studies is that if the industrial
relations/productivity equation is going to be changed, then a very
comprehensive strategy that involves a multifaceted change operation of
policies and structure is required.
1Katz, et.al, op.cit.
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The Industrial Relations Connection to the Different Strategic Levels
At this point we would like to be more explicit about how industrial
relations can make a positive contribution, or, at a minimum, eliminate its
negative role with respect to the three levels of strategic analysis presented
in the last chapter.
Intensification of Human Resources - We turn first to the level of the
individual or the small work group and the strategic assignment of
intensification of human resources. Here the model industrial relations
system is that of Japan. This presents somewhat of an anomaly for the U.S.
labor movement since the role of unions at the plant level in Japan is quite
minimal -- Japanese management enjoys considerable freedom for transferring
workers across assignments and the issue of work rules appears to be
non-existent. Hence, there is some support for the general proposition that
the greater the shopfloor power experienced by a trade union, then the greater
the ability of the union to enforce work rule arrangements and the greater the
potential drag on productivity.
Strong trade unions, however, can exist without their exercising
extensive control over shop level decisions. Experience in Sweden and Germany
can be cited in this respect. In both countries trade unions are strong at
the national level but management enjoys considerable freedom to deploy labor
-- indeed, much more flexibility in the assignment of workers than is the case
in the United States. A number of factors explain this contrast. Layoffs are
very rare in these two countries -- consequently, the adherence to work rules
in order to enhance ob security is not present. Also, firms recruit, develop
and advance workers much more via the internal market. Employees are hired at
the entry level and trained within the establishment or industry -- without
resort to apprenticeship programs of the sort that exist in the United
States. Finally, unions exercise their influence at the central level of the
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industry or economy, as well as through a network of co-determination
arrangements as is the case in Germany. The point of all of this is that a
different industrial relations system can accommodate a strong trade union
force without the inevitability of restrictions at the shopfloor level.
But these examples of industrial relations systems in other countries
only provide guidance for the U.S. in the long run. For the short run, the
probing question is: What role does collective bargaining play in influencing
the behavior of individuals and small groups?
To state our conclusion rather directly: a union does not play a
significant role in improving the productivity of individuals or small
groups. In many ways, management is right in saying that good productivity
can be achieved if there is intelligent supervision and if the workers are
involved on a direct basis. As managers often comment: "Why do we need a
third party to get on with the task of improving productivity?" There is much
evidence to support this premise and this leads to the point that a role for a
union at this lowest level is to minimize the drag that comes from excessive
grievances, unnecessary strikes, and the like.
Generally, unions do not find this conclusion incompatible since it is
difficult for a union to maintain its vitality and to participate
wholeheartedly in a quality of work program. This is due to the fact that a
quality of work program puts in place a different system for allocating work
and workers than the contract that the union has negotiated. So we come to
the conclusion that the union movement may not have a major proactive role to
play with respect to intensification of human resources. The various
committees and involvement efforts can proceed without the institutional
presence of a union. A union can improve the atmosphere so that high
commitment programs can go forward, but labor-management relations
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probably will not be a facilitating factor for intensification of human
resources.
A union can play a decisive role during the setup stage for a quality of
work program, especially if suspicion and/or apathy exist amongst the work
force. The union can present a point of view about the need for involvement
that often is more credible with the members than management's. As an
institution, the union has access to communication channels (union meetings,
stewards and mailings) that provide another entry point into the thinking and
awareness of the rank and file.
Harmonization of Work Organization - At the middle level, the level of
the plant where the collective bargaining agreement takes form, we come to the
heartland of what is known as the U.S. industrial relations system. The
essence of the U.S. industrial relations system is the plant agreement and the
structuring of a relationship at the local level between management and the
representatives of the workers. It is here where we also confront the many
rules that eminate from the contract and from customary practice that often
inhibit productivity. For this level there is no preferred model that comes
from another country. Instead, the model guiding the design of work
organizations come directly out of U.S. experience. We can distinguish two
major species of industrial relations systems.
On the one hand, there are a group of companies that have pushed into
new operations with the array of techniques that have been referred to as
comprehensive personnel policies. These operations are for the most part
unorganized and case studies suggest that motivation and enthusiasm are very
high in these operations.
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On the other hand, there are the established plants, usually unionized,
that are undergoing dramatic change at the hands of productivity bargaining,
concession bargaining, quality of work, and labor-management committees.
These measures have been referred to as the new industrial relations, or the
cooperative economy. The dust has not settled and it is too early to tell the
extent to which these new systems will really change the culture of
established operations and have a dramatic impact on productivity. But
certainly, considerable change and experimentation is underway.
Our survey contains dramatic examples of both systems. We have plants
in the steel industry that are engaging in participative endeavors; at the
same time we have plants in other industries that are practicing the
socio-technical ideas that are often installed in unorganized plants.
In passing, we would like to make a comment about the strategy of union
avoidance. While it is not our purpose to indicate that such a course of
action is ill advised, we would like to take note of one piece of research
that indicates that sooner or later unions come on the scene. Roger Schmnenner
presents data that indicates that growth in unionization takes place at about
the same rate in the growth areas of the country (such as the Sunbelt) as is
the case in the North1. It would appear that as plants age they increase
unionization by about 30 percentage points.
1Roger Schmenner, The Location Decisions of Laroe Multi-Plant
Companies, (MIT: oint Center for Urban Studies, 1980), p. 344.
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PERCENT OF MANUFACTURING
ESTABLISHMENTS UNIONIZED
Existing New
Plant Plant
Right to Work 44 14
Non Right to Work 57 29
Returning to the unionized sector, it is clear that more and more
experience with integrative bargaining or problem solving is occurring.
Rather than emphasizing the adversarial or conflictual elements of the
relationship, the emphasis is on accommodation.
Productivity bargaining can represent the first step toward such a
collaborative approach to labor-management relations. There is a type of
reinforcement that takes place between the specific activity and the general
strategy being pursued with respect to the labor-management relationship.
Quite often parties have found themselves in an adversarial relationship and
have embarked upon productivity bargaining as a way of dealing with certain
operating problems. Then, as a result of a successful agreement and the
recognition that costs can be lowered and obs can be made more secure, the
labor-management relationship turns in a more accomodative direction.
A good example of this reinforcement can be seen in the experience at
Goodyear in establishing new capacity for the production of radial tires. The
company indicated that it was willing to place the facility at an existing
location, either Topeka, Kansas or Gadsten, Alabama. At Topeka the rank and
file voted down productivity changes and as a result Gadsten got a chance to
compete for the new plant. At Gadsten the union voted 100 to 1 in favor of
adopting a labor agreement which guaranteed new productivity levels as a
result of abandoning incentives, instituting round-the-clock shift operations
and restricting the use of seniority (for transfer and bumping) to the new
plant.
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One of the most interesting developments that has come out of concession
bargaining and other efforts to change the work structure is the linkage of
changes in plant practices to the commitment of additional investment funds.
When this takes place as part of a particular package we would label it
"Job-investment bargaining". As we noted in our discussion of investment
decisions and involvement of the union at the highest levels of the
corporation and industry, this represents a new frontier for labor-management
relations.
One of the main reasons for concession bargaining, in a conceptual
sense, is that in many relationships the range of mutual advantage has
vanished and may even be negative. Certainly, the existence of a mutually
advantageous range has been seriously jeopardized by a number of important
economic developments. From the management side, a number of pressures have
moved them much "closer to the margin." Their alternatives for buying or
making the products outside the relationship, specifically outsourcing or
establishing nonunion operations, have increased in number. To put it in
economic terms, any contract must be viewed against the alternatives or the
opportunity costs involved and these have increased in number. It is also
possible that the transaction costs of pursuing the alternatives have
decreased.
The fundamental question is whether the pressures that are on the
parties will produce a one-shot repositioning, that is, placing the parties
once again back within a mutual dependence (only to resume the adversarial
stance) or whether the result will be a permanent change in the character of
labor-management relations in fundamental ways over the long run. There is
some support for both views and only time will tell which predominates.
Given the way we think about the labor-management relationship and the
range of mutual dependence, it is natural to argue that once the parties
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"re-write the contract," that the basic relationship will remain one of
adversary tinged with some cooperation. Certainly, the experience of the
steel industry would support this interpretation. Over the past 15 or 20
years there have been numerous labor-management productivity improvement
efforts involving human relations committees and special productivity programs
-- but none of these have worked or have had much of a bearing on the basic
tenure of labor-management relations. This is precisely because each time
that a committee was started, the profits of the industry returned to
acceptable levels and the incentive to establish new principles of
collaboration was removed or political factors within the union raised the
costs of collaboration for the leadership. As a result, labor-management
relations have remained in a conventional mode for the most part.
On the other hand, programs that have been undertaken by other companies
suggest that in some instances a new type of collective bargaining
relationship may be emerging. Quite significantly, the companies in our
survey that are in industries that are undergoing tremendous economic pressure
and change placed such subjects as quality of work, productivity bargaining
and communication at the top of their list of positive programs. Certainly,
this is to be expected. Crisis brings parties together. Whether it will be
temporary r permanent is the big question that needs to be answered by
observation of events over the next several years.
Rationalization of Investment - We now come to the highest level, the
level of the corporation or industry where the basic business decisions are
made about the deployment of capital assets. Here the model to emulate is
that of Germany. As we will discuss, we are not advocating co-determination,
rather we are advocating increased involvement and presence for unions at the
highest levels of the enterprise.
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For U.S. unions, involvement at this level has been relatively
infrequent and indeed most unions have said that they prefer to leave business
decisions to management. However, given the movement of capital on a
worldwide basis and given the vital stakes that are involved for employment of
their members, greater involvement would seem to be imperative. Unlike the
lowest level where good results can be obtained without the presence of the
union, we would argue that a balancing of the stakes cannot take place without
some representation of worker interest at the highest levels.
We would even go further and maintain that such involvement on the part
of unions also can be in the best interests of management and stockholder
interests. This philosophical premise holds that by bringing the concerns of
workers into key business decisions, the resulting decisions will be
qualitatively better, to the long run benefit of all concerned. For example,
a union participating in a discussion about the shift of capital from one
location to another can propose a transition timetable that minimizes
disruption for the workers involved, thereby enhancing operating effectiveness
and producing a "win-win" solution. One might ask why management on its own
could not balance off such interests and achieve a more optimum course of
action on its own. One answer is that pressures for short run results often
leads to a drastic shifting of resources with immediate gains but long run
destruction of the human capability of the organization.
Some persuasive examples from Germany can be cited where the presence of
unions has served to achieve this joint gain for all sides. The best examples
come from the experiences of VW and a number of German steel companies during
the mid 1970's. In these instances the unions involved helped shape programs
for achieving economic change, e.g., shift of production from Germany to the
U.S. (VW), and regearing facilities from bulk to specialty steels at the same
time that the impact on the workers involved was minimized through phasing,
retraining, and early retirement programs.
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When basic and fundamental restructuring processes are involved, it is
possible that the unionized situation can adjust more rapidly than the
unorganized situation. This is due to the fact that union leaders are often
aware of the basic economic realities facing the industry and recognize that
some plants have to be closed and that modernization has to take place in
order to maintain the viability of the remaining core of the industry.
The process that we are envisioning involves the presence and
participation of the union. Experience in this country, when unions have been
"brought in" on business decisions is that they generally do not try to block
these decisions but concentrate attention on modifying them from the
perspective of worker concerns. In other words, they join the issue rather
than creating a stalemate.
Clearly, these kinds of discussions fall within the non-mandatory sphere
of U.S. collective bargaining. This is just as well since mandatory
bargaining over business decisions would embroil the parties in considerable
posturing and power confrontation.l We see substantial movement in this
direction within U.S. collective bargaining. Recently, agreements in such
industries as meatpacking and automobiles have spelled out ways in which the
investment decisions of the respective companies will be reconciled with the
interests of the workers. Also, in some instances, forums and other means of
discussion and communication have been set into motion for the linkage of
business decisions to the stakes that workers and unions have in the shape of
the enterprise over the long run.
lIt should be noted that the legal framework governing
labor-management relations in the U.S. does not provide for consultation.
Rather, the approach is to identify mandatory subjects of bargaining,
including wages, hours and working conditions. Subjects such as productivity,
investment plans, and participation fall in the permissive area.
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General Motors refers to its consultation program as the "forum for the
competitive edge." This is an appropriate label because it focuses attention
on the viability of the enterprise and the steps that need to be taken at the
highest levels. Information about market share and the status of the
technology are pieces of the picture that affect the employment security of
all employees, as well as the profitability of the enterprise and the
interests of the other stakeholders.
The Concept of Industrial Relations as a "Bottom Line "l
Throughout this report our concern in terms of a bottom line or ultimate
focus has been with productivity and other aspects of economic performance.
It is appropriate at the end of our journey to turn the focus around and to
consider industrial relations as a potential bottom line.
It is clear that when productivity or economic performance is the bottom
line there is considerable connection between the character of industrial
relations and what happens ultimately to economic performance. For example,
in his work on plant locations, Schemenner has determined that the character
of industrial relations is a very important determinant as management decides
to expand an existing operation or to move to a green plant site.2
At least half a dozen firms we contacted have indicated that they will
direct investment depending on industrial relations factors. Usually the
sequence is one of committing new investment to greenfield sites or to plants
lit is significant that Donald Peterson, President of Ford Motor, has
used this term to describe the agreement between his company and the UAW.
Among other things, the agreement provides for pilot employment guarantee
programs at two plants, guaranteed income stream, overall employment targets,
retraining and mutual growth forums. All of these concepts indicate that
industrial relations is seen as a critical asset by Ford.
2 chmenner, op. cit.
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that have a good labor relations atmosphere. The troublesome plant may be
slowly phased out -- it will be kept in operation as long as cash flow is
positive. Thus, industrial relations factors work, albeit slowly and behind
the scenes.
In turn, we are convinced that investment decisions and many of the
other important strategies available to management impact directly upon
industrial relations. The difficulty is that we do not have adequate ways of
measuring the quality of the bottom line nature of industrial relations. We
can measure its negative attributes such as grievances, strikes and
absenteeism. But if the industrial relations system and more broadly the
organizational arrangements are viewed as a technology, we do not have good
ways for measuring the capacity and effectiveness of this human technology.
We have the concept of human capital which talks about the skills and
education acquired by individuals. We know effective organizations when we
see them, but we do not have good ways of measuring human assets as a
functioning organization.
Japanese companies place considerable emphasis on maintaining the growth
and vitality of the organization and view this as a direct objective. Many of
the large successful high tech firms in the U.S. have the same outlook.
Certainly, developing a positive labor-management relationship cannot hurt
productivity. While it may not be a factor in and of itself that will
guarantee, it certainly will not impede, productivity. For this reason, many
corporations are emphasizing this strategic direction. This appears to be the
case especially in the United States. For example, in the survey done by the
Sentry Insurance Company, business executives voted 61 percent of the time for
the proposition that there is too little cooperation between business and
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unions in the United States. A comparable group of Japanese businessmen only
voted for this proposition 15 percent of the time in Japan.I
Japanese firms have been able to develop a substantial amount of
organizational or social capital. It is appropriate for U.S. companies to
meet this challenge. One step would be to conceive of industrial relations as
a bottom line and to implement policies and programs to enhance industrial
relations performance. It is hoped that this report contains some ideas that
will help in the pursuit of such a goal.
1Sentry, op. cit.
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APPENDIX
Summary of Survey Findings
Survey Methodology
As part of the Committee of Economic Development (CED) research
project to study the productivity implications of industrial relations
institutional arrangements, a survey was designed to probe for recent
changes or trends in managerial beliefs and actions by asking a number
of open-ended questions. The intent of this approach was not to
provide statistical evidence of specific relationships but rather to
gain some insights into current practices and policies. However, there
was sufficient response to the survey to test on a rather limited
basis, some of the theory and literature.
The target of the survey was a representative sample of CED
members across a variety of major industries. In order to get a quick
response it was decided to have CED mail the survey to members of the
committee. This provided the advantage of easy access and relatively
good response, but also caused a number of serious data problems which
will be discussed in the next section.
Since the survey was sent to CED members who are predominantly
CEO's or other corporate officers, it was recognized that the responses
would mosty likely be of a very general nature. In order to alleviate
this problem, the survey was designed in two parts. Making the
assumption that most general policy decisions are centralized to some
1
degree at the corporate level, the first part was a survey to be filled
out by someone in the corporate office who could provide a general
overview of the corporation's policies and programs. The objective of
this questionaire was to get a better understanding of the types of
human resource decisions made in conjunction with changes in business
conditions, such as the opening of new facilities or the reduction of
workforce levels. In addition, an aim was to generate a list of the
types of productivity programs which were being used and how effective
they were.
In order to get closer to the inhibitors of productivity at the
lower levels of management, a second survey was designed to be
completed by personnel at a plant or facility. Here the objective was
to better understand the causes of the productivity decline by asking
questions as to what factors are inhibiting improved productivity.
The survey was pretested on a small sample of plants and then
mailed to 44 major U.S. corporations. Responses were received from 28
of these corporations. The remainder declined to respond for reasons
of lack of applicability, time constraints, or a feeling that the
survey was too general or difficult to fill out. (It was felt that a
number of excuses were most likely a disguise for a fear of
confidentiality due to impending contract negotiations with their
unions.) As a result, the data set includes 29 corporations (28 CED
members plus one pretest company) and 61 of their plants.
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Data Concerns
Because the survey was administered to a select group of CED
members, there are a number of reasons why the results should not be
considered statistically robust or representative of American industry.
1. The sample was hand chosen by CED based upon their
probability of responding. In addition, an objective was to
get a representative from as many of the major industries as
possible.
2. For access reasons, the survey was sent directly to the
CED member which in most cases was the CEO or Chairman of the
Board. It then had to be filtered down into the organization
(often 4 or 5 levels) to be answered. Because it came from
the top office, it was given a high priority but the actual
respondents most likely answered the survey as they believed
the CEO would want it to be answered, i.e. shedding a good
image on the corporation and possibly glossing over any
internal problems. In addition, middle management may have
been hesitant to admit to upper management that they have
problems which they can not handle. Therefore, since the
survey was returned back to CED via the CEO's office, there
is most likely a bias toward external factors which are
outside the control of management.
3. The aim of the survey was to get at problems of the
institutional industrial relations systems and therefore
probed at formal structures, particularly in the area of
productivity restraints. As a result, the bias is once again
toward external or formal internal structures outside the
control of management as opposed to managerial attitudes or
behaviors.
4. The survey was a self-report by management. Therefore'
there is no input from employees and no validation that the
responses are anything other than managerial perceptions or
beliefs.
5. The questions were left very open ended to minimize
leading the respondents toward specific programs or practices
which they might feel necessary to mention in order to
present the company in the proper light. As a result, the
questions meant different things to different people. This
became a larger problem than expected because the respondents
performed different functional roles within the corporations,
i.e. human resources, operations, productivity, finance,
etc. Therefore, the responses were far from uniform.
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6. The aim was to have the plant or facility questionaire
completed at the individual locations as opposed to the
corporate offices. However, due to time constraints many
were filled out by the corporate people. Even for those few
which were actually filled out by the plant or facility, the
questionaires were returned though the corporate office.
Here again many of the plant personnel may have been
concerned with their impression at the corporate office and
reluctant to mention productivity problems which they had not
solved.
7. The instructions asked the corporations to have 3-4
plants with different characteristics complete the second
questionaire, i.e. union versus nonunion, large versus
small, old versus new, etc. Therefore, the sample may not be
truly representative of their corporation. In addition, due
to the policy nature of CED and the specific subject matter
of this research, some corporations may have chosen plants
which could point to certain policy recommendations as
opposed to presenting a representative sample. (That is, one
might be anti-union and therefore chose a nonorganized plant
with few problems and a particularly problematic union
facility.)
8. The sample size is really too small and diverse to draw
much statistical evidence. In addition, as mentioned above,
it is not truly representative of American industry. (65% of
the facilities in the sample are unionized as opposed to less
than 24% in the country.)
Data Analysis
Despite all the data shortcomings, there is enough data to attempt
to draw some general trends as to factors inhibiting productivity
growth. The majority of the discussion in this appendix will be based
on 61 plant level responses to the following question:
A. In this section please enumerate the factors that in your
view are holding back productivity improvement, how these
practices or problems developed, and a rough magnitude of
the effects these inhibitors have on output per worker.
1. the following potential restraints have been
enumerated by other companies; these are offered for
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- illustrative purposes only:- (Indicate whether or not
each is a restraint, and then rank order them with
~ __the most serious ranked as one.)
(a) limitation on subcontracting
-- -b) crew size inflation
(c) worker or supervisor resistance to change
(d) seniority applied to transfer and overtime
allocations
(e) inefficiencies ascribable to paid time off
(f) absenteeism
(g) OSHA regulations
(h) other (please descibe)
Most of the respondents ranked those items listed and added a number of
additional restraints under the category of "other". In total, 54
restraints, many overlapping in subject matter, were identified under
the heading of "other". Analyses were made at several levels:
1. The initial step was to tabulate the number of times each
restraint was identified by plants having different
demographic characteristics which were obtained from other
questions on the surveys: industry, location, size, general
productivity trend, and corporate workforce reduction
policy.' (Table 1 lists the frequency of restraint
identification.)
2. Restraints were then grouped according to the following
broad topics (Those restraints which were listed on the
questionaire are identifed with an *.):
Resistance to Change
*worker/supervisor resistance to change
first-line supervisory resistance
adapting to change
uncertainty of change
Workrules
*subcontracting
*crew size
*seniority
contractual restraints/work rules
Motivation
*absenteeism
attitudes
work ethic
union-management relationship
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Paid Time Off
*paid time off
Government Regulations
*OSHA regulations
other government regulations
Business Conditions
limited resource dollars
volume
lack of sufficient information systems
product complexity
behind in technical improvements or equipment design
Training
insufficent training programs
lack of technical personnel
Other
outdated incentive pay systems
inability to perform time studies
job security
work stoppages
overtime
turnover
3. Several techniques were used to find associations between
the frequency or types of restraints and demographic
characteristics. (For analysis purposes the ranking order of
the restraints was reversed, i.e. the most serious restraint
was given a value of 9 and restraints not identified were
valued at 0.)
a. A tabulation was made as to whether or not
restraints within each topic were identified. This
ignored the intensity of the restraints, i.e. the
number of times specific restraints within each
grouping were identified or their rank order, but was
done in order to obtain the degree to which a grouping
of restraints occurred in plants with specific
characteristics. Table 2 lists the percentage of
plants which identified each topic.
b. The intensity of the restraints was then analyzed
by adding the rank order of the restraints within each
topic. This introduced a weighting bias for those
topics with a greater number of restraints but it was
assumed that if specific topics were identified more
than once they were more serious. 2 This also assumed
that all restraints ranked as number one were of equal
strength. Table 3 lists the average ranking given to
each topic.
c. Table 4 shows the regression coefficients resulting
from setting the dependent variable, each of the
restraint topics, equal to a linear function of the
various plant characteristics. (The base group are
northern, nonunion facilities in a white collar or
6
service industry whose workforce reduction policy is
something other than layoff as an initial step.)
Restraint Topic = a + a 2(reduction policy) + a 3(size)
+ a 4(age) + a 5(south) + a 6(west) + a 7(central) +
as(steel) + a(manufacturing) + ao(consumer products)
+ al, (communications)
A brief interpretation of the results will be interspersed in the
following discussion with general theory, expected relationships, and
selected anecdotes from the survey or literature.
Resistance to Change
Resistance to change was the most frequently mentioned restraint
and it ranked second in intensity. It is also important to note that
it was identified as either first or second within each demographic
category. In other words, it is viewed as a major inhibitor in both
unionized and nonunionized plants, large and small, and old and new.
Since resistance to change seems to be a perennial problem, one must
ask if this response is really any worse now than in past decades or is
it just that industry is being forced to make, what seems like, more
dramatic change in order to keep pace with growing foreign competition.
In looking at what factors might lead to increased resistance, one
would expect that older plants would tend to identify this restaint
more frequently than newer ones because their seasoned workforce would
be more ingrained in procedures or habits and thereby less willing to
try new processes or equipment. Since resistance to change received
such a high ranking, additional regressions were made to see if age
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would retain its causal relationship across several functions. It did
in fact remain statistically significant when set as the sole
independent variable, when combined with unionization, and when
regressed along with unionization, size, and reduction policy.
Therefore, it can be concluded that resistance to change does intensify
with increased plant longevity.
REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR RESISTANCE TO CHANGE
(STD. ERRORS IN PARENTHESIS)
MEAN
S.D.
UNI ON
AGE
CHANGE
(1)
5.10
3.97
2.11
(1.07)
CHANGE
(2)
5.61
3.68
.07
(.02)
SIZE
REDUCTION POLICY
R 2
.06 .21
CHANGE
(3)
5.10
4.10
.001
(.03)
.00002
CHANGE CHANGE
(4) (5)
5.61 5.61
3.72 3.66
-. 23 -. 52
(1.43) (1.45)
.07 .08
(.03) (.03)
- .33
- (.18)
- .67
- (1.22)
.21 .27
1 coefficient and std. error are 103
2 significant at 10% level (one tailed
3 significant at 5% level (one tailed
4 significant at 2% level (one tailed
test)
test)
test)
Another contributing factor, also supported by the regression
analysis, is that larger facilities have a greater propensity for
resistance to change. One explanation for this stems from the fact
that it is usually harder to change the attitudes or behaviors of
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masses than individuals.
One would also expect this restraint to increase with unionization
because workers would have a vehicle for voicing their resistance, but
the data did not support this contention. In fact, when asked how
union leaders react to the introduction of new technology, only 5%
indicated opposition, 83% listed cautious acceptance with a caveat
being the impact on job security, while the remainder were reported to
encourage such introduction.
Because of the universality of resistance to change, there is
really no good theory for variances across the different industries or
locations. One exception might be this data set's finding of less
resistance in the western states, possibly explained by the belief that
west coast residents lead a more experimental lifestyle.
Work Rules
By far the restraint topic receiving the highest intensity dealt
with the broad subject of work rules. Due to the rather detailed
treatmaent given this topic in the body of the paper, only a few
comments will be made here concerning the survey results.
As pointed out in the text, work rule restraints have often been
identified with industries which are predominantly craft oriented or
heavily unionized. Indeed, this data set's highly significant, large
regression coefficents for unionized plants, and steel and
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manufacturing industries, support this contention.
Construction is a good example of an industry which has
historically been plagued by work rule restraints. A survey by Ebasco
Services identified the sources of inefficiency in this industry to be
due to jurisdictional disputes (work stoppages), waiting for materials
and improperly trained personnel. In addition, A Study of Work
Practices and Working Conditions Prepared by the New York Construction
Users Council stated:
This study is comprised of excerpts from current collective
bargaining agreements which affect working conditions and
practices that we believe should be adjusted or eliminated in
order to increase productivity and help to make union
construction work less costly and more economically feasible.
The study then enumerated a range of problems involving extra
personnel, rigid starting and stopping times, payment of overtime
premium and arbitrary work requirements as to who should repair a
machine and where a certain type of work should be done, as between on
or off-site.
As the analyses point out, work rules tend to intensify with
increasing age of a facility. As Harbison pointed out in 1946:
Seniority rules may raise worker morale and increase
efficiency when they are first introduced, particularly if
they displace a haphazard and biased system of scheduling
layoffs and selection of employees for promotion. Seniority
rules appear to be fair when, as is usually the case, they
eliminate personal discrimination. But, as time goes on,
they may turn into rigid strait jackets which substitute
discrimination "by formula" for the haphazard discrimination
10
11
of poor management.3
It is interesting to note that resistance to change increases over
time at a constant rate in both unionized and nonunionized plants, but
work rules, because of the enforcability of past practices, build up
and are perpetuated more in organized plants. Thus, it is the
interaction of age and union status that puts the older, unionized
plants at a severe competitive disadvantage.
REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR WORK RULES
(STD. ERRORS IN PARENTHESIS)
MEAN
S.D.
UNION
AGE
WORK
RULES
(1)
8.36
6.13
8.54
(1.65)
WORK
RULES
(2)
8.30
6.70
.11
(.04)
SIZE
REDUCTION POLICY
R 2 .31 .17
WORK
RULES
(3)
8.36
7.39
.01
(.06)
.001
WORK
RULES
(4)
8.30
6.20
6.73
(2.38)
.05
(.04)
.31
WORK
RULES
(4)
8.30
6.14
5.75
(2.44)
.05
(.04)
.05
(.30)
3.24
(2.06)
.35
1 coefficient and std. error are 103
2 significant at 10% level (one tailed
3 significant at 5% level (one tailed
4 significant at 2% level (one tailed
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test)
test)
test)
Motivation
The CED survey results provide evidence that reduced motivation is
indeed viewed as one of the major inhibitors. One respondent who
estimated attitudes to have a 10% reduction in productivity, stated:
A small percentage of employees believe management is the
enemy; others have a philosophy of doing just enough to get
by; many have been spoiled by "soft" management.
In addition, a number of the respondents cited that the negative impact
of absenteeism on productivity is in the range of 5 to 10%.
Again, more detailed regression analyses were made for this
restraint because of its perceived seriousness.
A couple of points can be made concerning the effect of various
demographic characteristics on the magnitude of the problem:
1. The data shows a strong relationship between high
absenteeism and the use of layoff as the primary mechanism
for workforce reductions. (Although not statistically
significant in the above tables, when industry and location
variables were added in Table 4 the regression coeffient was
quite large (5.83) and highly significant.) This can be
explained by the tendency for workers to believe that if they
stretch out the work by being absent they will lengthen their
job continuity. It has often been suggested that just the
opposite relationship exists, that is, that workers should be
absent less in times of production declines due to fear of
disciplinary termination in that employers would prefer
discharging poor performers before laying off good workers.
However, with increased grievance machinery (contractual,
governmental, and in many cases employer instituted in
nonunion settings) employers find it more and more difficult
12
II
REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR MOTIVATION
(STD. ERRORS IN PARENTHESIS)
MOTIV
(1)
MEAN
S.D.
4.98
4.20
MOTI V
(2)
5.64
4.46
MOTIV
(3)
4.98
4.35
3.10
(1.13)
-. 01
(.03)
.06
(.03)
REDUCTION POLICY
.11 .004 .05
I coefficient
2 significant
3 significant
4 significant
and std. error are 103
at 10% level (one tailed
at 5% level (one tailed
at 2% level (one tailed
to discipline workers with poor absenteeism. This explains
why unionization remains the major factor in the above
analyses.
2. There also appears to be a strong relationship between
higher absenteeism and industries which are comprised of
significant numbers of blue collar workers.4 This finding
supports the claims of many work humanists who advocate
setting up all-salaried work structures, inclusive of
production and maintenance workers. As one of the survey
respondents stated:
All employees at our plant are paid on salary basis
which means that approved absences are paid for. This
is an excellent morale booster. Production employees
under our wage payment system are guaranteed the rate
of their scheduled job on a weekly basis. If they are
assigned to a higher pay job for a shift (8 hrs.) or
more, they are.paid the high rate. This provides more
flexibility in making work assignments and reduces
13
UNION
AGE
SIZE
MOTIV
(4)
5.64
4.30
3.37
(1.65)
MOTIV
(4)
5.64
4.28
3.00
(1.70)
-. 05
(.03)
.20
(.21)
-. 04
(.03)
1.41
(1.43)
.10 .15
test)
test)
test)
-training costs.
3. - The negative relationship between age of the plant and
absenteeism could loosely be viewed as evidence for the "new
values" argument if it is assumed that newer plants have
predominantly younger workers. However, Table 2 shows that
the frequency of motivational restraints increases for plants
in the 15 to 30 year range but decreases slightly in older
plants. One could still argue that "new values" are the root
of the problem because in this age range, workers who started
with the plant in its early years have retired and been
replaced by the younger breed. But many practitioners find
that absenteeism rates do not really vary significantly
across employee age groups, possibly because older workers
have a higher incidence of sickness and illness or the "new
values" have infiltrated all age groups.
Paid Time Off
One argument for the decline in productivity growth is that labor
costs are increasing faster than output partly because of increased pay
for time not worked. The data indicates that 56% of the respondents do
in fact view this as an inhibitor to productivity improvement.
Discussion will center on the two main types of paid time off:
holdiays and vacations.
Since both holidays and vacations have traditionally been viewed
as bread and butter goals for unions, it is not surprising that this
restraint is mentioned over twice as frequently in unionized plants
versus unorganized ones. In addition, since the magnitude of vacation
time (and often eligibility for paid sick days) is usually tied
directly to length of senioriy, it would be expected, as the data
supports, that older plants would view this as a more serious inhibitor
than newer ones. As one of the respondents cited:
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Due to long service of work force (28 years average)
extensive vacation time and holidays result in 20% yearly
non-presence or in effect a 4-day work week. Effect on
output per worker: 20%
Although not statistically significant, it is interesting to note
that this restraint was mentioned by half of the plants with less than
250 employees. The severity of this problem becomes more intense when
there are fewer workers who can cover for absent employees.
Government Regulations
Many Americans blame the government for many of our economic woes.
Indeed, most businessmen will claim that increased government
regulations are a major component of the productivity problem. The
issues concerning industrial relations are in the areas of OSHA, EPA,
EEOC, and ERISA.
Two interesting trends emerge from the survey data:
1. Managers are more than twice as likely to identify
government regulations as an inhibitor in firms which use
layoff as their primary vehicle for reducing employment
levels. One possible explanation for this is the constraints
which the equal employment regulation have placed on major
corporations, particularly those dependent on governmental
defense contracts (a major portion of the CED sample), in the
selection, placement, and termination of employees.
2. Unionization is not a factor in identification of
government regulations as a restraint in productivity
improvement. (The regression analysis even shows a negative
relationship, however, it is not statisitically significant.)
This is interesting in that unions have been one of the
driving forces behind much of the legislation. However,
since plant management in unionized facilities are used to
restraints or checks imposed by unions, they may not view
15
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governmental intervention into their personnel policies and
practices as any added constraint.
Business Conditions
This is the first topic which is totally comprised of write-ins by
respondents and therefore the frequency is rather low. In addition,
the regression analysis is not as relevant for this topic because it
includes a variety of different issues. But when mentioned, the
intensity was quite high. As a result, the discussion will be limited
to the two most frequently mentioned areas: volume and insufficient
resource dollars.
It stands to reason that if higher volumes are realized for a
given plant or enterprise, then there will be "economies of scale."
Higher volumes allow fixed costs to be spread over more and more output
and consequently the total unit costs will be lower as volume
increases. In a productivity sense this means that capital and labor
do not have to be increased proportionately as volume builds to higher
levels.
This point about productivity being related to volume can be seen
in the experience of many industries over the course of the business
cycle. Specifically, productivity is highest as volume grows towards
the capacity of the operation. Extra shifts can be added without a
corresponding increase in the resources required. However, as output
is expanded, the natural capacity of the operation can be exceeded with
overtime and the use of antiquated equipment to a point where
16
productivity may actually decline. Except for this limiting case, for
most of the range of utilization there is a positive relationship
between volume and productivity.
Examination of the productivity numbers for key industries over
the past two decades indicates that many of the industries that have
experienced a productivity deficit are precisely those industries that
have had a fall-off in volume of activity, such as automobiles, tires,
and shipbuilding.
Another problem associated with general business conditions is the
reluctance of corporate executives to update or invest in new equipment
or processes, especially in bad economic times. In a survey that was
conducted of a large number of businessmen who were asked the question,
"What are the major factors that explain low productivity?", 49% of
them gave "not enough capital" the first ranked position.5 As Table 2
shows, this hits those plants in the 15 to 30 year age range the
hardest because their age or vintage of equipment is reaching the end
of a typical machine life span and needs to be replaced.
Training
As with Business Conditions, this was a totally write-in topic and
therefore very low in relative frequency. What is interesting to note
about this general restraint is the very large negative regression
coefficents for the industrial dummy variables relative to the white
collar or service industries. This reflects the explosion and general
17
shortage of white collar technical personnel. It is also noteworthy
that the frequency of write-ins was greater in the western and central
states which most likely is a result of the move to the high tech areas
of the southwest and west coast.
Other Restraints
This grouping is a real mixed bag and therefore no conclusion or
trends can be drawn from the numbers. The only significance in
reporting its contents is to keep in mind the wide variety of factors
and issues which are included in management's perception of the
productivity inhibitors.
Conclusion
Once again the reader should be cautioned against drawing any firm
conclusions from this survey analysis. At best, some general trends or
hypotheses can be developed for further research. But as mentioned
earlier, the main question which must be asked in explaining America's
current productivity dilemma is whether or not the restraints cited by
the survey respondents have increased in intensity over the past few
years to a point where they can be considered contributing factors in
the current productivity decline. Comparing surveys from different
time periods which were designed for different purposes by different
researchers is always risky, but may begin to shed some light on this
question.
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In 1976, the Conference Board reported on a survey of 85 companies
which probed at the barriers to increased labor productivity. 6 Luckily,
the proportion of unionized firms in that study was relatively equal to
the CED survey, 66% versus 65%.
COMPARISON OF 1975 CONFERENCE BOARD SURVEY WITH 1981 CED SURVEY
CONFERENCE
BOARD CED
% %
(1) (2)
use of new technology 23.5 5.0
reorganization of work processes 50.6 38.1
narrow skill jurisdictions 67.1
subcontracting 58.8 34.4
crew size 41.2 31.1
safety rules 14.1 41.0
.production/quality standards 61.2 (3)
outmoded incentive plans 47.1 (3)
(1) # of companies considering it a significant problem
(2) # of plants identifying it as a productivity inhibitor
(3) volunteered as an inhibitor by two plants
As can be seen from the above table, many of the traditional
industrial relations restraints, such as use of new technology,
subcontracting, and crew size, have lessened as an inhibitor, but
flexibility by management in assigning jobs or rearranging job
classifications seems to have become more difficult in light of massive
employment losses. In addition, with the passage of more intensive
OSHA legislation, managers view an increased restraints in the area of
safety rules.
On the balance, however, it does not appear that there has been a
significant increase in industrial relations barriers to improved
19
---I-----
qaF
productivity. Although, improvements can always be made in this area
to help improve labor productivity, it does not appear that the blame
for the current U.S.. situtation can be even partically attributed to
industrial relations institutional arrangements.
20
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Notes
1. This assumes that there is a high correlation between corporate
workforce reduction policy and actual practice.
2. A counterarguement could be made that this is a survey bias
resulting from the probe at traditional industrial relations
institutional constraints, such as union work rules.
3. Harbinson, Frederick H., "Some Reflections on a Theory of
Labor-Management Relations", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol.
54, No. 1, February 1946.
4. This holds true in all blue collar industries except steel.
However, since the standard error is over twice the value the
coefficient, this should not be viewed as indicative of an exception to
the hypothesis.
5. Sentry Insurance, Perspectives on Productivity: A Global View,
survey conducted by Louis Harris and Associates, not dated.
6. Hershfield, David C., "Barriers to Increased Labor Productivity",
)} } , July 1976.
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TABLE 1: AVERAGE RESTRAINTS/FACILITY
MEAN S.D.
CATEGORIES
TOTAL (N=61) 4.3 2.4
INDUSTRY:
STEEL (14) 6.8 2.4
MFG (13) 4.5 2.4
COMM ( 7) 4.0 1.2
CONSUMER (13) 3.4 1.8
SERVICES (14) 2.8 1.6
REDUCTION POLICY:
LAYOFF (21) 5.8 2.5
OTHER (40) 3.6 2.0
LOCATION:
NORTH (23) 5.0 2.7
SOUTH (16) 3.6 1.9
WEST/CENT (18) 4.4 2.3
SIZE:
<250 (14) 3.6 1.7
250<X<1K (18) 3.4 1.7
1K<X<5K (19) 5.3 3.2
>5K (10) 5.2 2.0
AGE:
<15 (14) 3.2 2.3
15<X<30 (15) 5.3 2.1
>30 (15) 5.7 2.5
UNION:
YES (40) 5.3 2.3
NO (21) 2.6 1.6
PROD :
+ (36) 4.4 2.5
N.C. ( 7) 4.0 3.1
(11) 5.0 2.4
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TABLE 2: % OF PLANTS WITHIN EACH CATEGORY IDENTIFING RESTRAINT
CATEGORIES
WORK MOTIV-
CHANGE RULES TION
TIME GOVERN- BUSI- TRAIN-
OFF MENT NESS ING
TOTAL (N=61) 70 67 64 56 48 21 11
INDUSTRY:
STEEL
MFG
COMM
CONSUMER
SERVICES
(14)
(13)
( 7)
(13)
(14)
93
77
71
77
36
93 93
77 62
57 100
62 62
43 21
79
46
71
62
29
86 29
46 31
29 14
38 15
29 14
7 7
1 31
- 14
36 7
REDUCTION
LAYOFF
OTHER
LOCATION:
NORTH
SOUTH
WEST/CENT
POLICY:
(21)
(40)
(23)
(16)
(18)
86 76 90 76 71 19
63 63 50 45 35 23
78 74 70 61 48
56 44 63 56 63
67 72 67 56 39
1 10
13 13
17 4
31 13
22 22
SIZE:
<250
250<X<1K
1K<X<5K
>5K
(14)
(18)
(19)
(10)
57 50 50
72 72 39
79 74 79
70 70 100
50 36 21
39 39 22
63 53 21
80 70 20
29 7
11 6
5 21
- 10
50 43 57
87 73 87
93 87 73
50 50 21
73 40 40
73 60 20
14
7
7
83 85 78 68 48 23 8
48 33 38 33 48 19 19
13
20
15
5
PROD :
N.C.
(36)
( 7)
(11)
72 61 72 58 44 22
43 57 43 57 71 14
82 91 73 55 55 18
14 14
29 -
- 18
23
OTHER
11
26
6
AGE:
<15
15<X<30
>30
UNION:
YES
NO
(14)
(15)
(15)
(40)
(21)
II
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TABLE 3
MEAN RANKING OF RESTRAINS BY PLANTS WITH VARIOUS CHARACTERISTICS
........................
t _ _ _ (STD. DEVIATIONS IN PARENTHESIS)
WORK MOTIV- TIME GOVERN-
CHANGE RULES TION OFF MENT
BUSI- TRAIN-
NESS ING
CATEGORIES
5.10 8.36 4.98 3.72
(4.07) (7.33) (4.43) (3.58)
2.80
(3.64)
2.26
(4.68)
.80 .77
(2.37) (2.23)
INDUSTRY:
STEEL 5.93
(14) (4.46)
14.93
(7.10)
6.29
(3.60)
4.21 3.79
(2.78) (2.72)
3.07
(5.43)
-.14 .43
( .53) (1.60)
MFG 5.77 8.38 4.00
(13) (3.75) (5.61) (3.46)
COMM 5.43 5.14 9.43
( 7) (3.82) (5.49) (3.05)
4.00
(4.51)
4.86
(3.39)
2.54
(2.99)
2.00
(3.42)
2.77
(4.32)
1.00
(2.65)
.62 1.92
(2.22) (3.20)
- 1.14
( - ) (3.02)
CONSUMER
(13)
5.77 5.77
(3.35) (5.33)
5.54
(5.11)
4.08
(3.55)
2.23
(3.24)
1.38
(3.38) ( ) ( )
SERVICES
(14)
2.86 5.79
(4.40) (7.91)
REDUCTION POLICY:
5.90 11.33
(4.39) (8.37)
6.62
(3.46)
4.48 3.57 2.05
(2.99) (3.22) (4.62)
.43 .66
(1.57) (2.13)
OTHER 4.68
(40) (3.88)
6.80 4.13
(6.28) (4.67)
LOCATION:
NORTH 5.83
(23) (4.71)
10.04 5.30
(7.70) (4.26)
4.17 2.78 1.52
(3.76) (4.20) (3.40)
SOUTH 4.13
(16) (3.83)
WEST/CENT 4.50
(18) (3.65)
8.11
(6.88)
5.89
(5.23)
3.39
(3.22)
2.28 2.89 1.72
(3.23) (5.89) (3.34)
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TOTAL
(N=61)
OTHER
1.86
(3.70)
LAYOFF
(21)
2.07
(3.43)
3.00
(5.35)
2.43
(6.17)
2.79
(3.93)
.57
(2.14)
3.33
(3.83)
2.40
(3.82)
2.38
(4.77)
1.00
(2.70)
5.38
(7.16)
.83
(2.31)
4.31
(3.72)
4.06
(3.92)
.09
( .42)
3.88
(3.48)
1.70
(3.05)
3.19
(5.28)
1.00
(2.76) ( - )
.44
(1.89)
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TABLE 3 (CONTINUED)
4.57 5.36 4.50
(4.43) (6.16) (5.20)
3.57
(3.86)
2.29
(3.45)
3.07
(6.37)
2.14 .57
(3.55) (2.14)
250<X<1K
(18)
5.17 8.22 2.78
(3.45) (6.72) (3.70)
2.83 3.11 2.00 .94
(3.76) (4.79) (3.85) (2.75)
6.32 4.05 2.58
(4.66) (3.55) (3.08)
2.26
(4.82)
.11 1.47
( .46) (3.06)
7.10
(1.85)
4.90
(2.96)
4.21 3.64
(4.02) (3.89)
7.07
(4.54)
4.53
(3.16)
3.40
(2.80)
3.36
(3.67)
1.87
(2.88)
1.60
(3.41)
2.50
(5.29)
4.53
(6.33)
- .60
( - ) (1.90)
1.07
(2.73) ( - )
.47 .93
(1.81) (2.49)
>30 7.67 11.47 5.53
(15) (4.01) (6.17) (4.47)
5.00
(3.64)
2.60
(2.59)
1.73
(3.59)
.13 1.07
( .52) (2.28)
5.83 11.30
(3.84) (6.97)
6.05 4.38 2.20
(4.32) (3.41) (2.75
2.35 .43
(4.74) (1.68)
NO 3.71 2.76 2.95 2.48 3.95 2.10 1.52
(21) (4.22) (4.05) (3.97) (3.66) (4.79) (4.69) (3.25)
PROD :
+ 5.06
(36) (3.64)
2.14
(3.34)
N.C.
( 7)
-_ 7.00
(11) (5.18)
1NOTE: Time off
7.53
(7.45)
9.57
(9.47)
10.00
(4.96)
5.83
(4.61)
3.92
(3.61)
2.71 3.57
(3.50) (3.87)
5.27 3.73
(3.82) (3.74)
2.72
(3.93)
3.86
(3.29)
2.82
(3.06)
2.36
(4.82)
1.29
(3.40)
2.36
(5.55)
and other have a possible range of 0-9;
.86
(2.32)
2.57
(4.39)
.38
(1.75)
.86
(2.26)
( - )
1.45
( - ) (3.27)
government
and training range from 0-18; resistance to change,
motivation, and business conditions range from 0-27;
work rules ranges from 0-36.
and
25
SIZE:
<250
(14)
1K<X<SK
(19)
5.05
(3.94)
9.63
(7.82)
>5K
(10)
AGE:
<15
(14)
15<X<30
(15)
.28
(1.18)
5.80
(5.25)
4.00
(4.45)
5.07
(3.01)
10.40
(8.59)
4.07
(5.14)
9.07
(8.37)
UNION:
YES
(40)
.98
(2.44)
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TABLE 4: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
(STD. ERRORS IN PARENTHESIS)
WORK
CHANGE RULES
5.61
3.93
8.30
5.38
MOTIV- TIME
TION OFF
5.64
4.10
4.41
3.24
GOVERN-
MENT
2.59
2.87
BUSI- TRAIN-
NESS ING
2.93
5.12
.55
1.50
-1.69
(3.03)
5.83 5.60
(2.31) (1.83)
-1.11 4.05 2.52
(2.02) (2.77) (2.11)
1.03
(1.67)
2.33 -3.84 -. 79
(1.62) (2.89) (.85)
-1.26
(1.48)
3.04
(2.64)
1.67
(.77)
-.39
(.23)
.08
(.03)
-.87
(1.64)
-. 01
(.32)
.06
(.04)
.28
(.24)
-.06
(.03)
-. 35 .58
(2.24) (1.71)
-1.59 6.50 -. 22
(2.63) (3.60) (2.74)
.31
(.19)
-.03
(.03)
1.31
(1.35)
-2.05
(2.17)
.20 .18
(.17) (.31)
-. 02
(.02)
1.59
(1.20)
-. 05
(1.92)
.001 .14
(.09) (.11)
-. 02 -. 01
(.04) (.01)
2.14 .91
(2.14) (.63)
-. 02
(.02)
-1.54
( .80)
1.45 2.82 -1.59
(3.43) (1.00) (1.28)
-1.41 -. 38 .30
(1.75) (2.39) (1.82)
.12 .64
(1.44) (1.28)
1.99 10.82 -1.59
(3.25) (4.44) (3.39)
-2.94 2.98
(2.68) (2.38)
-4.58 -3.97 -.40
(4.24) (1.24) (1.58)
1.71 4.92 4.05
(2.52) (3.45) (2.63)
2.91 -.61 7.70
(3.19) (4.37) (3.33)
1.68 2.97
(2.40) (3.29)
.31 .59
3.28
(2.51)
.36
4.98 4.50
(2.08) (1.84)
5.00 3.12
(2.64) (2.34)
2.02
(1.98)
.37
2.75
(1.76)
.34
coefficient
significant
significant
significant
and std. err
at 10% level
at 5% level
at 2% level
or are 103
(one
(one
(one
tailed
tailed
tailed
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MEAN
S.D.
LAYOFF
UNION
.95
(2.21)
OTHER
.68
1.91
SIZE
AGE
SOUTH
WEST
-.11
(1.08)
1.34
(.98)
CENTRAL
STEEL
2.96
(2.28)
MFG
COMM
CON
.73
(.67)
-1.37
(.85)
R 2
-6.85
(3.29)
-10.11
(4.16)
-8.06
(3.13)
.28
-3.46
(.96)
-4.84
(1.22)
-4.11
(.92)
.53
1
2
3
4
1.34
(1.22)
.87
(1.55)
.28
(1.17)
.31
test)
test)
test)
"Beyond doubt, the greatest problem, the
danger, which above all others most threatens
not only the success, but the very existence
of the American Federation of Labor is the
question of jurisdiction."
Samuel Gompers, in his annual report to the
American Federation of Labor convention,
New Orleans, Louisiana, November 1902.
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